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Abstract 
The Use of Statutory Control by U.S. State Legislators: 
One Step Closer to a More Complete Understanding of Legislative Control of 
Bureaucrats 
By 
David Goodman 
Legislative scholars examining the use of statutory control to oversee and control 
bureaucrats have consistently found that the political environment influences the amount 
of policy-making discretion provided to bureaucrats in legislation. These studies 
however, have focused predominantly on statutory control decisions made by the U.S. 
Congress, an institutionally static legislature, or by U.S. state legislators in general 
legislation over a discrete period of time. These research designs severely limit our 
understanding of statutory control strategies in addition to the factors other than 
partisanship that influence legislative decisions. This study builds upon the prevailing 
research by examining a new dataset of statutory control decisions by state legislators in 
both general legislation and appropriations bills over six legislative sessions (1997-2007). 
More specifically, using enacted legislation pertaining to the Children's Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) from 1997-1998 through 2007-2008 across all 50 states, I examine how 
the political and institutional arrangements that vary across states influences statutory 
control decisions made by legislators, as well as further explore the substantive content of 
CHIP legislation to bring the discipline one step closer to a more complete understanding 
of statutory control of bureaucrats. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
In 2003, the Texas Department of Transportation (TXDOT) sold a transportation 
bill to state legislators as a way to build roads quickly and without public money. Eager 
to please their constituents with better transportation options and at minimal costs, 
legislators backed the legislation only to learn later that TXDOT hid their intentions to 
privatize toll roads and subsidize them through tax breaks and exemptions, low-interest 
loans, and grants. Legislators felt they were duped by the agency and sought to control 
what they believed to be an "imperious department" that threatened their objectives {The 
Texas Observer, Feb 23, 2007). 
In 2008, amid complaints by constituents and environmental groups about the 
potentially hazardous chemicals in consumer products and the lack of state oversight, 
California legislators provided the Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) 
broad authority over the issue. Acknowledging that they possessed a limited knowledge 
of hazardous chemicals and the procedures necessary to deal with them, legislators 
provided the DTSC with the discretion to regulate and ban hazardous chemicals used in 
consumer products, develop a panel of scientists to advise the department, and create a 
website to inform consumers {The Sacramento Bee, Aug 25, 2008). 
The relationships between legislators and bureaucrats highlighted in these 
examples have received significant scholarly attention in legislative studies. It is widely 
accepted that legislators who lack resources and information , like those in California, 
will rely on bureaucrats to assist and guide them in the development and implementation 
of policy due to their expertise and knowledge of specific policy areas. However, 
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bureaucrats, like legislators, possess preferences for policy outcomes that may differ from 
those of their legislative counterparts. In some cases, the differences in preferences are 
minimal and are not likely to significantly impact the legislative process or outcomes. 
Yet, in other instances, the differences may be substantial, as with the TXDOT. 
Legislators must find ways to balance the amount of discretion provided to bureaucrats 
with the ability to ensure that their preferred outcomes are realized. The research 
presented in this study examines these dilemmas, specifically the use of language in 
legislation, or statutory control, by legislators to control bureaucratic behavior and ensure 
the development and implementation of policy that is consistent with their intent. 
Despite the numerous mechanisms used by legislators to control and oversee 
bureaucrats (e.g. fire alarms, report and monitoring requirements, etc.), statutory 
language is often considered the most powerful tool possessed by legislators to change 
agency behavior (Wood & Waterman 1993; Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003) or as a 
signal of legislative dissatisfaction with the status quo (Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast 
1989; Bawn 1997; Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003). Not only are legislators able to 
shape bureaucratic behavior and ensure specific outcomes through legislative language, 
but they are also able to include many of the control mechanisms normally used outside 
of the legislative process (Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003). 
Most of what we know about legislative control strategies and the factors that 
influence decisions to engage in statutory control come almost exclusively from studies 
of the U.S. Congress (Moe 1987; McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll & 
Weingast 1987, 1989; Shipan 2004). However, Congress is a politically and 
institutionally static legislature that severely limits our understanding of legislative 
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control decisions as well as the effectiveness of statutory control (Huber, Shipan & 
Pfahler 2001; Volden 2002b; Gerber, Maestas & Dometrius 2005). As a result, scholars 
have begun to examine these issues in the U.S. states where political and institutional 
environments vary across states. Although the state-level studies have improved our 
understanding of the use of statutory control, even these designs are limited. 
As in congressional studies, state scholars have focused on the use of statutory 
language to control a single agency or group of similar agencies over a limited period of 
time. The most cited of the state-level studies is Huber & Shipan's (2002) Deliberate 
Discretion, which examines the adoption of Medicaid managed care legislation ("MMC") 
across the U.S. states. The authors find that the amount of discretion provided to agencies 
is influenced by the capacity of the legislature when different parties control the 
proposing chamber and the executive branch. Although other studies support these 
findings (Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Shipan 2004; but 
see Volden 2002b), I posit that previous studies have provided an incomplete assessment 
of statutory control decisions. 
The improvements made in this study are designed to expand upon the research of 
Huber & Shipan and the prevailing research on statutory control. In particular, this 
dissertation makes four main contributions to the literature. First, I develop and 
empirically test an expanded institutional model of statutory control that expands upon 
previous research by using measures of legislative capacity and legislative veto that more 
appropriately capture the variation that exist across U.S. state legislatures. Additionally, I 
incorporate additional measures that account for the influence of other institutional actors 
such as the governor and the bureaucracy. 
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The second contribution of this study is the examination of statutory control 
decisions as a two-stage process. Although previous studies of statutory control only 
examine the decision by the legislature to engage in control and the amount of discretion 
in general legislation (Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Huber & Shipan 2002; Volden 
2002b; Huber 2004), I posit that this only provides half of the statutory control story. 
More specifically, once legislators decide to engage in statutory control, they must then 
decide where to impose the control - in general legislation or appropriations bills. I argue 
that this is a rational calculation on the part of legislators based on the desire to enact 
policies that governors will not alter or veto. Examining statutory control as a two-stage 
process provides a more realistic control environment, while incorporating a control 
mechanism that is widely accepted as a viable bureaucratic control (see Fenno 1966; 
Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast 1989; Ting 2001; Dometrius & Wright 2006). 
Thirdly, I create and use of a new dataset of statutory control decisions by 
legislators across all 50 states pertaining to the Children's Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP). While previous studies merely count the amount of words in statutes (Huber, 
Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Huber & Shipan 2002), this dataset measures mandates - the 
words and mechanisms used by legislators that specifically refer to the CHIP policy 
thereby eliminating the superfluous non-policy related language that often accompanies 
legislation. Coding the mandates allows me to replicate Huber & Shipan's research, but 
more importantly, I develop a new measure of legislative control based on the substantive 
content of CHIP legislation and the specific language legislators use to convey their 
policy intent. The new variable, total control, provides a more accurate assessment of 
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legislative policy intent and significantly improves our understanding of statutory control 
strategies across states and over time. 
The dataset coded for this study provides a final contribution - the ability to 
examine statutory control decisions over time. Previous studies have focused primarily on 
snapshots of statutory control decisions or examined decisions over a discrete period of 
time (see Clingermayer 1991; Potoski 1999; de Figueiredo & Vanden Burgh 2004). 
However, this design does not provide us with a complete understanding of the statutory 
control process or the use of specific control strategies. Specifically, this design cannot 
tell us whether state legislators impose statutory control once and hope for the best, or 
whether decisions are based on changes to the political environment, the budget, the 
salience of the policy area, or simply boilerplate legislation, where identical bills are 
introduced with each new legislative session. Evidence of legislators writing mandates 
that are more detailed after a shift in legislative control might provide evidence that 
partisanship affects these decisions. However, if an investigation over time reveals this as 
a consistent control strategy despite the political environment, changes to the budget, or 
salience of the policy, the previous findings may be less compelling. 
The contributions of this study will not only build on previous research and 
provide a more appropriate model of legislative control of bureaucrats, but it will also 
provide legislative scholars with a more complete understanding of the use of statutory 
control and the factors that influence its strategies and decisions. 
5 
Do Institutions Matter? 
The institutional focus of this dissertation and the attempt to assess whether 
institutions matter is not uncommon in political science1. Political scholars often debate 
whether political actors shape institutions to meet their personal and collective needs (e.g. 
securing pork for their district, protecting preferences, etc.), or whether the institutions 
themselves shape human behavior and the interactions between them. However, simply 
stating that institutions shape human behavior or interactions between individuals is of 
little value if the phenomena were unobservable or not empirically tested (Mezey 1993; 
Gamm & Huber 2002; Volden 2002b). 
Although much has been learned because of studies examining the development 
and structure of institutions by rational choice theorists (see Smith 2000) and new 
institutionalists (see March & Olsen 1984)2, most of this research has studied institutions 
on the national level, primarily the U.S. Congress (see above). As mentioned previously, 
the U.S. Congress is static institution - a single legislature with minimal turnover in 
members, relatively stable rules and enduring institutional arrangements (Gamm & Huber 
2002). As a result, institutional studies focusing on Congress severely hinder our 
understanding of the effects of institutions generally and our understanding of how 
different arrangements affect political behavior and strategies more specifically (Mezey 
1993; Hamm & Squire 2001; Polsby & Schickler 2002). 
Many scholars believe that for institutions to matter, we must be able to compare 
them in different settings and under different conditions in order to adequately assess 
1
 See Shepsle & Weingast 1981; Weingast & Marshall 1988; Moe 1988; Miller 1992, to name a few. 
2
 Rational choice theorists claim that political actors play a significant role in shaping institutions to meet 
their individual and collective needs; while new institutionalists claim that legislative structure shapes 
individuals. Riker (1980), in so many words, claims that both claims are correct. 
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their consequences and impact on other political phenomena (e.g. actors and other 
institutions) (see Epstein & O'Hallorn 1999; Gamm & Huber 2002; Volden 2002b; 
Squire & Hamm 2005). The U.S. states provide us with the variation necessary to 
accomplish this goal, and as a result have received significant scholarly attention 
(Morehouse & Jewell 2004; Squire & Hamm 2005; Volden 2005). Prior to discussing 
how this dissertation brings institutions back into the study of legislative control of 
bureaucracies, I will briefly discuss how two institutions - legislative professionalism and 
term limits - have influenced political behavior and strategies. 
The Institutional Impact of Legislative Professionalism 
Although numerous definitions for legislative professionalism have surfaced over 
the years (Grumm 1971; Mooney 1994; Clucas 1995; Rosenthal 1998), a consensus 
centers around the transition of the institution to become more like the U.S. Congress, as 
measured by member pay, number of days in session and level of staff support (Squire & 
Hamm 2005). U.S. states vary significantly in these factors and are thus classified 
according to their level of professionalism: amateur (e.g. low professionalized), hybrid 
(e.g. moderately professionalized), or professional (e.g. highly professionalized). 
The degree that a state legislature is professionalized has been found to 
significantly impact the behavior of legislators. Rosenthal (1998) finds that the 
professionalization of state legislatures has led to a decline in turnover which, in turn, has 
diminished teamwork and increased incentives for legislators to work alone in order to 
credit claim and improve re-election chances (see also Morehouse 1996; Brace & Ward 
2000). Similarly, in an examination of the transition from state legislatures to the U.S. 
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House, Berkman (1993) posits that legislators from more professionalized legislatures are 
more likely to pursue a mastery of public policies that are relevant to their state 
jurisdictions. This finding is consistent with Maestas (2003) that suggests that 
professionalism attracts more ambitious members and thus responsive to their districts 
and constituents. Berry, Berkman & Schneidermann (2000) find that professionalism 
institutionalizes and insulates members from external shocks, thus securing them and 
extending their careers (see also Squire, Hamm, Hedlund & Moncrief 2004). 
The Institutional Impact of Term Limits 
An additional institutional factor that influences political behavior and strategies 
is legislative term limits. With its rapid diffusion across 18 states beginning in the early 
1990s, legislative term limits were designed to limit the maximum number of years an 
elected official could serve in a particular office. Although initial studies were 
speculative, political scholars anticipated that they would dramatically effect the 
composition of legislatures and the behavior of its members as well as significantly 
influence the electoral arena and policy outcomes (Powell 2000; Carey, Niemi & Powell 
2000; Peery & Little 2003). Like the level of legislative professionalism, term limits 
differed across states. While some states possessed no limits on legislative careers, others 
varied in the amount of years an elected official could serve (e.g. 6, 8, or 12 years) and 
the nature of limits (e.g. lifetime or temporary ban from re-entry). 
Research examining the impact of term limits has also found a significant impact 
on the strategies and behavior of legislators. In an investigation of state legislative 
careers, Kousser (2003) finds that states with term limits create a "non-iterated" game in 
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which members, who once looked solely at party leadership for guidance on policy and 
reelection, are now forced to do much of the legislative work on their own. The study 
concludes that term limits provide members with less time to make a name for 
themselves within the chamber or initiate policy (see also Hodson 1995). In another 
study, Moncreif & Thompson (2001) find that members in term limited states will leave 
their present legislative seats early when an opportunity for advancement to another 
office arises. This result was challenged, however, by Meinke & Hasceke (2003) that 
suggests that term limits only impacted the incentive structure of legislators in 
moderately professionalized legislatures (see also Fiorina 1994). 
The imposition of term limits in the U.S. states has also influenced the attention 
legislators dedicate to their constituents. Through personal interviews with legislators 
across all 50 U.S. states, Carey, Moncrief, Niemi & Powell (2003) report that legislators 
spend less time on district work (e.g. parochial policy, constituency services) and more 
time developing and implementing general policies that reach a wider constituency in 
anticipation of their next elected office (see also Copeland & Rausch 1991; Hibbing 
1991; Carey, Niemi & Powell 2000). Chen & Niou (2006), however, find that term limits 
"reign in" legislators and force them to be more attentive to the needs of their 
constituents and pursue policies closer to the median voter. 
Legislative professionalism and term limits are but two examples of institutional 
factors that influence the behavior and strategies of political actors and thus evidence that 
institutions do matter.3 Based on these studies, we would anticipate that the differences in 
institutional environments that exist across U.S. state legislatures would influence 
3
 Similar institutional impacts on legislative behavior and strategies can be found in studies of the strength 
of legislative committee systems across U.S. states (see Francis 1985a; Hamm & Hedlund 1990, 1994; 
Hamm, Hedlund & Martorano 2005, 2007). 
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statutory control decisions made by legislators. As a result, this dissertation brings 
institutions back into the study of statutory control and attempts to determine if 
institutions matter in this context as it does in those discussed above. If similar statutory 
control decisions are made despite the institutional arrangements, then we can be more 
confident that Huber & Shipan (2002) are correct; that the institutions are secondary to 
partisanship in understanding the use of statutory language to control bureaucracies. 
However, if we find different legislative strategies and behavior based on the institutional 
arrangements, we can be more confident that institutions do matter, and our expanded 
institutional model succeeds in bringing the discipline a step closer to a more complete 
understanding of legislative control of bureaucracies. 
The Importance of Legislative Control of Bureaucracies 
Aside from the theoretical justifications of studying statutory control, this study is 
an important undertaking for a number of other reasons. One issue of particular 
importance concerns the motivation of legislative abdication of policy responsibility to 
bureaucracies. More specifically, why do legislators delegate the policy-making authority 
entrusted upon them by voters to non-elected bureaucrats who have demonstrated the 
ability to not only resist legislative control (Wood 1988; Balla 1998) and behave 
autonomously (Potoski 1999; Shipan 2004), but also influence the development of policy 
(Ruhil & Teske 2003; Meier & O'Toole 2006)? Initially, the decision to delegate to 
bureaucrats seems understandable. Like the California example at the beginning of the 
chapter, legislators who lack information and expertise, and do not have sufficient 
resources (e.g. time, staff) to dedicate to all of society's policy demands, will delegate 
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policy-making authority to bureaucrats who possess time, resources, and the knowledge 
of the policy area. In this scenario, bureaucrats perform a valuable policy service by 
providing legislators with information and time to dedicate to other responsibilities, as 
well as significantly lowering the costs of policy development and implementation4. The 
concern over abdication arises, however, when legislators continue to delegate this 
authority when they are not hindered by a lack of information, time or resources. 
Although some scholars consider this type of abdication a welcome alternative to 
policy-making authority in the hands of self-interested and self-serving politicians (see 
Hibbing & Theis-Morse 2002), others perceive it as a threat to a basic tenet of 
representative democracy, a principle in which voters expect the politicians that they 
elect to be the vehicles of policy formation, adoption, and maintenance (see Stewart 
1975; Fisher 1985; Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991). Combine this view with the already 
tarnished reputation elected officials have as a result of the frequency of governmental 
scandals, and the perceived increase in influence of special interests in the policy-making 
arena, and the abdication of policy responsibility to bureaucrats by legislators looks even 
more questionable. 
Understanding legislative motivations to delegate and the amount of discretion 
will undoubtedly shed some light on which of these two extremes are closer to the truth. 
Previous attempts to investigate legislative motivations for abdication at the federal level, 
however, have revealed that decisions are based on necessity and are unavoidable due to 
institutional constraints (see Ogul 1976; Lowi 1979; Ornstein, Mann & Malbin 1990; 
Potsoski 1999; Reenock & Poggione 2004), the differences in the salience and 
4
 This is especially true for state legislatures that sought help from bureaucracies as a result of the 
devolution of federal policy that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s (Weber & Brace 1999; Barrileaux & 
Berkman 2003; Squire & Hamm 2005). 
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complexity of the issue area (McCubbins 1985; Gromley 1986; Ringquist, Worsham & 
Eisner 2003), or the result of partisanship (Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Ringquist, 
Worsham & Eisner 2002). As mentioned previously, the validity of these results are 
suspect due to the static nature of the U.S. Congress. Examining this question using the 
differences in political and institutional environments in U.S. legislatures will provide me 
with the variation needed to determine the impact of these factors on decisions by 
legislators to abdicate authority. More specifically, examining abdication decisions by 
state legislators will help us to determine whether elected officials are "playing it safe," 
continually deferring to bureaucrats regardless of issue area or partisanship. Studying 
these decisions can also tell us whether legislators engage in statutory control based on 
the institutional arrangements, partisanship, or whether they only do so when a problem 
or scandal reaches a level of political discourse and compels them to act. Having this 
information will not only provide voters with a better understanding of their elected 
officials but more importantly for this study, it will allow us to better understand 
legislative intent and the relationship between legislators and bureaucrats. 
An additional issue that is raised by studying legislative use of statutory control 
involves the influence of other institutional actors in development and implementation of 
policy, specifically the executive branch. The influence of the executive influence in the 
legislative arena is well documented in political science. In particular, scholars have 
examined the impact of presidential approval ratings and popularity on their legislative 
success in the U.S. context (Neustadt 1960; Bond & Fleischer 1990; Covington, Wright 
& Kenney 1995; Canes-Wrone 2001; Binder & Maltzman 2002), in cross-national studies 
(see Shugart & Carey 1992; Mainwaring & Shugart 1997; Cox & Morgenstern 2001), 
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and at the state level where research has examined the influence of gubernatorial 
"formal" or constitutional powers (Bernick 1979; Clynch & Lauth 1991; Beyle 1996; 
Hall 2002; Barrilleaux & Berkman 2003), as well as "informal" or personal powers 
(Jewel 1962; Beyle 1983; Sigelman & Dometrius 1985; Ferguson 2003). These studies 
suggest that legislators do not make policy decisions in a vacuum and, as a result, are 
likely to develop strategies in anticipation of executive influence in legislation through 
their formal and informal powers. 
In terms of the use of statutory control, governors vary in their ability to alter both 
general legislation and appropriations bills (e.g. the scope of their veto power, or their 
ability to transfer or alter funds, and reorganize departments or agencies, influence the 
budget). Yet, the motivations of governors are difficult to ascertain; is their policy-
making behavior simply a consequence of the institutional environments within their 
state or do they engage in policy-making based on partisanship despite their capacity to 
influence legislation? Or, like legislators, do governors only engage in policy-making 
when they are compelled to do so? Studying different statutory control decisions by 
legislators that confront executives with varying gubernatorial powers in the policy-
making arena will not only provide us with a better understanding of legislative 
decisions, but it will also allow us to better understand those made by governors as well. 
Plan of the Study 
The goal of this dissertation is to assess the impact of the political and 
institutional environments that vary across the U.S. states on the amount of discretion 
imposed in CHIP legislation using a new database of statutory control decisions by 
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legislators in all 50 U.S. state legislatures. Specifically, this study answers the following 
theoretical and empirical questions: to what extent do state legislators engage in the use 
of statutory language to control the behavior and actions of bureaucrats? Given the 
decision to engage in statutory control, do legislators impose such control in general 
legislation or in appropriations bills? What factors influence the decision of state 
legislators to engage in statutory control of bureaucracies? 
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework for the dissertation - the principal-
agent theory ("PA" model). Although this dissertation does not deviate from this 
theoretical framework, I believe that it is important to review the theory - its premise, its 
origin and its application in order to understand the challenges and hurdles legislators 
face in attempting to control and oversee bureaucrats. In particular, I examine the 
problems legislators, as principals, must overcome in order to ensure that bureaucrats, 
their agents, achieve their preferred policy outcomes: divergent policy preferences, 
asymmetric information and the costs associated with both obtaining information and 
controlling bureaucrats. I posit that the presence of these problems adversely affects the 
interactions principals have with their agents and thus increases the principal's incentive 
to utilize control and oversight mechanisms to ensure that their agents behave in a 
manner consistent with their intent. In developing this argument, I review the literature 
addressing these problems and evaluate each in terms of the PA relationship between 
legislators and bureaucrats. In addition, I address the issues of political costs and the 
impact of the political and institutional arrangements that are unique to this particular PA 
relationship. I also address criticisms of the PA framework as it has been applied to the 
PA relationship between legislators and bureaucrats. 
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The chapter continues by addressing how legislators, given the problems and 
challenges they face in their relationships with bureaucrats, are able to control and 
oversee bureaucratic behavior and ensure the legislature's preferred outcomes. To answer 
this question, I review the literature surrounding legislative control of bureaucracies and 
address how theoretical questions and mixed empirical results caused "shifts" in the 
literature that led to an institutional focus of legislative control and ultimately a 
concentration on the use of statutory control in U.S. State legislators. 
Chapter 3 provides a more detailed examination of focus on legislative use of 
statutory language to control and oversee bureaucrats. In particular, this chapter discusses 
the origin of the use of the mechanism in addition to its development in congressional 
studies and its evolution to U.S. state legislatures. I review the variation in political and 
institutional environments that exists across the U.S. states. This dialogue stresses the 
importance of these differences in assessing the effectiveness of statutory control as well 
as understanding legislative decisions that involve control and oversight of bureaucrats. I 
highlight Huber & Shipan's (2002) Deliberate Discretion as an example of an attempt to 
assess the impact of the political and institutional environments on the ability of 
legislators to control and oversee bureaucracies, but ultimately suggest that their model is 
incomplete. Building this argument, I present my expanded model of legislative control 
of bureaucracies and show how it both incorporates and expands upon Huber & Shipan's 
(2002) model in order to take the discipline a step closer to an understanding of 
legislative control of bureaucracies. The chapter concludes with a discussion of my 
expanded empirical model and the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical chapters. 
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Chapter 4 focuses specifically on the motivation, development, and measurement 
of my two dependent variables, mandate length and amount of control. In particular, I 
begin the chapter with a discussion of the the Children's Health Insurance Program 
("CHIP"). In this section, I discuss the choice of CHIP legislation, the data itself, and 
address why the adoption, implementation, and timing of CHIP legislation is ideal for 
this type of inquiry in U.S. state legislatures. Following the discussion of the data, I 
provide an in depth analysis of each dependent variable. 
Chapter 5 is the first of two chapters examining the variation in my dependent 
variables. Chapter 5 focuses exclusively on mandate length, detailing the differences 
across states in the amount of CHIP bills enacted, mandates produced, and the amount of 
words pertaining to mandates. The chapter also examines the variation in mandate length 
that exists in both general legislation and appropriations bills, as well as over time both 
across states and within specific states. The chapter concludes by analyzing a mixed 
effects model which provides information about which of my independent variables 
might provide the most explanatory power. 
Chapter 6 replicates the analysis in chapter 5 only using my second dependent 
variable, total control. Although I examine the direct measure of total control, the chapter 
focuses primarily on the variation that exists in the factors that make up total control, 
specifically, procedural, policy, and both mandates, and the additional control 
mechanisms included in mandates to further constrain bureaucrats. I argue that these 
factors contribute much more to our knowledge and understanding of statutory control 
decisions and the strategies employed by legislators than a simple measure based on 
length of a mandate. These factors are based on the substantive content of legislation and 
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allow me to observe what aspects of the policy are important to legislators, how 
legislators limit discretion, and the costs they are willing to incur to control bureaucrats. 
Chapter 7 is the first of two main empirical chapters that examine the causes of 
the variation I observe in my dependent variables. Chapter 7 focuses specifically on 
mandate length. The chapter begins by re-introducing Huber & Shipan's and my 
empirical model, and the hypotheses to be tested. I then begin building my model of 
statutory control starting with the partisanship and leading to Huber & Shipan's model. 
The second empirical chapter replicates chapter 7 only focusing on the causes of 
the variation in total control and the amount of control imposed in factors that make up 
the variable, procedural, policy, and both mandates. Additionally, I assess the causes of 
the variation in the use of additional control mechanisms, specifically time constraints 
and approval requirements. 
My final chapter concludes the dissertation by summarizing the major findings 
and evaluates how well I have answered my main research questions. I discuss possible 
or necessary alterations to this study and prescribe potential avenues of future research to 
take us even closer to a more complete understanding of legislative control of 
bureaucracies. 
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Chapter 2: 
Legislative Control of the Bureaucracies: Theoretical Foundations & Literature 
Review 
Bringing institutions back into an examination of legislative control of 
bureaucracies requires a theoretical framework capable of explaining how legislators 
successfully delegate policy-making authority to bureaucrats while ensuring their 
preferred policy preferences are realized. Despite an early focus on linking legislative 
preferences with bureaucratic outcomes (see Weingast & Moran 1983; Weingast 1984), 
legislative scholars have consistently relied upon the principal-agent framework 
(henceforth "PA"), a variant of the rational choice theory, to provide more than a simple 
link between legislative influence and bureaucratic compliance (Mitnick 1973; Pertshuk 
1982; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987; Huber & Shipan 2002; Worsham & Gattrell 
2005). The power of the PA framework lies in its ability to explain the factors that 
frustrate the relationship between principals and their agents - divergent preferences, 
information asymmetries, and costs of control - as well as its ability to demonstrate how 
and to what degree institutions influence the ability of legislators to control and oversee 
bureaucracies (Moe 1987; Wood & Waterman 1991). 
Based on the rational choice framework, the literature examining legislative 
control of bureaucracies has evolved to its present comparative focus, examining the 
impact of the variation in U.S. states, because studies have built upon the perceived 
theoretical and empirical deficiencies in the research (see Spence 1997; Balla 1998; 
Shipan 2004). Although these studies have further improved our understanding of the 
impact of institutions, their interactions with bureaucracies, and the policies that they 
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produce, a review of the literature will show that despite moving in the right direction, 
research in this area remains incomplete. 
This chapter has two distinct goals. The first is to discuss the theoretical 
framework for the study of legislative control of bureaucracies. I review the PA 
framework by addressing its origins, its application to political relationships, and 
perceived shortcomings of the theory5. In particular, I examine the central problems that 
frustrate the relationship between principals and agents - preference divergence, 
information asymmetries, and costs of control, and apply them to the PA relationship 
between legislators and bureaucrats. The second goal is to provide a general overview of 
the literature pertaining to legislative control of bureaucracies, from the debate between 
administrative and congressional dominance, to a focus on the determinants of legislative 
control. I conclude by addressing how this research and its shortcomings have led to a 
predominant focus on the use of statutory control to control and oversee bureaucrats. 
The Principal-Agent Dilemma: Origin & Problems 
The PA framework originated in economic studies where scholars sought to 
explain the contractual relationship between the buyer ("principal") and seller ("agent") 
of goods or services specifying the requirements of each in order to fulfill their 
contractual obligations (see Perrow 1986)6. In particular, economic research focused on 
5
 Although not all research examining legislative control of bureaucracies classifies their studies as PA 
relationships, most studies generally utilize a rational choice framework to examine the incentives control 
and oversight. I posit that these two approaches are not mutually exclusive and both "speak from the same 
book" to examine the purposeful action or inaction of a rational actor to influence the behavior of another. 
6
 These problems are addressed by Jensen & Meckling (1976) in their examination of the ownership 
structure of corporations. The authors posit that the problems occur as a result of buyers and sellers 
possessing different attitudes toward risk (see also Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen 1983). Alchain & Demsetz 
(1972), who build upori Coase's (1937) discussion of organizations and the efficiencies associated with 
hierarchical development, also address the issue of insufficient information on the part of decision-making 
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the cooperation between parties to a contract, the problems that with divergent 
preferences and division of labor, and the attempts by buyers to control the seller's who 
were thought to be driven by their own interests and made decisions with information 
only imperfectly known to the buyer (see Mitnick 1973; Ross 1973; Moe 1987) . 
The focus on preferences and goals of those in power ("principals") and those that 
possess both information and expertise ("agents") has also provided a foundation for 
scholars interested in explaining political relationships (Weber 1958; Moe 1987; 
Worsham & Gattrell 2005)8. The PA framework is primarily concerned with addressing 
and resolving three central problems associated with the relationship between principals 
and their agents: preference divergence, information asymmetries, and the costs 
associated with the control of agents. It is widely accepted that the existence of these 
problems create substantial hurdles for principals in their attempts to achieve their 
preferred policy outcomes (Pertshuk 1982; Moe 1987; Calver, McCubbins & Weingast 
1989; Bawn 1995; Potoski 1999; Gerber, Maestas & Dometrius 2005). In particular, the 
presence of these problems adversely affects the interactions principals have with their 
agents and thus increases the principal's incentive to utilize control and oversight 
mechanisms to ensure that their agents behave in a manner consistent with their intent. 
managers in a firm. The authors evaluate the problems that develop as a result of managers not being able 
to effectively observe or determine which of their agents is contributing to profits (see also Simon 1955; 
Williamson 1975). 
7
 Some research argues that the economic framework does not translate well to political relationships. Moe 
(1987) finds the transition from the economic model to be fraught with peril given problems of translation 
and applicability. Wood (1988) suggests that political relationships involving bureaucrats do not possess 
the same incentives as employees in a firm (see also Mitnick 1986). Waterman & Meier (1998) posit that 
preferences for both legislators and bureaucrats change or are altered over time as a result of changes to the 
institutional and political environments as well as external relationships (pg 176). 
8
 Political scholars utilized the PA framework to examine presidential decisions to use force (Chubb 1985; 
Downs & Rocke 1994), the influence of interest groups on bureaucratic action (Moe 1989; Banks & 
Weingast 1992), and decisions between different levels of the judiciary (Songer, Segal & Cameron 1994). 
Much of the early political PA research focused on interactions involving elected officials and bureaucrats 
attempting to assess whether political control of bureaucracies was possible (Wilson 1887; Mitnick 
1973;Weingast & Moran 1983; Weingast 1984). 
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Preference Divergence 
The first problem associated with PA relationships assumes that principals and 
agents possess different preferences for policy procedures and outcomes9. The reason for 
this assumption is fairly straight forward: if principals and agents share similar 
preferences then the incentive for principals to control the actions of their agents and 
attempt to limit their discretion is minimized significantly, if not eliminated altogether. 
PA research has consistently found that bureaucrats have their own preferences for 
procedures and outcomes (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987; Bawn 1997; Huber & 
Shipan 2002; Gerber, Maestas & Dometrius 2005) and, if desired also posses the ability 
to influence the development and implementation of those policies (Potoski 1999; Ruhil 
& Teske 2003; Shipan 2004; Meier & O'Toole 2006). Yet, if their preferences are 
consistent with those of the legislature, then the uncertainty surrounding the actions and 
goals of the bureaucracy is alleviated. As a result, legislators can feel more secure 
providing policy-making authority to bureaucrats and limiting (if not eliminating) the 
need to engage in statutory control. In the event of divergent policy preferences, the 
incentive for legislators to control the bureaucrats is increased. Legislators will feel less 
secure about delegating extensive policy-making authority knowing that they not only 
have the ability and incentive to influence legislation. 
9
 It is important to point out that despite similar preferences for policy outcomes, legislatures might still 
decide to engage in statutory control to ensure the use of specific procedures. This point will be developed 
further in the next section, but legislatures are likely to require bureaucracies to use particular procedures in 
order to appease constituents and credit claim (e.g. hold hearings), or simply to protect their political or 
party interests (McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987). 
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Asymmetric Information 
The second assumption derived from the PA framework assumes that agents 
possess an informational advantage over their principals (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 
1987; Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991; Worsham & Gattrell 2005). Asymmetric information 
on the part of bureaucrats involves both information about themselves (e.g. their 
capabilities, experience and expertise) as well as the specific area in which they 
specialize (e.g. sources of information, feasible and effective procedures and outcomes). 
In the relationship between legislators and bureaucrats, bureaucratic knowledge and 
expertise benefits legislators in the development and implementation of policy. However, 
when confronted with divergent policy preferences, the information disadvantage create 
additional problems for legislators who must continue to delegate policy-making 
authority to bureaucrats, but must also find ways to control and oversee their actions to 
ensure their preferred outcomes (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987). In particular, 
asymmetric information causes problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, and 
unintended policy outcomes. 
The problem of adverse selection, or hidden or private information, involves the 
inability of principals to determine whether their agents have adequately represented 
themselves in terms of their capabilities, expertise or experience10. In terms of the PA 
relationship between legislators and bureaucrats, the problems of hidden and private 
information are alleviated over time because of repeated interactions between the two 
Hidden information involves principals' not knowing specific information about their agents - whether 
they have misrepresented their capabilities (i.e. lazy, unqualified, risk averse) or their experience in a 
specialized area. Private information involves principals lacking information possessed by their agents 
regarding the feasible and effective processes and procedures for achieving goals in their specialized area 
(see Moe 1984; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987). Agents are policy experts and are likely to be at the 
forefront of advancements in the field (Moe 1985; Gromley 1986). It would therefore be reasonable to 
expect that agents would possess the most accurate information about the policy area and the procedures 
that are most feasible and effective. 
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actors. For example, the prevalence and influence of sub-governments (e.g. iron triangles, 
policy subsystems), have structured and solidified the relationship between legislators 
and bureaucrats. These institutions have enabled legislators to learn about bureaucratic 
capabilities and experiences and subsequently obtain information about the feasible and 
effective procedures in a specific policy area (see Heclo 1978; Kingdon 1984; Hamm 
1986; Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Sabatier 1999). 
Although a certain degree of uncertainty is likely to remain as a result of changes 
to the political environment and external relationships (Waterman & Meier 1998), the 
technical nature of the policy area (Bawn 1997; Potoski 1999; Volden 2002b), or the 
ability of bureaucrats to be at the forefront of policy innovations and advancement (Moe 
1985; Gromley 1986), much of these information deficiencies are likely to be alleviated. 
Based on these assumptions, the more important problem for legislators as principals is 
their inability to observe the hidden actions of bureaucrats, or the moral hazard problem. 
The moral hazard problem stems from the belief that principals cannot adequately 
monitor or verify that their agents are behaving in a manner that is consistent with their 
intent. In particular, agents with their own policy preferences may purposely hide or 
conceal their actions in order act opportunistically and achieve their own goals. In terms 
of the PA relationship between legislators and bureaucrats, bureaucrats are likely to 
engage in various types of opportunistic behavior such as shirking, bureaucratic drift, or 
exploitation - all of which result in saved costs and increased payoffs for bureaucrats (see 
McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987; Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991; Waterman & Meier 
1998; Worsham & Gattrell 2005)11. 
1
' Shirking involves an agent engaging in behavior that is risky or intended to cut corners in order to save 
time and resources and thus their profits. "Bureaucratic drift" involves an agent using their knowledge and 
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Although divergent preferences intensify the problem of moral hazard, the 
inability of legislators to observe bureaucratic action is still a concern even when the two 
political actors share similar policy preferences. Waterman & Meier (1998) argue that 
although bureaucrats possess policy preferences, they are primarily concerned with 
maximizing their budget: not only obtaining funds and resources but, also minimizing 
their expenses to retain as much funding and resources as possible (pg 176). It is likely 
that, despite possessing similar policy goals as the legislature, bureaucrats will choose 
procedures and processes that minimize their expenditures while allowing them to 
achieve their preferred ends. These choices may not be preferred by legislators who, in 
addition to their policy preferences, have preferences for re-election (see Fenno 1971; 
Mayhew 1974) and blame-avoidance (see Fiorina 1982a). As a result, legislators would 
like to shape bureaucratic behavior in a manner that satisfies their constituents but, at the 
same time, avoid blame for failed policies or unintended adverse policy consequences 
(see McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987). 
The problem of unintended policy outcomes is of particular importance to this 
study. Implemented policies often result in outcomes that were not anticipated by 
legislators (see Clingermayer 1991; Waterman & Meier 1998). Unanticipated events may 
be the result of a state's financial windfall, a change in technology, acts of the judiciary, 
or even acts of nature (e.g. natural disasters). In these situations legislators will possess 
an incentive to re-visit and alter the policy in order to adjust for (or take advantage of) the 
particular event. 
expertise to develop and implement policies that drift from the legislature's preferred outcome to their 
preferred outcome (Spence 1997; Balla 1998; Huber & Shipan 2002). Exploitation involves bureaucrats 
taking advantage of the favorable strategic position in which they have been placed. 
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Although in some instances unintended consequences will affect legislators and 
bureaucrats similarly (e.g. financial windfall), it is likely that the results are zero-sum, 
where the benefit to one results in the detriment to another. In these instances, divergent 
policy preferences and asymmetric information further compel legislators to oversee the 
actions of bureaucrats as well as utilize mechanisms to control or shape their behavior. 
Costs of Control 
The informational advantage held by agents, the threat of their opportunistic 
behavior, and the demand of non-policy related preferences further increase the 
incentives for principals to control and oversee the actions of their agents. However, 
control and oversight do not occur automatically and the choice of control mechanisms 
depends upon the costs the principal is willing and able to incur in order to "minimize the 
gap between desired and actual performance" (Moe 1987). These costs of control 
represent the third assumption associated with principal-agent relationships. In particular, 
this assumption focuses on time and resources and political costs. 
Time and Resource Costs 
The primary cost that principals must endure in order to alleviate, if not eliminate, 
the problems they face in their relationships with their agents is the cost of time and 
resources. The argument regarding time and resources is fairly straight forward: 
principals confronted with problems of adverse selection and / or moral hazard must 
possess enough time (e.g. time in the legislative session) and resources (e.g staff, salary, 
funds, infrastructure) to dedicate to obtaining and disseminating the information about 
25 
specific policy areas and/or their agents12. At the same time, legislators must have time 
and resources to establish and monitor control and oversight mechanisms where the 
actions and behavior of their agents is unobservable. The difficulty for legislators to 
obtain information varies significantly depending on the specific policy, the nature of the 
agent, as well as the type of control and oversight mechanism utilized . 
In terms of the PA relationship between legislators and bureaucrats, legislators are 
likely to invest more time and resources in policy areas where they have limited 
knowledge or which represent more complex and technical issues (Bawn 1997; 
Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003)14. Policies involving more complex or technical 
issues create greater demands on legislators and, although they are more likely to 
delegate authority involving these issues (Bawn 1997; Huber & Shipan 2002), they must 
still obtain information to understand the policy area as well as credit claim for success. 
In addition to the complexity of the policy area, the nature of bureaucrats may 
influence the amount of time and resources legislators must incur to obtain information 
(see Moe 1987; Waterman & Meier 1998). At the U.S. state level, bureaucracies vary not 
only in size and in the nature of their personnel (civil servants vs. patronage), but also in 
their ability to influence policy, act autonomously and resist both legislative and 
executive control (see above). For example, some bureaucracies are led by executive 
branch appointees while others are elected positions (Book of the States, 2007). 
Appointed administrative agency heads are likely to be "beholden" to the executive and 
12
 This refers to private or hidden information regarding the agencies and/or procedures and outcomes. 
13
 The costs for obtaining and disseminating information will be alleviated somewhat as a result of the 
specialization of legislative committees to tap the talents of its members (Hamm & Hedlund 2004; Hedlund 
& Hamm 2005) and the continuous interactions between the two actors (e.g. policy subsystems, sub-
governments) (see Heclo 1978; Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Sabatier 1999), 
4
 Radner (1985) suggests that interactions between legislators and bureaucrats are constant and iterative 
and thus the costs can be more substantial than if the relationship was a one-shot game. 
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are more likely to share similar preferences for policy outcomes. Elected administrative 
heads must satisfy their own constituent's preferences and thus are more likely 
autonomous and more likely to resist pressure from the other branches of government. At 
the same time, bureaucracies that are staffed by merit based employees (civil servants) 
are more likely to be career bureaucrats driven by the policy area than partisan 
preferences (Gailmard & Patty 2007). Consequently, these bureaucracies are more likely 
to pursue outcomes that differ from those of the executive and legislative branches. 
The type of mechanism used to control bureaucrats impacts a principal's 
investment of time and resources. For example, principals may require their agents to 
submit reports, hold hearings, consult with groups, use specific procedures, or engage in 
budget manipulation. Each of the mechanisms comes with its own costs, and their 
effectiveness depends upon the particular relationship between the principal and agent as 
well as the principal's specific informational needs (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991; Huber 
& Shipan 2002). In situations where principals possess a significant informational 
disadvantage, they may choose to require their agents to submit reports on progress or 
procedures associated with policy development and implementation. This mechanism 
will provide information about the policy area and updates so that the legislature may 
monitor bureaucratic actions and make sure that they are not shirking or pursuing their 
own outcomes. Alternatively, principals may require bureaucrats to hold hearings in 
order to provide information to constituents as well as alleviate costs by shifting the 
burden of oversight to constituents who are most interested in the specific policy area15. 
15
 McCubbins & Schwartz (1983) classify these mechanisms as fire alarms since the legislature's "alarm" 
will be triggered by constituents or interested parties when the bureaucracy deviates from their preferred 
procedures or outcomes (see also McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987). 
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Political Costs 
In addition to time and resources principals must incur in order to control and 
oversee the actions of their agents, some principals must face additional costs to 
overcome the problems associated with their relationship with their agents. In terms of 
legislators as principals, these costs can also be political in nature. As mentioned 
previously, legislators have preferences for re-election and as a result, will focus on 
achieving policy outcomes that are consistent with those preferred by their constituents 
(see above). In order to achieve this goal, legislators will attempt to shape bureaucratic 
behavior in a manner that satisfies the needs and/or desires of their constituents while at 
the same time avoiding blame for failed policies or unintended, adverse consequences of 
policy implementation (see McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 
1987). Political costs arise when legislative control and oversight decisions fail to 
accomplish these goals and thus adversely impact their re-election chances as evidenced 
by lower confidence or favorability ratings, challenges to legislative seats, and declining 
campaign contributions or support (see Fenno 1971; Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1982a). 
Legislators thus have an incentive to make careful control and oversight decisions as well 
as utilize mechanisms that minimize time and resources as well as alleviate the possibility 
of incurring political costs. For example, in situations where legislators are confronted 
with a controversial policy area, they are more likely to choose a control mechanism that 
minimizes their or the bureaucrats' involvement with constituents, such as a requirement 
to submit periodic reports or consulting with specific groups or individuals rather than 
holding hearings. Using these mechanisms will allow legislators to gain the requisite 
information about both the policy area and bureaucratic action in addition to insulating 
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the process and their involvement in the event that outcomes are inconsistent with the 
preferences of their constituents. 
Shortcomings in the Principal Agent Framework 
Until this point in the chapter, we have discussed the origin of the PA theory and 
the problems and / or challenges faced by legislators, as principals, in their attempts to 
control and oversee bureaucrats, their agents, and ensure the development and 
implementation of their preferred policy outcomes. Although the PA framework has 
played a prominent and powerful role in examining the relationship between politicians 
and bureaucrats (Huber & Shipan 2002, 26), it has not escaped criticism. In fact, over the 
past few decades, a significant amount of attention has been dedicated to addressing both 
its theoretical and empirical shortcomings. In general, the criticisms levied on the PA 
framework center on the dyadic relationship between principals and agents, the failure to 
treat bureaucracies as an institution, the focus on a single agency, and the inability of PA 
researchers to adequately model the political or institutional environments in which the 
PA relationship resides. I will address each separately and discuss how this dissertation 
will improve upon these shortcomings. 
Principal - Asent Dyads 
The first criticism of the PA framework is that the dyadic relationship between a 
single principal and a single agent is unrealistic. The argument states that although the 
PA framework is based on the ability of the principal to ensure that the agent is behaving 
in a manner consistent with their intent, focusing on a single principal to test these 
29 
assumptions does not adequately represent most PA relationships (see Moe 1987; 
Waterman & Meier 1998; Worsham & Gattrell 2005; Meier & O'Toole 2006). In fact, 
PA critics suggest (and have found) that bureaucrats often balance the preferences and 
attempts at control from multiple principals (Mitnick 1986; Waterman, Rouse & Wright 
1998; Worsham & Gattrell 2005). 
PA critics contend that although bureaucracies serve the executive branch, this 
does not limit the institutions involved in attempting to influence the processes and 
procedures they utilize or the decisions they make. Wood & Waterman (1994) provide an 
excellent example of this argument in their examination of bureaucratic appointments in 
both the Carter and Reagan administrations. Bureaucratic appointments are a shared 
power between the two branches of government and the authors find that bureaucrats 
must - and do - respond to both principals - even when their preferences diverge. 
Waterman & Meier (1998) concur by suggesting that findings of influence by a single 
principal is suspect since it is impossible to determine if the bureaucracy is shirking or 
simply achieving the goals of another principal. 
Bureaucratic autonomy scholars also contend that studies of the relationship 
between legislators and bureaucrats do not take into consideration other variations in PA 
relationships. For example, Sabatier & Pelkey (1987) find that although principals often 
act in "concert" with one another, evidence of and the impact of competing principals on 
bureaucratic behavior is substantial in studies examining the PA relationship (see Wood 
& Waterman 1991, 1993, 1994; Hammond & Knott 1999; Brehm & Gates 1997; 
Waterman, Rouse & Wright 1998; Worsham & Gattrell 2005). At the same time, Sabatier 
& Jenkins-Smith (1993) find that bureaucrats must also adjust to the fact that some 
30 
principals enter and exit the PA relationship depending on the particular issue, its 
salience, or the stance of competing principals. 
This dissertation addresses this criticism in two distinct ways. First, I assume that 
bureaucracies possess the ability to pursue their own preferences as well as withstand 
legislative control and oversight. I posit that the degree to which bureaucrats can act 
autonomously is based on the structure, leadership and size of the agencies involved in 
policy development and implementation. As mentioned above, bureaucracies vary 
significantly across states based on these factors and these differences will be included in 
my model of legislative control. Secondly, I account for the possibility of multiple 
principals attempting to control and oversee bureaucratic action. In particular, I examine 
the relationship and the bargaining that takes place between legislators and the governor. 
I assume that legislators and the governor both have policy preferences, and when they 
diverge, both actors - depending on their institutional powers (e.g. legislative & 
appropriations powers) - will attempt to influence legislation in order to compel 
bureaucrats to pursue their preferences rather than their counterpart's. 
Bureaucracies as an Institution 
An additional criticism levied on PA studies stems from the fact that agencies are 
ignored as an autonomous and influential institution. Although the PA framework is 
founded on the assumption that principals and agents have divergent policy preferences, 
most PA researchers assume that the preferences possessed by bureaucrats mirror those 
of the executive branch for which they serve (Ogul & Rockman 1990; Kiewiet & 
McCubbins 1991; Brehm & Gates 1997). Bureaucrats are thought to be responsive only 
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to the executive branch and lack their own values, goals, or preferences, let alone the 
ability to pursue them and influence the policy-making process (Arnold 1979; Ogul & 
Rockman 1990; Carpenter 2001). Studies of bureaucrats, however, have revealed a much 
different environment. Not only is there significant variation between bureaucracies -
administrative histories, organizational structures and resources, norms and standards, 
operating procedures, as well as size and personnel, and the appointment or election of 
administrative heads (see Worsham & Gattrell 2005) - but bureaucrats have been shown 
to be quite autonomous with distinct policy preferences (Dodd & Schott 1979; Calvert, 
McCubbins & Weingast 1989; Carpenter 2001). In fact, research has shown that 
bureaucrats with the resources and desire can influence policy development and 
implementation, and often do so (Wood 1988, 1998; Cook 1998). Although PA critics 
contend that the assumption of shared preferences is the result of the difficulty 
differentiating between bureaucracies and assessing their preferences (Waterman & 
Meier 1998; Worsham & Gattrell 2005), Meier & O'Toole (2006) argue that without 
knowledge of the specific bureaucracies' values and preferences, attempting to determine 
the degree of political control is futile (pg. 178). As stated above, this dissertation 
assumes that bureaucracies possess the ability to pursue their own preferences as well as 
withstand legislative control and oversight. As a result, I test whether more autonomous 
bureaucrats impact of control strategies by legislators. 
Single Bureaucracy or Similar Bureaucratic Group Studies 
Building off of the criticism regarding the dyadic nature of PA relationships, PA 
critics also question the examination of PA relationships involving one agency or a group 
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of similar bureaucracies16. As stated above, there is significant variation in bureaucratic 
autonomy and each possess different values, goals and preferences. PA critics contend 
that lumping bureaucracies into the same mold and assuming that they will act and react 
similarly is unrealistic (see Meier & O'Toole 2006). Meier & O'Toole (2006) suggest 
that although examining a single bureaucracy provides leverage for easy measurement 
(e.g use of dummy variables) it adversely impacts the generalizability of the results since 
they will be idiosyncratic to the particular agency in question. 
Critics of PA literature also point out that agencies are often in competition with 
each other for limited money and resources, not to mention the competition that takes 
place between factions or departments within bureaucracies (Waterman & Meier 1998). 
This was evident in Waterman, Rouse & Wright's (1994) examination of the strategies 
and behavior of state and federal level bureaucrats. The authors find that both groups of 
bureaucrats compete for the same resources, but that they also possess different 
preferences and strategies. These findings are supported by studies that find preference 
divergence between policy implementation bureaucrats and those that are involved in 
policy development (Mazmanian & Sabatier 1983) as well as between career and 
temporary bureaucrats (Pfiffner 1988). Simply examining a single agency or group of 
similar agencies does not allow the researcher to account for the bargaining and 
coordination legislators must take into consideration when developing and implementing 
a control and oversight strategy. 
To address the single agency criticism, instead of focusing on control and 
oversight of a specific agency or group of agencies, this dissertation focuses on a specific 
16
 Meier & O'Toole (2006) note that some PA scholars have, in fact, examined the impact of legislative 
control on multiple agencies. See Gormley, Hoadley & Williams 1983; Mitinick & Backoff 1984; Chaney 
&Saltzsteinl998. 
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policy area and examines legislative attempts to control and oversee all agencies involved 
in the development and implementation of the policy. This focus will allow me to assess 
how all agencies involved in the policy area are impacted by the legislative control 
strategy. At the same time, by examining the type of constraint and the amount of 
discretion provided by the legislature, I will also be able to assess the importance 
legislators place on the agencies or the policy as a whole. 
Political and Institutional Impacts on PA Relationships 
The last criticism of PA studies centers on the context in which relationships are 
examined. In particular, critics have found that the political and institutional 
environments in which the relationship is embedded affect interactions between 
legislators and bureaucrats. The political and institutional environments that vary across 
states have consistently been found to influence legislative strategies and structure 
(Squire & Hamm 2005; Kousser 2005), the development and implementation of policy 
(Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Huber & Shipan 2002; Volden 2006), as well as the choice 
of mechanisms to control and oversee bureaucrats (Moe 1987; McCubbins, Noll & 
Weingast 1987; Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Huber & Shipan 2002). Additionally, this 
variation has been shown to influence interactions between legislators and bureaucrats as 
well as the severity of the problems associated with their relationship. In fact, Moe (1987) 
suggests that without knowing more about the two parties - "their underlying goals and 
value structures, the nature and availability of rewards and sanctions, the presence of 
institutional constraints...," it would be difficult to predict whether a principal is likely to 
engage in control of its agent or the extent of that control (pg 481). 
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Political Environment 
It is widely accepted that political parties are not unitary in their policy 
preferences as each member has different personal preferences in addition to those of 
his/her constituents (see Downs 1957; Smith 1997; Barrilleaux et al 2002). Thus, it 
should be expected that chambers in a legislature that are controlled by different parties 
will interfere with the passage of party policies and pursue their own preferences (Downs 
1957; Smith 1997). As a result, the initiating or proposing chamber possesses an 
incentive to control and oversee the actions of the bureaucracy to ensure that their, and 
not the other chambers' preferred outcomes are enacted. If the chambers are controlled by 
the same party, it is more likely that they will share similar preferences or differ slightly 
due to differences in constituents, their needs and the length of their legislative terms. As 
a result, the incentive of the initiating chamber to control the bureaucracy is diminished. 
The impact of the political environment in state legislatures also applies to the 
relationship between the legislature and the executive branch. Although PA studies have 
found that bureaucrats can and will influence policy (see above), they are an extension of 
the executive branch which maintains significant control over their composition, 
structure, and resources (e.g. budget, personnel, etc) (see Branokowski & Gross 2006). 
As a result, if the executive and legislature are controlled by different parties, and thus 
possess divergent policy preferences, the executive branch can influence the actions and 
strategies of the bureaucracy "away" from the legislature's preferred outcomes. This will 
likely increase the incentive for the legislature to find ways to control and oversee 
bureaucratic actions. In these settings, the legislature knows that the executive possesses 
differing policy goals and, thus the flow and dissemination of policy and bureaucratic 
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information will likely be stifled (Waterman & Meier 1998). Consequently, the costs for 
legislators to obtain and disseminate policy and bureaucratic information, as well as 
utilize control and oversight mechanisms will be increased. If, however, the executive 
and the legislature share preferences, the incentive for the legislature to engage in 
bureaucratic control is diminished since the executive will encourage the bureaucracy to 
pursue policy outcomes that are consistent or similar to those of the legislature. 
Institutional Environment 
In addition to the impact of the political environment on the incentive for 
legislators to engage in bureaucratic control and on the mechanisms themselves, the 
institutional environment in which they reside also influences legislators at the U.S. state 
level. U.S. state legislatures vary in the amount of time that they are in session, ranging 
from a few months every two years (biennial session) to year around legislatures (annual 
sessions), and in the amount of resources they possess (e.g. staff, legislator salary) (see 
Squire & Hamm 2005; Squire 2006), the capacity of their institution (e.g. strength of 
committee system, policy-making and appropriations powers) (see Huber & Shipan 2002; 
Volden 2002b), as well as the powers of the legislature in relation to that of the chief 
executive. The differences have been shown to significantly impact a legislature's ability 
to obtain and disseminate policy and bureaucratic information, as well as impact their 
ability to develop and implement policy (Berry & Berry 1990; Rosenthal 1998; 
Barrilleaux & Berkman 2003), and control and monitor bureaucrats (Thompson 1986; 
Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001). Legislators that are in session year around, possess more 
resources, and have stronger committee systems (e.g floor and agenda control, deference 
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from chamber, etc.) (see Hamm, Hedlund & Martorano 2006), can be considered highly 
capable and are thus able to invest more time obtaining and disseminating information 
about bureaucrats and the specific policy area, as well as establishing control mechanisms 
and monitoring behavior. At the same time, the larger staffs and stronger institutions (i.e. 
committee systems) enable these legislators to alleviate much of the costs of both 
obtaining and disseminating information as well as engaging in bureaucratic control and 
oversight (Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Huber & Shipan 2002). Less capable 
legislatures - legislatures that meet in session only a few months out of the year, possess 
limited resources, and have weaker committee systems - are less effective in obtaining 
and disseminating information and have less time and resources to perform all of their 
legislative functions, let alone bureaucratic control and oversight (Thompson 1986). 
As discussed previously - as well as more fully in the chapter 3 - this dissertation 
builds upon existing PA studies that have examined legislative attempts to control and 
oversee bureaucratic action using the variation in political and institutional environments 
that exist in U.S. state legislatures (Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 
2001; Huber & Shipan 2002; Volden 2002b; Gerber, Meastas & Domertirus 2005). This 
study provides a richer set of institutional variables in which to assess more completely 
the impact of institutional environments on legislative control and oversight strategies, 
and does so over a 10-year period. This time frame will allow me to better understand the 
strategies employed by legislators as well as the impact of changes to the political and 
institutional environments. 
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Where Do We Go From Here? 
Given the problems of divergent policy preferences, asymmetric information, and 
the costs of control that adversely impact the PA relationship between legislators and 
bureaucrats, how are legislators as principals able to control the actions and behavior of 
bureaucrats? In particular, how do legislators decide which control mechanisms fit their 
specific relationships and political and institutional environments in which they reside? 
Over the past several decades, legislative scholars have performed a significant 
amount of research attempting to answer these questions. The research began by 
assessing who exerted control over whom - the U.S. Congress or bureaucrats, and the 
effectiveness of specific control and oversight mechanisms, and then shifted to an 
institutional focus due to mixed results deriving from studies attempting to examine these 
relationships empirically (see Spence 1997; Potoski 1999). At the same time, research 
shifted because of the belief that variation in the political and institutional environments 
was necessary to assess the impact of specific control and oversight mechanisms (see 
above). This institutional shift also led many legislative control scholars to concentrate 
specifically on the language in legislation, or statutory control, as the preferred control 
and oversight mechanism due to its effectiveness and ability to minimize costs (see Meier 
1993; Bawn 1997; Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003). 
Although these extensions have vastly improved our understanding of decisions to 
engage in control and oversight of bureaucracies, as well as the choice of mechanisms, a 
review of the literature will show that, despite moving in the right direction, our 
understanding of legislative control of bureaucracies remains incomplete. Not only does 
the literature fail to adequately account for the variation in institutional environments that 
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exist across U.S. state legislatures, but it also only examines this relationship over a 
discrete period of time. At the same time, existing models of legislative control provide 
inadequate measures for legislative capacity and the legislative veto, and fail to account 
for other institutional features that have been shown to impact the relationship between 
legislators and bureaucrats. Examining these decisions over one or two legislative 
sessions also provide us with a limited understanding of legislative incentives or 
strategies to control and oversee bureaucracies. Combined with the PA framework, this 
dissertation remedies these theoretical and empirical shortcomings. 
In the remaining part of this chapter, I review the literature surrounding legislative 
control of bureaucracies and the research examining the use of control and oversight 
mechanisms. I conclude with a discussion of how this literature has led to a focus on 
statutory control, as a legislative control and oversight mechanism and set up a more 
complete discussion of statutory control in the next chapter. 
Legislative Control of Bureaucracies: Literature Review 
The early research examining the relationship between legislators and bureaucrats 
focused on the power and influence of the administrative state and its ability to withstand 
legislative control and influence the policy-making process (see Ogul 1976; Dodd & 
Schott 1979; Wilson 1980; Peters 1981; Rourke 1984).17 While some scholars believe the 
deference to bureaucrats is of practical necessity (Huber & Shipan 2002, pg. 23) and 
17
 Administrative dominance scholars believe that the complexity of policy issues, the rapid expansion of 
government and subsequent policy overload, as well as the size and expertise of administrative state (see 
Skowronek 1982; Skocpol 1992), enabled bureaucrats to "run the show, while politicians essentially had no 
choice but to sit on the sidelines and watch the show" (Huber & Shipan 2006, pg. 256-257). Other scholars 
suggest sociological explanations for bureaucratic dominance in policy-making including the internal 
organization of bureaucracies (Selznick 1949; Wilson 1980), the competing interests within bureaucracies 
(Katzman 1980), and the insulation of bureaucracies due to growing professionalism (Dodd & Schott 1979; 
Knott& Miller 1987). 
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beneficial to the policy-making process (see Mashaw 1997; Meier & O'Toole 2006), 
other scholars found bureaucratic dominance to be detrimental, fearing self-serving 
agents (see Putnam 1975; Wright 1978) and a threat to representative democracy (Lowi 
1969; Offe 1972; Huber & Shipan 2002). 
Support for the administrative dominance theory is based primarily on studies 
examining the policy-making process and the ability of bureaucrats to incorporate 
competing interests (see Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976), in addition to research 
establishing bureaucratic ability to withstand or resist legislative control (Wood 1988; 
Balla 1998; Carpenter 2001). These studies also downplayed the role of institutions, 
specifically legislatures, defining them as "little black boxes" that exerted minimal 
influence and control (Moe 1987)18. 
Congressional dominance scholars attribute bureaucratic dominance to the 
inattentiveness of the U.S. Congress (Sher 1963; Ogul 1976; Dodd & Schott 1986; Huber 
& Shipan 2002). Specifically, these studies contend that Congress possesses the tools and 
resources to control and oversee bureaucrats (Ogul 1976; McCubbins 1985), but also 
chooses not to use them because the "threat of control" is sufficient to shape agency 
behavior (McCubbins & Schwartz 1984). Studies also suggest that Congress is more 
concerned with satisfying the demands of their constituents than spending time and 
resources to control and oversee bureaucracies (Bibby & Davidson 1972; Ogul 1976; 
Sudquist 1981). Wood & Waterman (1991) also suggests that much of the early 
congressional control and oversight was tied to money, and accomplished through the 
18
 Wood (1988), in its examination of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) response to the 1980 
Clean Air Act, finds that despite research that suggests that political institutions can control the behavior 
and thus the outputs of bureaucracies, those agencies with substantial resources and the desire to do so, can 
alter their outputs in directions completely opposite of what a model of hierarchy would predict. 
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appropriations process that was more decentralized and incremental and was thus not 
easily observable (see also Wildavsky 1964; Fenno 1966). 
The empirical research supporting the attempts to dispel administrative 
dominance suggests that the manner in which bureaucratic dominance is measured is 
flawed (see Moe 1982; Shipan 2004). Huber & Shipan (2002) claim it is difficult to 
measure the preferences of actors, policies, and outcomes (pg. 23-24; see also Gross & 
Baranowski 2006), and claim of bureaucratic dominance are based on "anecdotes and 
intuition rather than empirical study" (pg. 23). In their empirical study of bureaucratic 
actions, Weingast & Moran (1983) find that the choice of cases agencies hear as well as 
their level of activism is influenced by congressional oversight committees and contend 
that bureaucratic dominance is observational equivalence; a result of researchers viewing 
the relationship through a lens attributing broad discretion. 
Evidence of congressional dominance is also supported empirically by Moe 
(1985) which finds that quarterly decisions of the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), rather than outcomes, are affected by numerous federal institutions including 
Congress. Olson (1995), like Weingast & Moran (1983), finds that Congress, specifically 
congressional committees, influence the Federal Drug Administration's (FDA) approval 
rates for drug and medical devices and finds additional influence on levels of inspection 
(see also Mayhew 1974; Calvert, Moran & Weingast 1988). Although the literature 
focuses exclusively on the relationship between the U.S. Congress and federal 
bureaucracies, the congressional dominance scholars believe that legislators willing to 
incur the costs of bureaucratic control could successfully do so (Barke & Riker 1982; 
Moe 1982; Weingast & Moran 1983; Calvert & Weingast 1984). 
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Like administrative dominance studies, congressional dominance research also 
has its critics. Moe (1987) contends that the "great promise" of congressional dominance 
studies to explain legislative control of bureaucracies never materialized as studies 
continued to ignore the bureaucracy as an autonomous, political actor (see also Waterman 
& Meier 1998; Meier & O'Toole 2006) and failed to account for the influence of other 
institutions such as the executive, courts, and interest groups (pg. 477). Moe's (1987) 
belief is supported by empirical studies that reveal the power of bureaucrats to resist 
legislative control (Wood 1988; Balla 1998), behave autonomously (Potoski 1999; 
Shipan 2004), influence the development of public policy (Ruhil & Teske 2003; Meier & 
O'Toole 2006), and demonstrate the impact of other influential actors in the relationship 
between legislators and bureaucrats such as the executive, courts, and interest groups 
(Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast 1989; Aberbach 1990; Hammond & Knott 1996). 
Despite the theoretical questions and empirical results that continue to contradict 
one another, both administrative and congressional dominance scholars insist that there is 
enough evidence to support one theory or the other and thus end the controversy over 
"who controls" and shift the focus of legislative control research to investigations of the 
determinants of control (see Wood & Waterman 1991). As a result, the focus of 
legislative control literature shifted from "who controls?" to an examination of "how the 
legislature controls." 
With the shift in the legislative control research, studies began to investigate how 
legislators control and oversee bureaucracies. More specifically, legislative control 
scholars began to focus on - given the decision by legislators to engage in control and 
oversight of bureaucracies - how legislators facilitate control and what mechanisms are 
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most effective at making bureaucrats pursue legislative interests. This focus has led to the 
study of two main legislative control strategies: ex ante controls - those imposed prior to 
policy implementation, and ex post oversight - legislative control and oversight imposed 
after policy implementation. 
Ex Ante Controls 
Ex ante legislative controls involve rules, processes, and procedures that are 
integrated into a particular policy during the legislative process to ensure that bureaucrats 
behave in a manner consistent with legislative intent and ultimately achieve the 
legislature's preferred policy outcomes (see Bawn 1995; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 
1987). The use of ex ante controls is thought to provide legislators with an effective 
mechanism in which to shape and control bureaucratic behavior (Calvert, McCubbins & 
Weingast 1989; Bawn 1995; Huber & Shipan 2002), limit a bureaucrat's choice of 
feasible policy alternatives (Bawn 1997; Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001), alleviate the 
costs associated with obtaining and disseminating policy and bureaucratic information in 
addition to the costs of control and oversight (Bawn 1995; Epstein & O'Halloran 1994, 
1999; Huber & Shipan 2000; Reenock & Poggione 2004), enable elected officials to 
credit claim and improve re-election chances (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987; 
Fiorina 1989; de Figueiredo & Vanden Burgh 2004), and minimize the need to use other 
control mechanisms (Bawn 1997; Gerber, Maestas & Dometrius 2005). 
Although research has provided important information about ex ante controls 
specifically and legislative control of bureaucracies generally, they have also received 
considerable theoretical and empirical criticisms, many of which are similar to those 
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levied on bureaucratic dominance studies (see Spence 1997; Gerber, Maestas & 
Dometrius 2005). Epstein & O'Halloran (1994) argues that ex ante controls place 
restrictions and constraints on agencies that ultimately hinder their flexibility and stifle 
the provision of potentially valuable information. This point is supported by Spence 
(1997) which suggests that structural and procedural requirements exacerbate legislative 
drift (see also Horn & Shepsle 1989). Wilson (1989), on the other hand, believes that 
certain agencies (the military) are difficult to monitor and control due to their 
unobservable actions or production of observable but "noisy" results (Wilson 1989). 
Ex Post Controls 
Legislative ex post political controls, on the other hand, allow legislators to "right 
an agency gone wrong" (Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003). These controls involve 
mechanisms and/or procedures to monitor, audit, or sanction agency behavior after the 
implementation of policy as well as provide sticks or carrots (i.e. rewards or 
punishments) for compliance or noncompliance (Bendor, Taylor & Van Gaalen 1987; 
Aberbach 1990; Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003). The use of ex post controls are 
thought to be less costly for legislators because of their flexibility (Kiewiet & McCubbins 
1991). Because legislators can wait until after the implementation of polices to decide 
whether they "need to" or "want to" correct their implementation, it is believed, the costs 
associated with obtaining and disseminating information as well as imposing specific 
controls is lowered19. 
19 
One of the most cited studies of ex post controls is McCubbins & Schwartz (1984) discussion of 
congressional use of procedures to alert the legislature about bureaucrats that pursue policy outcomes that 
are inconsistent with legislative intent or "fire alarms," as well as direct surveillance and monitoring by the 
legislature or "police patrols" (see also McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987, 1989; Balla 1998). Aside from 
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Like ex ante controls, ex post research has also been heavily criticized for 
measurement problems (Spence 1997; Balla 1998; Potoski 1999) and the exclusion of the 
other potentially influential institutions (see Carpenter 1996; Cook 1998; Wood & Bothe 
2004; Meier & O'Toole 2006). At the same time ex post controls are seen as inefficient 
due to the fact that information is only available after the fact (Niskanen 1971; 
McNollGast 1989; Macey 1992), bureaucracies are too large to monitor (Ogul 1976), and 
too costly to implement (Balla 1998; Gerber, Maestas & Dometrius 2005)20. 
Empirical studies examining the effectiveness of specific ex ante and ex post 
legislative control strategies have also produced mixed results (see Spence 1997; 
Ringquist, Worsharri & Eisner 2003). Although some research has found specific control 
strategies to be influential in shaping and/or altering bureaucratic behavior, including 
administrative procedures (Potoski 1999; Gerber, Maestas & Dometrius 2005), agency 
design (Ruhill & Teske 2003; Reenock & Poggione 2004), monitoring devices (Shipan 
2004), and a combination of both ex ante and ex post controls (Bawn 1997), other studies 
have found no such impact. Balla (1998), for example, in an examination of the 
effectiveness of notice and comment procedures used by the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA), finds, contrary to the deck stacking thesis purported by 
McCubbins, Noll & Weingast (1987) (see above), that certain procedures are not 
effective in controlling agencies. Balla (1998), like Wood (1988), finds that the agency, 
"fire alarms" and "police patrols," research on ex post legislative controls has examined the use of 
oversight hearings (McCubbins & Schwartz 1984), monitoring or auditing procedures (Aberbach 1990; 
Lupia & McCubbins 1994a), sanctions for noncompliant bureaucrats (Weingast & Moran 1983; Huber & 
Shipan 2000), the legislative veto (see Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003), and the use of appropriations 
to reward or sanction bureaucrats (Fenno 1966; Wison 1989; Ting 2001). 
20
 Fiorina (1981a) questions the incentives for legislators to engage in post-implementation oversight in the 
first place. The author contends that since the benefits of oversight are public goods and individual 
legislators can benefit without participating, there exists little incentive for the legislature to engage in 
oversight. 
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in some cases, is more likely to listen to its own constituents rather than those preferred 
by Congress. These findings are supported by Potoski (1999) which uses survey data to 
examine legislative design of air pollution control agencies. This study shows empirically 
how legislators use different types of administrative procedures depending on the policy 
area and the type and level of uncertainty that exists in the relationship. 
Legislative control scholars have debated the cause of the mixed empirical results. 
Some scholars suggest that the spurious results are the result of the difficulty 
differentiating between ex ante and ex post mechanisms (see Bawn 1977; Ting 2001; 
Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003). In particular, scholars have questioned whether 
legislative action that significantly alters bureaucratic structure or procedures is an ex 
post control because it was imposed after policy implementation - or an ex ante control 
because it, in itself, alters the agency's subsequent behavior (Ringquist, Worsham & 
Eisner 2003). To correct the problem, some scholars suggest examining ex ante and ex 
post controls together (see Bawn 1997; Ting 2001) or temporally (Ringquist, Worsham & 
Eisner 2003). Spence (1997), however, suggests that the mixed results are problems 
associated with how control has been measured (see Spence 1997; Potoski 1999; 
Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003). The study suggests that legislative scholars model 
away the problems associated with legislative control by measuring control in terms of 
agency actions and/or policy outcomes that oversimplify the degree to which control 
exists (pg. 200). Spence (1997) argues that the focus on these dependent variables are 
ineffective in assessing control because they ignore the substantive policy foresight 
possessed by legislators in their efforts to control bureaucracies. This policy foresight 
provides invaluable information about what policies are important to legislators as well as 
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the extent to which they will go to control and oversee their achievement and 
bureaucratic behavior, if at all21. Without legislative policy foresight, the use of specific 
control and oversight mechanisms may be deemed ineffective when in reality the 
legislature was not concerned about controlling the bureaucracy and/or the policy 
outcome in the first place (see also Epstein & O'Halloran 1994). 
To resolve the empirical problems associated with ex ante and ex post control 
studies, legislative scholars began examining control strategies that not only incorporated 
the use of both ex ante and ex post control mechanism, but also captured the legislature's 
policy foresight (Wood & Waterman 1991; Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003). One 
strategy that has received significant attention is the use of language in legislation, or 
statutory control22. Not only is it widely accepted that legislators impose substantive 
policy constraints on bureaucratic discretion via enabling legislation (see Spence 1997; 
Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Huber & Shipan 2002), but scholars have also found 
statutory language to be more effective in alleviating the problems associated with PA 
relationships (McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987; Moe 
1989, 1990; Bawn 1997; Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Reenock & Poggione 2004). In 
particular, the costs associated with legislators placing policy and procedural constraints 
on bureaucrats in legislation is considered minimal compared to the time and resources 
that legislature's would have to incur acquiring information about bureaucracies and 
policy issues on their own, as well as engaging in individual forms of control and 
21
 According to Spence (1997), most legislative control studies assume a norm of limited bureaucratic 
discretion on the part of legislators due to the belief that addressing all substantive policy areas is both 
impossible and inefficient. 
22
 Legislative control scholars often use other names beside statutory control to classify the use of language 
in legislation to control and oversee bureaucratic action. For example, many studies refer to this as 
administrative procedures (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987, 1989; Bawn 1995; Potoski 1999; Gerber, 
Maestas & Dometrius 2005). 
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oversight. This fact combined with the difficulty and additional costs associated with 
overturning or altering enacted legislation due to the nature of separation of powers 
systems (i.e. multiple veto players, majority rule cycling) (see Moe 1989), provides an 
ideal control and oversight mechanism for legislators to ensure that bureaucrats will 
pursue their preferred outcomes (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987) as well as protect 
against alterations to outcomes by future legislative coalitions, or legislative drift 
(McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1989; Horn & Shepsle 1989; Horn 1995). 
Although research continued to examine specific control mechanisms, this 
revelation regarding the use of statutory language led to another shift in the literature. In 
particular, legislative control scholars began to examine the use of statutory control as a 
means to alleviate the problems associated with their PA relationship and protect the 
implementation of their preferred outcomes. The use and effectiveness of statutory 
control will be the focus of the next chapter. Specifically, I will address the literature 
surrounding statutory control as well as discuss how this research initiated an institutional 
focus on legislative control of bureaucracies. I posit however, that the institutional focus 
presented by the prevailing research is incomplete, and in justifying the argument, I 
present my expanded model of legislative control of bureaucracies as well as the 
hypotheses to be tested. 
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Chapter 3: 
The Use and Effectiveness of Statutory Control in U.S. State Legislatures 
A review of the legislative control of bureaucracies literature in the previous 
chapter reveals a progression from studies focusing on who controls? and how to 
control? to an understanding that without legislative foresight, scholars will not be able to 
effectively determine how legislators control bureaucrats and the extent of their control. 
Although legislative language, or statutory control has been found to provide the 
necessary legislative foresight, in order to better understand decisions to both engage in 
statutory control and where that control is imposed, it is important to examine its use and 
effectiveness across varying political and institutional settings (see Huber & Shipan 
2002; Volden 2002b). 
Some legislative scholars have attempted to examine statutory control in U.S. 
state legislatures where significant variation exists in political and institutional 
environments (see Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Huber & 
Shipan 2002; Volden 2002b, 2006). I aruge, however, that despite the important 
information provided by these studies, they only partially capture the impact of the 
varying political and institutional environments and provide an incomplete assessment of 
the statutory control options available to state legislators. Additionally, the state studies 
only examine the use of statutory control in general legislation within a discrete period of 
time. This chapter provides the foundation for addressing and rectifying these 
shortcomings in the study of statutory control of bureaucrats. 
I begin the chapter by providing a more detailed analysis of statutory control, the 
literature surrounding its use and effectiveness, as well as discuss the transition to more 
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institutional studies in U.S. state legislatures. This discussion will focus predominantly on 
the work by Huber & Shipan (2002) which provides the most cited investigations of state 
legislative use of statutory control and its impact on the adoption of Medicaid Managed 
Care legislation across the U.S. states. I posit that despite the important contributions of 
their work, Huber & Shipan (2002) provides an incomplete picture of the statutory 
control environment that exists across states. More specifically, the author's model only 
partially captures the institutional variation that exists in the U.S. states and only 
examines statutory control decisions in general legislation over a discrete time period. 
These factors provide a limited understanding of the factors that influence statutory 
control decisions as well as the different strategies used by legislators to control and 
oversee bureaucrats. In making this argument, I discuss how this dissertation improves 
upon Huber & Shipan's research and outline the research design presented in the next 
chapter. The chapter concludes with hypotheses, measurements, and empirical 
expectations derived from the model, the theoretical framework and control literature. 
The Use and Effectiveness of Statutory Control 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the transition from legislative control to 
statutory language came about to solve the empirical and theoretical problems associated 
with examinations of ex ante and ex post control mechanisms. Additionally, statutory 
control provided researchers with legislative policy foresight necessary empirically assess 
which aspects of the policy are important to legislators as well as which agencies are 
targeted (see Spence 1997)23. The focus on the use of statutory language, however, was 
23
 Epstein & O'Halloran (1994) suggests that statutory language provides researchers with a legislative 
control strategy that, when compared to actual bureaucratic behavior and subsequent policy outcomes, 
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also thought to assist in alleviating - if not solving - problems associated with the PA 
relationship between legislators and bureaucrats (Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast 1989; 
Reenock & Poggione 2004). Specifically, it is believed that statutory control allows 
legislators to improve their informational deficiencies and lower costs of control by 
providing an effective control and oversight mechanism, the ability to integrate or stack 
the deck in favor of the legislators' preferred constituents, as well as provide the ability to 
protect policy outcomes and preferred interests from future legislative majorities. 
Statutory Control: Controlling & Overseeing Bureaucratic Action 
Statutory control is considered the most powerful tool legislators have at their 
disposal for controlling or altering agency actions (Wood & Waterman 1993; 
McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987; Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003)24. Although not 
all legislative language reduces agency autonomy or controls bureaucratic behavior, 
statutory control generally signifies the desire of legislators to control bureaucratic action 
as a result of their dissatisfaction with a specific policy area and/or their lack of 
confidence in the agency's ability to achieve their preferred outcomes (Calvert, 
McCubbins & Weingast 1989; Bawn 1997; Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003). As a 
result, it is believed that by strategically using language in legislation, legislators can 
effectively control and alter bureaucratic action ex ante as well as secure specific policy 
outcomes ex post (see McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987; Bawn 1997; Ringquist, 
Worsham & Eisner 2003). In particular, legislators can use language to create or shape an 
produces a more reliable and accurate measure of the ability of legislators to control bureaucracies (see also 
Huber & Shipan 2002). 
24
 McCubbins, Noll & Weingast (1987) posit that statutory control provides a more effective mechanism 
for altering the incentives of agencies, claiming that individual ex ante and ex post controls "do not 
comprise a perfect solution because they are costly, inexact, and have limitations" (pg. 235). 
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agency, require it to use specific procedures or processes, submit a report or findings, 
hold a informational or fact-finding hearing, or define and clarify the parameters of the 
policy area in order to guide or constrain the policy options available to bureaucrats. 
Statutory Control: Protecting Preferred Constituents 
In addition to using legislative language to control and oversee bureaucratic 
action, statutory control protects the interests of groups and constituents for whom the 
policy area is of particular importance (McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll 
& Weingast 1987, 1989; Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991). Since remaining in the legislature 
is one of the most important goals for elected officials (see Fenno 1971; Mayhew 1974), 
legislators can use language in legislation to require bureaucrats to consult with specific 
groups or constituents or hold hearings to present findings to satisfy constituent goals or 
needs and thus ensure that they are included in the development and implementation of 
policy. McCubbins, Noll & Weingast (1987, 1989) define this use of statutory language 
as enfranchising particular constituents or stacking the deck in their favor by predisposing 
agencies toward policy choices that satisfy their favored constituents' preferred outcomes 
(1989, p. 444; see also Balla 1998). This legislative control tactic has also been classified 
as afire alarm by McCubbins & Schwartz (1984). In this instance, legislators' favored 
constituents inform legislators, or sound the alarm, when an agency behaves in a manner 
that is inconsistent with their preferred policy goals or produces outcomes that deviate 
from their preferred policy goals. 
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Statutory Control: Ensuring Policy Outcomes 
Not only do legislators control and limit agency discretion most commonly 
through legislative directives, but they also routinely alter or clarify policy decisions 
through legislation (see Moe 1989; Clingermayer 1991). Although altering legislation is 
considered difficult due to the nature of separation of powers systems (i.e. multiple veto 
players, majority rule cycling) (see above), there are instances in which legislators will 
choose to alter legislation in response to altered economic, political, or social conditions 
(see Pertschuk 1982; Melnick 1983; Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003) or policy 
outcomes that were not anticipated by the legislature (see Clingermayer 1991; Waterman 
& Meier 1998). Statutory control enables legislators to revisit policy decisions ex post in 
order to correct for these situations as well as to amend policy that has deviated from 
their intended outcomes. Although this use of legislation allows legislators to adjust (or 
take advantage) of economic, political, and social changes, it also allows them to alter the 
policy in order to protect or reinforce their preferences because of the changes. 
In addition to protecting against policy uncertainty, legislators also use statutory 
language to protect against the political uncertainty faced by majority coalitions in 
legislatures. Legislators in the current majority coalition can take advantage of the 
fragmented nature of the American political system by imposing policy and procedural 
constraints in legislation that ensure their preferred policy procedures and outcomes will 
not be easily altered by future legislative coalitions (i.e. legislative drift) (Moe 1989; 
Horn & Shepsle 1989; Horn 1995). McCubbins, Noll & Weingast (1987) claim that the 
encumbrances imposed in legislation place bureaucrats on auto-pilot by limiting their 
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choice of policy procedures and outcomes . This tactic, combined with the difficulty 
altering or overturning legislation, makes it difficult for future majorities to influence 
bureaucratic behavior even with changes to preferences or the majority coalition . 
In terms of the PA problems faced by legislators in their attempt to control 
bureaucrats, protect their favored constituents, and ensure their preferred policy 
outcomes, statutory control also allows legislators to obtain invaluable information about 
the specific policy area, the feasibility and effectiveness of specific procedures, and the 
nature of bureaucrats themselves. In particular, these constraints help to alleviate 
informational disadvantages and reduce the uncertainty surrounding the policy area. At 
the same time, statutory control helps alleviate many of the costs legislators would have 
to incur as a result of performing control and oversight on their own. Not only are 
bureaucrats in a better position to obtain policy information due to their experience, 
expertise and connections, but they also know the procedures and process that are most 
feasible and effective (see Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991; Huber, Shipan & Pfhaler 2001). 
In addition to improving information, legislators are also able to insulate 
themselves from potential political costs that may arise because of a failed policy, 
unanticipated negative outcomes, or from participating in risky or controversial issues 
(see Fiorina 1982, 1989; McCubbins 1985; Clingermayer 1991). In what Kiewiet & 
McCubbins (1991) call "blame avoidance," statutory language provides legislators with 
cover to instruct bureaucrats to perform policy development and implementation and the 
25
 McCubbins & Schwartz (1984) use the term lock in to describe this effect. 
26The nature of legislative attempts to alter constraints or change legislation also provides a degree of 
policy security. Specifically, the strategic bargaining and negotiating that takes place between political 
actors in passing legislation ensures that, at the very least, some degree of the majority coalitions 
procedural and policy constraints will incorporated in the legislation. At the same time, because non-
majority legislators and the executive branch are involved in the enactment of legislation, the chances of 
passing the legislation are also increased (see Huber & Shipan 2002, pg 13). 
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ability to decide ex post whether they will take credit for the policy or blame bureaucrats 
for its development (see also McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; Spence 1997). 
Research Examining Legislative Use and Effectiveness of Statutory Control 
Although statutory language improves the ability to assess the impact and 
effectiveness of legislative control of bureaucracies by providing legislative policy 
foresight, some scholars have criticized the mechanism on empirical and theoretical 
grounds. Empirically, studies testing the theoretical assumptions have produced 
conflicting results (Spence 1997; Potoski 1999; Huber & Shipan 2002). Aberbach (1990) 
tests McCubbins & Schwartz's (1984) contention that, in the delegation of policy-making 
authority to bureaucrats through legislation, Congress favors the use of fire alarms over 
police patrols. Aberbach (1990) examines congressional oversight decisions during the 
1960s and 1970s and finds that Congress does not favor fire alarms over police patrols, 
and that the choice of control mechanisms by Congress is issue and context specific. 
More specifically, the study finds that the changing levels of oversight that occurs 
between 1960 and 1970 are directly attributed to the changes to the incentive structure 
within Congress' internal environment as well as the larger political environment27. Balla 
(1998), on the other hand, tests McCubbins, Noll & Weingast's (1987) assertion that 
Congress stacks the deck in favor of the legislators' preferred constituents through 
administrative procedures imposed in legislation. In an examination of the imposition of 
a notice and comment process in the context of Medicare physician payment reform, 
Balla (1998) finds that bureaucrats are influenced more by their own constituents than 
27
 These findings are further supported by Lupia & McCubbins (1994a) which extends Aberbach (1990) to 
determine the conditions under which fire alarms or police patrols are preferable. 
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those favored by legislators. Additionally, the author finds that despite Congress' 
attempts to stack the deck in favor of their preferred constituents, bureaucrats remain 
autonomous in their decision-making28. 
Theoretical questions further compound the empirical criticisms. In particular, 
some legislative control scholars believe that statutory control studies are too interpretive 
and are not generalizeable due to their almost exclusive focus on legislation passed by the 
U.S. Congress - a static legislature that experiences little to no change in institutional 
arrangements, structure or composition across sessions (Squire & Hamm 2005). The 
criticism also stresses the fact that the research does not address the conditions under 
which structure and procedural hypotheses would operate (Potoski 1999; Huber & Shipan 
2002; Volden 2002b). This criticism remains despite the fact that scholars moved to a 
focus on statutory language so that they could obtain legislative policy foresight in order 
to accomplish this goal (Spence 1997). 
Ultimately, the research design examining the use of statutory language in federal 
legislation severely limits our understanding of legislative decisions to engage in 
statutory control of bureaucrats and its effectiveness (Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Huber, 
Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Huber & Shipan 2002).29 Volden (2002b) suggests that these 
limitations - both empirical and theoretical - are due to the inability to obtain data at the 
federal level on factors that are thought to influence legislative control generally and 
Hamilton & Shroeder (1994) and Hamilton (1996) examine the use of administrative procedures to 
facilitate political control over the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The authors 
conclude that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) withstood congressional attempts at control and 
retained significant policy-making discretion. 
29
 Legislative control critics point to studies of a single agency, studies examining a snapshot of control 
decisions, and a single policy area as other biases in theories of legislative control of bureaucracies (see 
Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Volden 2002b). 
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statutory control specifically (p 188-189) . Volden (2002b) suggests that research "must 
systematically analyze decisions across varying political settings if we desire to more 
thoroughly understand the political processes governing delegation or control" (pg. 188). 
To address these problems, the literature examining legislative control of 
bureaucracies shifted once again. In particular, legislative scholars began testing their 
theories and examining the relationship between legislators and bureaucrats in an 
environment that varied in political and institutional arrangements - U.S. state 
legislatures (see Keiser & Soss 1998; Holburn & Vanden Bergh 2000; Huber, Shipan & 
Pfahler 2001; de Figueiredo & Vanden Bergh 2001). 
Statutory Control in U.S. State Legislatures 
U.S. state legislatures are widely accepted as ideal laboratories in which to 
examine the impact of political and institutional arrangements on political phenomena 
(Morehouse & Jewell 2004; Kousser 2005). Not only do state legislatures mirror the U.S. 
Congress as an institution in terms of historical and political origins, Republican ideals, 
similar electoral systems, party systems, and legislative functions (see Polsby 1975; 
Squire & Hamm 2005), but their similarities enable scholars to focus exclusively on the 
variation between states and sidestep thorny issues of culture, history and environment 
that often interfere with the ability to make reliable inferences about the effects of their 
differences (Squire & Hamm 2005). However, it is the differences between state 
Other federal level examples that lack sufficient data to test the effectiveness of statutory control include 
the political environment (Epstein & O'Halloran 1994; Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001), the policy area 
(Bawn 1997; Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner 2003), the executive branch (see Beyle 1994; de Figueiredo 
1997; Ferguson 2003), the judiciary (Hill & Brazier 1991; Mashaw 1997; Shipan 1997), and the 
bureaucracy (Shipan 2004). 
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legislatures and Congress that make states ideal for assessing the true impact and 
consequence of institutional design. 
State legislatures are composed of many of their own structures, rules and 
procedures, and have developed or institutionalized differently and at different times (see 
Brace & Ward 1999; Squire & Hamm 2005)31. Although state legislatures are bicameral 
(except Nebraska) and have a two-party system, they differ in their institutional rules 
(e.g. voting requirements, campaign finance laws), degrees of professionalism, party 
dominance (e.g. unified or divided government), composition, and organization (e.g. 
committee systems), to name a few (Squire & Hamm 2005). Because of this variation, 
scholars can observe the impact of behavior, rules and policies in different contexts and 
under different conditions. At the same time, the variation translates into the ability to 
isolate the effects of the variation to answer questions about the impact of legislative and 
institutional design on behavior and policy development and implementation (Kousser 
2005), as well as on decisions to engage in statutory control and its effectiveness (see 
Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Huber & Shipan 2002; Volden 2002b). 
Huber & Shipan's (2002) Deliberate Discretion 
Although numerous scholars have examined the use and effectiveness of statutory 
language to control bureaucracies by U.S. state legislators (see Epstein & O'Halloran 
1994, 1999; Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001; Volden 2002b, 2006), the most cited research 
is Huber & Shipan's (2002) Deliberate Discretion32. In this study, the authors examine 
31
 Some scholars attributed this variation in development as the result of regional factors (Mooney 1995), 
the variation of expertise within states (Burns et al 2005) or reflective of the wealth of the state (Squire & 
Hamm 2005). 
32
 Hereafter, 'Huber & Shipan (2002)' will be referred to as 'Huber & Shipan.' 
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how the institutional and political environments that vary across U.S. states influence the 
amount of discretion provided to bureaucrats to develop and implement the MMC policy. 
In particular, the authors examine 67 laws in 35 U.S. states over a two-year period and 
measure the total number of new words enacted into law in non-appropriations legislation 
that pertains to Medicaid managed care provided to Medicaid recipients (pg. 141). 
Huber & Shipan posit that the amount of discretion legislators provide to 
bureaucrats depends on the existence of four main factors: the policy conflict between the 
legislature and bureaucrats, the bargaining environment within the legislature, the 
capacity of the legislature, and the presence of non-statutory policy-making mechanisms 
(legislative veto). To test their model, the authors measure the amount of new words in 
legislation and argue that the length of legislation is inversely related to the concept of 
discretion. In other words, as the number of words in the legislation increase, the amount 
of discretion provided to bureaucrats decreases. Table 3-1 provides a brief description of 
the main explanatory variables in Huber & Shipan's model. 
Huber & Shipan's examination of decisions by state legislators to provide 
discretion to bureaucrats confirms previous studies' findings regarding the impact of the 
political environment (see Epstein & O'Halloran 1994, 1996, 1999; Huber, Shipan & 
Pfahler 2001). In particular, the authors find that although there is no difference in the 
amount of new words used by state legislators with low compensation (i.e. legislative 
capacity) between unified and divided legislatures, more capable legislators in unified 
legislatures produce more words than those in divided legislatures. These results lead the 
authors to conclude that divided government is necessary but not a sufficient factor to 
produce the incentive for legislators to write more detailed legislation to control and 
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oversee bureaucrats (pg. 161). Additionally, the authors find that those legislators that 
can rely on the legislative veto to control and oversee bureaucrats will do so and, if 
possible, will forego the costs of writing more detailed legislation and allow their 
legislative veto to act as a control and oversight mechanism. 
Table 3-1: Model of Legislative Control of Bureaucracies 
Huber & Shipan (2002) 
Conceptual Variable 
Policy Conflict 
The degree to which legislators and the executive 
branch agree on policy goals. Conflict is likely to 
be greater during divided government, when the 
party that controls the executive branch does not 
also control bother chambers of the legislature. 
Bargaining Environment 
The degree to which both chambers of the 
legislature and executive branch agree on 
policy goals. Given divided government, 
conflict is likely to be greater when each 
chamber is controlled by a different party, 
than with a unified legislature 
Legislative Capacity 
the degree to which legislators have the time 
and resources to engage in statutory control of 
bureaucrats. Capacity is likely to increase 
with the compensation of legislators 
Non-Statutory Factors 
The ability of legislators to alter or deny 
agency rules & regulations without engaging 
in statutory control 
Measurement & Expectation 
Dummy Variable 
(1 = divided government) 
Expectation - Divided government will increase 
the likelihood of legislator engaging in statutory 
control (+) 
Dummy Variable 
(1 = divided government, given divided 
legislature) 
Expectation - Given divided government, a 
divided legislature will increase the likelihood of 
legislators engaging in statutory control (+) 
Legislator Compensation 
Expectation - the higher the compensation 
(professionalism) will increase the likelihood 
of engaging in statutory control (+) 
Legislative Veto 
Dummy Variable (1 = existence given unified 
legislature) 
Expectation - The presence of a legislative 
veto, the less likely legislatures will engage 
in statutory control (-) 
Despite the invaluable information Deliberate Discretion reveals about the impact 
of the political and institutional environments on the amount of discretion provided to 
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bureaucrats, I argue that improvements and expansions to Huber & Shipan's research 
design and institutional model can provide a much more complete understanding of 
legislative control of bureaucrats and the factors that influence these decisions. In 
particular, Huber & Shipan use a dependent variable that is fraught with theoretical and 
empirical problems. Length of legislation is used as a measure for the amount of 
discretion provided to bureaucrats and the authors argue that longer, more detailed 
legislation provides less discretion to bureaucrats to develop and implement policy and 
thus ensures the preferred policy outcomes of the legislators33. Although I agree with 
Huber & Shipan's assumption that longer statutes are more likely to provide less 
discretion on bureaucrats, I do not believe that legislators must write longer, more 
detailed legislation in order to effectively constrain bureaucrats and limit their policy-
making discretion. Instead, I posit that the length of legislation may be sufficient to limit 
bureaucratic discretion, but it is not a necessary condition simply because legislators 
possess other less costly statutory options to control and oversee bureaucrats. 
Legislators can overcome informational asymmetries and the costs associated 
with writing more detailed legislation by using specific, constraining language, including 
additional constraints in legislation (time constraints, approval requirements, and 
sanctions), or by clearly defining the parameters of the policy area designed to limit 
policy-making flexibility and interpretation. At the same time, length of legislation 
includes additional superfluous language that addresses other policy areas or constitutes 
Huber & Shipan originally coded MMC legislation based on the type of instruction given to bureaucrats 
- procedural or policy, but concluded that "lumping together of policy and procedure [sections] is not only 
necessary from a coding perspective but also desirable from a conceptual one" (pg 61). The authors argue 
that "[they] cannot and should not treat the role of procedures as independent of the way in which policy is 
specified in a statute" due to the nature of MMC legislation where procedures are intertwined with policy 
instructions (pg. 61). 
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general legislative language that does not provide any information about the specific 
policy area and does not convey any instructions to bureaucrats that is crucial to assessing 
and understanding legislative policy intent. Lastly, the length of legislation tells us almost 
nothing about the foresight of legislators to control and oversee bureaucrats shown to be 
so important in determining legislative intent and assessing the impact of statutory 
control decisions. Although longer bills suggest that legislators intend to limit 
bureaucratic discretion, they do not provide us with information about the aspects of the 
policy are important to legislators. For example, the amount of words in a bill cannot tell 
us whether legislators are more concerned with the development of the policy, the 
outcomes of policy implementation, or whether they are simply engaging in cheap talk to 
appease particular constituents and ensure re-election. 
To improve our knowledge on statutory control of bureaucrats and the factors that 
affect these decisions, I expand upon Huber & Shipan's research design. First, I construct 
and test two separate dependent variables. The first variable, mandate length, sums the 
length of words pertaining to a particular mandate instead of a simple measure of bill 
length. Mandates are words that convey policy or procedural instructions that only 
directly relate to the specific policy area. This measure provides me with a more accurate 
count of the length of words pertaining specifically to instructions or directives imposed 
on bureaucrats for that specific policy, but it does so without the superfluous language 
that refers to other policies. At the same time, mandate length also allows me to replicate 
Huber & Shipan's empirical model to assess the impact of political and institutional 
factors on the statutory control decisions. 
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The second dependent variable, total control is a measure of the amount of 
control in individual mandates reserved for legislators based on the specific type of 
mandate imposed, the specific language used to convey legislative policy intent, and 
additional control mechanisms designed to further constrain bureaucratic behavior (time 
constraints, approval requirements, or sanctions for non-compliance). Summing the 
amount of control legislators placed in individual mandates, I am able to assess the 
amount of control in each mandate, as well as the amount of control in each bill, in all 
bills in a particular legislative session, and in all bills in a particular state across sessions. 
Although I cannot assess changes in the amount of control as a result of the nature of 
specific policy areas and the structural and institutional differences that exist across state 
legislatures, total control provides me with the necessary policy foresight to more 
accurately assess of the intent of legislators, the importance of the specific policy area, 
and the degree to which legislators choose to provide or constrain bureaucratic discretion 
based on the political and institutional arrangements. In other words, I will not only be 
able examine statutory control strategies within one particular legislative session, but I 
will also be able to compare strategies over legislative sessions as well. 
The second improvement to Huber & Shipan's design involves their predominant 
focus on statutory control decisions in general legislation. By focusing exclusively on 
general legislation, previous studies have only addressed half of the statutory control 
story that exists in state legislatures. I argue that once legislators decide to engage in 
writing more detailed legislation, they must then decide where to impose the control to 
ensure that their preferred outcomes will be enacted and not vetoed or significantly 
altered by the governor. Huber & Shipan's design ignores the possibility of placing 
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statutory language in appropriations bills despite its wide acceptance as a viable 
bureaucratic control mechanism whether through the manipulation of budgets and 
resources (Fenno 1966; Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast 1989; Ting 2001), as a threat 
used to shape agency behavior (Bendor, Taylor & Van Gaalen 1987; Carpenter 1996; 
Shipan 2004; Aldrich, Gomez & Merolla 2006) or based on the belief that governing and 
budgeting are synonymous (Wildavsky 1988; Gerber, Maestas & Dometrius 2005). 
This dissertation expands upon this design by examining data on both decisions to 
engage in statutory control and where the control is imposed, in general legislation or in 
appropriations bills. Including this second stage of the statutory control process provides 
a more realistic environment, as well as enables me to perform a subsequent test to 
determine the impact of the political and institutional environments on these decisions. 
Although results suggest that the capacity of the legislature and partisanship influence 
statutory control decisions, finding out that those or other factors have no impact on 
where language is imposed may render their findings suspect. On the other hand, if we 
find that these factors affect both decisions to engage in statutory control and where that 
control is imposed, than we can be even more confident that institutions do matter. 
A third contribution of this study involves expanding the examination of statutory 
control decisions beyond a single legislative session. Huber & Shipan examine new 
MMC legislation across a discrete period of time, specifically in the one session 
following the 1995-1996. The authors justify their examination due to the variation in the 
way states write legislation and the fact that legislators do not address the same issues in 
each legislative session (pg. 143)34. Huber & Shipan claim that these factors and the fact 
34
 While some states carry over the entire bill without indicating which aspects of the law are new, others 
note additions or subtractions to the law, and others only enact the altered sections. The inability to observe 
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that they did not code the substantive content of MMC bills make it difficult to assess 
the amount of discretion given to bureaucrats over time. Although their design is 
consistent with other studies of statutory control (see Clingermayer 1991; Potoski 1999; 
de Figueiredo & Vanden Burgh 2004), it does little to improve our understanding about 
the long-term effect of statutory control or the use of different strategies based on the 
specific PA relationship, the current political and institutional environment, or changes to 
these environments. In particular, not only do PA relationships develop over time (Harris 
& Milkis 1989; Waterman & Meier 1998; Worsham & Gattrell 2005) but attempts to 
control and oversee bureaucrats may be useful in the short run but lose their effectiveness 
over time, or vice versa (Waterman 1989; Wood & Waterman 1994; Worsham & Gattrell 
2005). More specifically, this design cannot tell us whether legislators incur the costs of 
imposing constraints on bureaucrats once and hope that agencies do what they are told, or 
whether they engage in subsequent attempts to control based on changes to the 
partisanship (e.g. change in partisanship, scandal) or institutions (e.g. elections, term 
limits, procedural changes). At the same time, they cannot tell us whether legislators are 
simply following the suggestions or demands of agencies who articulate their preferences 
to legislators who, in return, write legislation in order to credit claim or appease the 
bureaucracy. An examination of statutory control decisions over time will provide me 
with more information to determine which of these are correct. 
As addressed by Huber & Shipan, the nature of state legislation makes comparing 
statutory control decisions across legislative sessions difficult. Not only are there 
changes to policy over time led Huber & Shipan to abandon the length of legislation and adopt the amount 
of new words. 
35
 Huber & Shipan justify not coding substantive content or language used because they claim that most 
MMC legislation across states is policy specific and very few procedural instructions are used by legislators 
(pg 143). This is not the case with my data; which will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. 
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structural and institutional differences across states that influence the manner in which 
legislation is written and issues addressed, but it also makes tracking specific issues and 
changes to policy difficult. In particular, some states include previous legislation in 
subsequent bills displaying how the policy has been altered while other states only 
include changes to the existing policy. Understanding these limitations and constraints, I 
proceeded to code substantive content in the hopes of obtaining more information about 
specific decisions and strategies over time to improve our understanding of statutory 
control. In particular, I coded the amount of words pertaining to mandates across a 10-
year period (1997-2007), but also the specific language used by legislators to convey 
policy intent or procedural requirements, in addition to any additional mechanisms that 
further constrain bureaucratic action. Coding the substantive content of legislation in this 
manner will allows me to develop a measure of total control in individual mandates and 
bills by each state in a single legislative session, but it also enables me to compare the 
amount of control legislators impose in mandates and bills across sessions. More 
specifically, although I cannot observe changes to the amount of control placed in 
specific mandates and bills across sessions, I can compare statutory control decisions by 
legislators in one legislative session to decisions made in subsequent sessions. For 
example, some states may pass a lengthy bill or one that provides little discretion through 
language and mechanisms in one session and then not address the policy again for many 
years. Other states may pass smaller bills year after year that address different issues and 
thus repeatedly incur the costs associated with statutory control while other states may be 
able to write legislation at will, regardless of time and resources36. Ultimately, this design 
3
 This approach is consistent with the assumptions that longer bills are more costly to write and that 
particular constraints are more costly to include in legislation that others. In particular, Huber & Shipan, 
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will allow me to determine whether differences in statutory control decisions are based 
on changes to the political and institutional environments within the particular state or the 
result of factors the impact all states equally. 
Lastly, this dissertation expands on Huber & Shipan's research by testing an 
empirical model that more appropriately captures the variation in institutional 
arrangements that exist across state legislatures. In particular, Huber & Shipan use a 
measure of legislator salary as a proxy for legislative capacity, a dummy variable for the 
presence of a legislative veto, and measures of the influence of the bureaucracy and 
governor that do not adequately capture their potential impact on statutory control 
decisions. Although their model provides important information about the institutional 
impacts on the amount of discretion provided to bureaucrats, a more appropriate 
institutional model will provide us with a better assessment of the impact of these 
variables. To achieve this goal, I utilize two separate measures of legislative capacity: 
legislative professionalism and committee system strength, and an index of legislative 
veto powers based on differences across state legislatures. Additionally, I employ 
separate measures that better account for the influence of the bureaucracy and the 
governor on statutory control decisions. 
An Expanded Institutional Model of Statutory Control of Bureaucracies 
Based on the theory literature, the proposed improvements and expansions state 
above, Table 3-2 displays Huber & Shipan's statutory control model and the one used in 
my study. 
(see also Epstein & O'Halloran 1994, 1999; Huber, Shipan & Pfahler 2001), argue that policy constraints 
are more costly than procedural ones due to the time and resources necessary to gather information and 
articulate it at a level and in a manner that will shape or constrain bureaucratic behavior. 
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Table 3-2: Comparison of Statutory Control Models 
Huber & Shipan and Goodman 
Conceptual Variable 
Policy Conflict 
Bargaining 
Environment 
Legislative Capacity 
Non-Statutory Control 
Mechanisms 
Bureaucratic Autonomy 
Executive - Legislative Relations 
Huber & Shipan 
dummy variable 
(1 = divided government) 
dummy variable 
(1 = divided legislature, given divided 
government) 
Legislator compensation 
dummy variable 
(1= presence of legislative veto given 
unified legislature) 
Salary of Administrative Heads 
Gubernatorial powers 
Goodman 
Same as Huber & Shipan 
Same as Huber & Shipan 
Legislative Professionalism 
Committee System Strength 
Legislative Veto Scale 
Bureaucratic Autonomy Scale 
Gubernatorial Effectiveness Scale 
While I adopt their hypotheses for policy conflict and bargaining environment, I expand 
upon their measures legislative capacity, legislative veto, and the independent influence 
of the bureaucracy and the governor. The following section addresses each variable 
separately and provides the hypotheses I employ to test them. 
Policy Conflict 
Although the executive branch in state legislatures (e.g. governors) vary in the 
amount of policy-making and appropriations powers, (see Beyle 1990), their involvement 
in the policy-making arena is well documented (see Dometrius 1979b; Morehouse 1996; 
Ferguson 2003). Governors possess their own constituents and policy preferences that are 
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likely to be different even if they share the same party as the majority party in the 
legislature (Barrilleaux & Berkman 2003). As a result, legislators have the incentive to 
protect their preferences through legislation and control the actions of the governor's 
servants (bureaucrats), especially when the executive branch is controlled by a different 
party. Thus if the legislature is controlled by one party {unified legislature) and the 
executive branch is controlled by another {divided government), I assume that the two 
branches possess divergent policy preferences and compete to enact policies that better 
represent their preferences and outcomes. As a result, I would expect legislators to incur 
the costs of engaging in statutory control to protect their interests. This is consistent with 
Huber & Shipan's assumption that legislators will provide less discretion to bureaucrats 
when policy conflict exists. I agree with this expectation and adopt it as a hypothesis: 
Hi - State legislators within a divided government will be more likely to engage 
in statutory control of bureaucracies than state legislators within a unified 
government 
Bargaining Environment 
When the two chambers of the legislature are controlled by different parties 
{divided legislatures), the costs of writing more detailed legislation rise significantly as a 
result of the bargaining and compromise that takes place because of chambers with 
different policy preferences attempt to pass legislation that is closer to their preferred 
outcomes. This conflict between chambers will also limit the extent to which the 
proposing chamber opposing the governor can limit the amount of discretion provided to 
bureaucrats. If the proposing chamber decides to engage in statutory control, it will 
therefore likely expend more resources (i.e. time, staff) gathering and developing 
language in legislation that will be acceptable not only to the opposing chamber, but to 
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the governor as well. This further raises the costs of engaging in statutory control and the 
uncertainty of policy enactment. In some cases, if the costs get too high, it is likely that 
legislators will be deterred from engaging in statutory control altogether. As a result, the 
second hypothesis states: 
H2 - Given divided government, legislators in a unified legislature are more 
likely to engage in statutory control of bureaucrats than legislators in a divided 
legislature. 
It should be noted that in addition to adopting Huber & Shipan's measures of 
policy conflict and bargaining environment, I also adopt their classification of the 
variables as well. More specifically, Huber & Shipan combine their measures of policy 
conflict and bargaining environment to make their empirical tests more straightforward 
and readable. In particular, the authors measure two separate variables: divided 
legislature and unified legislatures against the governor. Divided legislature refers to 
instances where the governor's party controls only one of the legislative chambers. This 
incorporates the policy conflict that would arise as a result of the governor and one 
chamber possessing divergent policy preferences, as well as the divergent policy 
preferences associated with both chambers controlled by different parties {bargaining 
environment). The expectation in divided legislature is that the costs will be too high for 
legislators to engage in statutory control given the adversarial environment and the 
hurdles they must overcome to enact policies that represent and ensure their preferred 
outcomes. Divided legislatures take the value of " 1 " when the governor's party controls 
one chamber of the legislature. 
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Unified legislatures against the governor refers to situations in which both 
chambers of the legislature are controlled by the same party and the executive branch is 
controlled by an opposing party. In these instances, legislators in both chambers likely 
share similar policy preferences and, as a result, can minimize the costs associated with 
engaging in statutory control as well as obtaining information and overcoming 
informational disadvantages. Additionally, the expectation in unified legislatures against 
the governor is that legislators will engage in statutory control to make sure that 
bureaucrats with divergent preferences will pursue policy outcomes and procedures 
consistent with legislative intent. Unified legislatures against the governor take the value 
of " 1 " when the chambers are controlled by the same party but not the executive. 
Legislative Capacity 
Huber & Shipan find that highly capable legislators are better able to write more 
detailed legislation and incur the costs of controlling and overseeing bureaucrats than 
legislators in low capacity legislatures. However, they use a measure of legislative 
capacity based on the total amount of compensation paid to legislators per year. Huber & 
Shipan justify the use of the measure of compensation stressing the importance of the 
individual legislator's motivation to control bureaucrats (pg. 151). I do not believe, 
however, that legislator salary is sufficient on its own to represent the type of resources 
necessary to engage in statutory control. More specifically, the decision to engage in 
statutory control is a collective agreement on the part of legislators in a chamber or both 
chambers based on shared policy preferences and/or a desire to control bureaucratic 
behavior and ensure their collective preferred outcomes. At the same time, there also 
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exists more appropriate institutional factors in state legislatures that influence the 
collective ability of legislators to write longer, more detailed legislation. Testing only the 
one measure of capacity limits our understanding of impact of other variables or their 
interactions with compensation. To expand on this analysis I examine two separate 
measures of capacity: legislative professionalism and committee system strength. 
Legislative Professionalism 
Legislative compensation is a proxy for legislative professionalism, a measure 
that was developed primarily to gauge how much the state legislative institution 
resembles the U.S. Congress in terms of member salary, time spent in session, and 
resources available to its members, such as staff and facilities (see Squire 1992b; Squire 
& Hamm 2005) . However, I argue that the costs (time, resources) associated with 
researching and developing policy and writing detailed legislation is related to more than 
just the salary of legislators. In fact, legislative resources - in particular, legislative staff-
are often intimately involved in the legislative process and in some cases (term limited 
states) play a much more dominant role in the development of policy and in the writing of 
legislation (Grossbeck & Peterson 2004). At the same time, the length of the legislative 
session has the potential to influence statutory control decisions. Longer legislative 
sessions provide legislators with more time in which to research, develop, and write 
policy, as well as engage in the bargaining and compromise that takes place between 
37
 State legislatures that pay higher member salaries, are in session longer, and provide members with more 
staff and resources are considered similar to the U.S. Congress and thus highly professionalized, while 
other legislatures are considered hybrid or amateur depending on the level of these factors in their 
institutions (Squire 1992b; Hamm & Squire 2004; Squire & Hamm 2005). Research has found that the 
level of professionalism significantly influences decisions to adopt control mechanisms (Hamm & 
Robertson 1981; de Figuieredo & Vanden Burgh 2004) and influences incentives to impose control on 
bureaucrats (Rosenthal 1981; Epstein & O'Halloran 1994). 
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political actors in the policy-making arena. Unlike legislators that meet once every two 
years (biennium), legislators that meet year around (annual) are also more stable and 
typically composed of career politicians who have a better grasp of specific policies and 
the legislative process (Squire 1988a). Career politicians are also more likely to have 
established relationships with bureaucrats and interest groups (Heclo 1978; Baumgartner 
& Jones 1993; Sabatier 1999) and thus can alleviate the costs associated with gathering 
information and writing detailed legislation. 
Huber & Shipan test a measure of legislative professionalism and find that it 
introduces an unacceptable level of collinearity (pg 151). The authors claim, however, 
that the collinearity problem is the result of the "relatively small data set and the use of 
multiple interacted terms" (pg 152). The data in this study, however, are not small -
nearly 8,300 individual observations. As a result, I feel more comfortable using Squire's 
(2007) index of legislative professionalism which represents how close the state 
legislature resembles the U.S. Congress in terms of legislator salary, time in session and 
resources (e.g. staff, facilities, etc). 
Squire's (2007) index combines the base legislative salary amount in each state 
(salary), number of legislative days (not calendar days) a legislator is at the state capitol 
conducting business (session length), number of staff members providing assistance to 
legislators (resources). I believe that this measure of professionalism will better assess the 
impact of these factors on the capacity of legislators to write more detailed legislation and 
incur the costs of control. I do believe, however, that the level of professionalism will 
impact primarily the amount of discretion (i.e. whether to engage in statutory control) 
since legislators that lack the time and resources necessary to invest in writing more 
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detailed language will likely be deterred from doing so in the first place. As a result, the 
third hypothesis states: 
Hs - more professionalized state legislators will be more likely to engage in 
statutory control of bureaucrats than less professionalized state legislators 
Legislative Committee Strength 
To better assess the impact of the capacity of the particular legislature, I also 
include a measure of legislative committee strength. Legislative committees at the heart 
of the policy-making process (Francis 1989; Hedlund & Hamm 2004; Squire & Hamm 
2005), and stronger committee systems, in terms of structure and formal rules have been 
found to impact the behavior and strategies of individual legislators (Hedlund & Hamm 
1996; Hamm, Hedlund & Martorano 2001; Martorano 2002), as well as influence the 
context of lawmaking (Hamm, Hedlund & Martorano 2006) as a result of the 
specialization of the committees and the ability of its members to self-select onto 
committees that match theirs or their constituents' interests (Hedlund & Hamm 2005)38. 
Research has also found that stronger committee systems interact directly with agencies 
to develop and implement legislation and do so outside of the public purview (see Hall & 
Wayman 1990). This insulation from the public enables committees to deal with sensitive 
and controversial policy issues without the threat of adverse political costs. 
In terms of the PA relationship between legislators and bureaucrats, stronger 
committee systems enable legislators to minimize the informational disadvantages with 
the ability to research, develop and disseminate information in addition to the specific 
policy knowledge of the committee members who self-selected to the particular 
38
 Hamm, Hedlund, & Martorano (2006) find that strong committee systems possess significant power to 
obtain information, review and alter legislation, control committee and floor actions, as well as enjoy 
significant deference from the chamber as a whole (see also Francis 1989). 
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committee. As a result, legislators can significantly reduce the costs associated with 
gathering information, writing more detailed legislation, and controlling bureaucratic 
action. Legislators in states that are less professionalized and who lack the requisite time 
and resources to invest into writing detailed legislation may also be able to rely on 
stronger committee systems to help gather information in addition to alleviating the costs 
associated with statutory control. As a result the fourth hypothesis states: 
H4 - state legislators with strong committee systems will be more likely to 
engage in statutory control of bureaucrats than state legislators with weaker 
committee systems 
To capture the impact of committee system strength on statutory control decisions 
I use individual state measures developed by Martarano (2006) that measure committee 
system power across 99 state legislative chambers (Nebraska has one chamber) based on 
6 dimensions: committee effectiveness; the ability to receive, screen, and shape bills; 
affect the passage of bills; the ability to hold meetings and gather information; and the 
institutional capacity and power of the committee system. I argue that legislative 
committees that possess these powers will be better able to gather information and incur 
the costs of writing more detailed legislation (see above). 
It is important to mention here that using committee system strength as a measure 
of legislative capacity is based on the assumption that state committees are structured and 
organized in a manner that ensures that they are agents and not outliers of the full 
chamber. This belief is consistent with the informational theory of legislative 
organization as posited by Krehbiel (1990) (see also Gilligan & Krehbiel 1991; Overby & 
Kazee 2000; Aldrich & Battista 2002; Hedlund & Hamm 2005; Prince & Overby 2005). 
In this rationale, legislators organize committees to achieve the needs of the parent 
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chamber, especially in ways to overcome informational disadvantages and a lack of 
resources to become more specialized and improve the development and implementation 
of policy (Krehbiel 1991). Although other theories of legislative organization 
(distributive and partisan theories) provide different explanations for committee 
assignments39, the informational rationale has found the most empirical support at the 
state level. Specifically, Overby & Kazee (2000) use interest group ratings of state 
legislators in 12 lower state houses to examine roll call votes and find that outlying 
committees are rare, especially in more professionalized and amateur legislatures. In 
instances where committees are outliers, Overby & Kazee (2000) finds that they are not 
important control or money committees (appropriations, ways and means). Further 
support of the informational rationale is found by Hedlund & Hamm (2005). In this 
study, the authors assess whether different state committees are outliers of the parent 
chamber in five different states from 1909 to 1989. Using a Monte Carlo simulation to 
obtain percentages of specific committees occupational traits, the authors find that 
legislators with specific occupational experience are assigned to committee for which that 
experience is relevant, and that this has occurred consistently throughout the century. As 
a result of these studies, I am confident in making this assumption. 
Non - Statutory Control Mechanism: The Legislative Veto 
Non-statutory control mechanisms are institutional arrangements or procedures 
enacted through statutes that act to constrain the behavior of bureaucrats automatically, 
3
 The distributive theory posits that committee assignments are the result of "gains for exchange" in which 
members seek assignments to obtain benefits for their constituents (see Shepsle 1978; Weingast & Marshall 
1988). The partisan rationale suggests that assignments are made to solve collective action problems by 
delegating assignment power to party leaders (see Cox & McCubbins 1993), 
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without re-establishing them with every new piece of legislation (see McCubbins, Noll, 
Weingast 1987, 1989; de Figueiredo & Vanden Burgh 2004; Rossi 2006). For example, 
the American Procedures Act ("APA") regulations require agencies to receive some form 
of tacit if not explicit approval from the legislature prior to policy action (see McCubbins 
& Schwartz 1984; Clingermayer 1991; Reenock & Poggione 2004). In essence, "they 
create a set of super-ordinate requirements including rules of notice, standing, 
information gathering, and judicial review that every agency must follow in making 
policy decisions" (de Figuieredo & Vanden Burgh 2004, 569-570). The procedures allow 
legislatures to bypass potential hurdles to the passage of legislation such as gubernatorial 
vetoes (McCubbins, Noll, Weingast, 1989, 435-440). 
The legislative veto, on the other hand, is the "ultimate in...oversight power" 
(Ethridge 1984). It provides legislators with a significant mechanism in which to shape or 
alter agency behavior automatically by allowing them to review agency rules and 
regulations prior to their adoption in order to determine whether they are reasonable and 
faithful to the legislative intent (see Ethridge 1984; Gerber, Maestas & Dometrius 2005). 
Although legislators vary in the scope and power of their legislative vetoes (formal 
versus advisory, ability to suspend rules, and result of inaction, to name a few) legislators 
"do not have to rely solely on statutory strategies to achieve the policy outcomes they 
desire from bureaucratic activity" (Huber & Shipan 2002, 149). As a result of this 
variation, legislators with extensive legislative vetoes may alleviate the need to engage in 
statutory control altogether. Bureaucrats know ex ante the power of legislators to 
influence the adoption of their proposed rules and regulations and are thus more likely to 
adopt rules that are closer to the preferences of the legislature (McCubbins, Noll & 
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Weingast 1987; de Figueiredo & Vanden Burgh 2004). At the same time, this self-
monitoring on the part of bureaucrats enables legislators to save time and resources by 
alleviating the bargaining and compromise that would take place in the absence of the on-
going statutory control mechanisms. 
Although Huber & Shipan (2002) find that a legislative veto diminishes the 
incentive for legislators to provide more discretion to bureaucrats, they use a dummy 
variable for the presence of a legislative veto given a unified legislature. They justify the 
use of the dummy variable in this situation by claiming that all states that have a 
legislative veto have similar procedures (pg 160) and that it is likely only to be utilized in 
a unified legislature. Although I suspect that the presence of a veto will reduce the need 
to engage in statutory control, eight states do not possess a formal veto (CA, HI, MN, 
MS, NE, NM, RI & TX), and there exists significant variation in veto powers in the 
remaining 42 states. These differences can slow down the process, create gridlock, and 
increase costs of policy-making as well as diminish the veto's effectiveness. 
In half of the states that possess a legislative veto, the mechanism is only advisory 
and possesses no formal power over agency rules and regulations. In the other half of the 
states, legislators vary in whether they must act (approve or disapprove) of agency rules 
and regulations, or simply not act and allow the submission to die without 
implementation. Of the states that vary in whether they must act or not, they also differ 
on by the actors necessary to overrule the veto (one committee, one chamber or both 
chambers). At the same time, based on the variation in scope and power of the veto, I also 
believe that its use will extend beyond unified legislatures, especially in situations where 
the veto is advisory or not as difficult to overrule. As a result, I replace Huber & Shipan's 
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dummy variable with a scale of legislative veto power with "0" constituting no power and 
"7" constituting the most power and most difficult to overturn. I develop the index using 
information obtained from the NCSL and research performed by Ethridge (1984). As a 
result, the seventh hypothesis states: 
H; - state legislators that possess extensive non-statutory control mechanisms 
are less likely to engage in statutory control of bureaucrats than state legislators 
that have less extensive non-statutory control mechanisms. 
The Impact of Other Political Actors on Statutory Control Decisions 
Legislators do not make statutory control decisions in a vacuum. Although 
legislators must have the power and capacity to engage in bureaucratic control, these 
factors must be examined in relation to the competing power of other institutions 
involved policy-making, specifically the power of the bureaucracy and the governor. An 
executive or bureaucracy that does not share the legislators' preferences and possesses 
extensive policy-making and appropriations power can significantly affect the ability of 
legislators to ensure their preferred policy outcomes. 
Bureaucratic Autonomy 
As discussed earlier, bureaucrats not only have the ability and desire to influence 
policy and its outcomes, but they often do so. To capture the impact of the bureaucracy as 
an independent institution, Huber & Shipan use the salary of agency administrators to 
measure the amount of their autonomy and ability to both withstand legislative directives 
and influence the policy-making process. Higher paid agency administrators, according to 
Huber & Shipan, are more likely to head larger agencies and/or lead bureaucrats in more 
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important policy areas. The authors believe that these factors improve the ability of 
agencies to influence legislation and withstand legislative directives (Hammond 1986). 
Although the salary of the agency administrators is likely to constitute larger and 
agencies dealing with more important policy areas, I do not believe that administrator 
salary alone is a sufficient measure to account for bureaucratic autonomy. In addition to 
the importance or size of the agency, the salary of the administrator may simply reflect 
the cost of living in the state or amount of time a specific administrator has held the 
position. At the same time, other factors exist that can have an impact the policy-making 
process and the ability of bureaucracies to withstand legislative directives. For example, 
the governor appoints some agency administrators, while others are elected and not 
beholden to the governor. They possess their own constituents and, like other elected 
officials, will adopt policy preferences that will ensure their reelection. Additionally, 
some agency administrators are members of the governor's cabinet and some have tenure 
that overlaps with that of the governor. Both of these factors will influence whether they 
share similar preferences as the governor or whether they will pursue their own. 
The nature of the bureaucrats themselves can affect bureaucratic autonomy. Aside 
from the size and the salary of bureaucrats, those that are civil servants are career policy 
professionals that likely possess different preferences than their administrators who are 
likely to be directly or indirectly tied to the executive branch. To capture the influence of 
the bureaucracy on statutory control decisions, I include a measure of bureaucratic 
autonomy developed from survey responses of state agency heads from the American 
State Administrators Project (ASAP) (Bowling & Wright 2004). The ASAP project 
began surveying state agencies twice every decade since 1964 regarding their specific 
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agencies, but also attitudinal questions regarding the influence of the executive and 
legislative branches on the agency in general and their budgeting process in particular. 
Scores are based on a "0" to "3" scale ("3" being the most influential) and the means for 
each survey year (1994, 1998, and 2004) are added together and divided by the number 
of years to obtain a single score of bureaucratic autonomy. 
Although survey responses are thought to introduce a degree of bias and are 
considered rough indicators of executive and legislative influence, they are the best we 
have available due to the dearth of research examining bureaucratic autonomy (see 
Waterman & Meier 1998; Meier & O'Toole 2006). Additionally, the ASAP project 
gathers survey responses over time so that we can evaluate any significant changes or 
trends over time. This will enable me to better evaluate the responses and determine if 
changes were the result of political and/or institutional forces. 
The impact of bureaucrats is likely to be similar regardless of where the control is 
imposed (Potoski 1999; Ruhil & Teske 2003; Shipan 2004; Meier & O'Toole 2006). If 
bureaucrats are going to influence legislation, they will do so whether it is in 
appropriations bills or general legislation. As a result, the eight hypothesis states: 
He - state legislators confronted by more autonomous bureaucrats are more 
likely to engage in statutory control than state legislators that are confronted by 
less autonomous bureaucrats 
Gubernatorial Effectiveness 
In the case of governors, scholars have consistently demonstrated gubernatorial 
influence in the policy-making arena through formal powers such as agency 
4
 Survey responses run the risk of biased results due to question construction, word choice, definitions, and 
ordering (see Morgan & Sonquist 1963; Achen 1975), as well as by the incentive of some respondents to 
either promote or negate the influence of other political actors. 
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appointments (Dometrius 1979b), agenda power (Morehouse 1996; Hall 2002), budget 
powers (Sharansky 1968; Barrilleaux & Berkman 2003), and through informal powers 
such as persuasion and personality (Jewell 1962; Rosenthal 1990; Ferguson 2003) . 
Governors, however, vary in their formal powers across states (see Beyle 1999). 
Specifically, governors differ in their tenure potential (term limited or not), appointment 
power, veto capabilities, whether they received an electoral mandate in the previous 
election, the year of their term (election year or not), and whether their party controls the 
legislature. These factors contribute to the governor's ability to influence legislation and 
thus impact statutory control decisions. In particular, a governor with a mandate in the 
previous election, who is not in an election year and not constrained by term limits and 
possesses a line-item veto can significantly frustrate the ability of legislator's to obtain 
information due to their control over bureaucrats, in addition to raising the costs of 
engaging in statutory control due to their ability to alter language or veto the legislation 
altogether. On the other hand, governors with strong legislative powers can influence the 
decision of legislators where to impose the control as well. A governor with weak 
appropriations powers but who possesses a line-item veto, an electoral mandate, whom 
appoints the majority of executive branch officers, and is not constrained by term limits 
will limit the legislator's statutory control options and likely force them to impose the 
control in appropriations bills, if at all. 
Legislators know ex ante gubernatorial policy preferences as well as their formal 
(institutional) and informal (personal) powers. It is reasonable to believe that legislators 
41
 Executive influence in the legislative arena well established in political studies at both the national 
(Neustadt 1960; Bond & Fleischer 1990; Covington, Wright & Kenney 1995; Edwards & Wood 1999; 
Canes-Wrone 2001; Binder & Maltzman 2002) and the U.S. state level (Schlesinger 1971; Bernick 1979; 
Clynch & Lauth 1991; Gosling 1994; Beyle 1996; Rosenthal 1998; Barrilleaux & Berkman 2003; Ferguson 
2003). 
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take these factors into consideration when making a decision to engage in statutory 
control as well as where that control will be imposed. As a result, it makes little sense for 
legislators in low capacity legislatures to engage in statutory control when confronted by 
a governor from a competing party with extensive legislative power and/or appropriations 
powers. The costs for legislators are simply too high. Not only must a legislature invest 
scarce resources and time to legislation that is unlikely to receive the governor's 
signature, but they must also incur the political costs of supporting legislation that is 
likely to be defeated or significantly altered by the chief executive. The same costs arise 
in the decision where to impose the control. As mentioned previously, legislators are less 
likely to impose statutory control in appropriations bills when the governor enjoys 
significant appropriations power and thus the ability to alter language and amounts to 
ensure his/her preferred policy outcomes. 
Huber & Shipan include measures "specific to the governor that might influence 
the level of discretion" including the percentage of vote necessary to override a 
gubernatorial veto, gubernatorial appointment powers, his/her prospects for staying in 
power, veto powers, and a summary measure of the governor's institutional powers. The 
authors find that none of the variables are significant but admit that this is "somewhat 
surprising" (pg. 165) and gubernatorial influence and bureaucratic professionalism 
"deserves further investigation" (pg. 165). Although they find no impact of their measure 
on the amount of discretion provided, the measure used only addresses a few ways in 
which the governor can influence policy. 
To improve upon Huber & Shipan's measure, I create an index of gubernatorial 
influence or effectiveness in the legislative arena based on the Beyle (1999) measure 
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consisting of a governor's appointment, budget, veto, and tenure potential. However, the 
Beyle (1999) measure is coded differently across years and only dates back a few years. 
To expand upon the Beyle (1999) measure, I re-coded all of the variables using the Book 
of the States and various internet sources (National Conference of State Legislatures 
website) from 1990 to 2007. The new, expanded measure provides me with consistent 
values throughout the timeframe of this study and enables me to more accurately assess 
the impact of gubernatorial effectiveness and their impact on statutory control. As a 
result, I include the following hypotheses: 
Hj - state legislators that face a highly effective governor are less likely to 
engage in statutory control of bureaucrats than those that face less effective 
governors. 
Control Variables 
An additional reason for choosing to examine mandates that refer directly or 
indirectly to the CHIP policy is to eliminate language referring to other policies that are 
often included in legislative bills that lead to more words and thus longer bills. Huber & 
Shipan's dependent variable does not differentiate between discretion and this 
superfluous language and, as a result, they must control for the possibility of length of 
legislation being related to policy change. Although I do not have to worry about these 
additional words impacting my findings, I choose to utilize numerous controls to account 
for the length of mandates and the amount of control not related to discretion. First, I 
control for the type of CHIP program established in the state. It is argued in this study 
that CHIP programs that are encompassed by the larger Medicaid program (i.e. Medicaid 
expansion) will have much of the health care specifics already in place at the time of 
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CHIP initiation (e.g. enrollment procedures, eligibility process). An established program 
will significantly diminish the need for more detailed instructions. Hybrid programs will 
require more attention than Medicaid expansions, but less than a stand-alone program 
that will require legislators to spend significant time establishing the program and 
defining its parameters. To account for the type of CHIP program used in the state, I 
include a measure of CHIP program type that takes the value of "0" for states that adopt 
a Medicaid expansion, a " 1 " for states that possess a hybrid program, and a "2" for states 
with a stand-alone CHIP program. 
Second, the length of CHIP mandates or the amount of control may simply be the 
result of an increase in demand for insurance for low-income children rather than a 
function of changes in partisanship or institutional arrangements. In other words, 
legislators are likely to alter or expand CHIP policy when a demand for the program is 
increased. As a result, we should see more detailed, and thus longer, CHIP legislation in 
states that spend more money on CHIP to meet the demand. To account for this 
possibility, I include a measure of the average CHIP expenditures in each state between 
2000 and 2006 obtained the Kaiser Family state health facts website 
(www.statehealthfacts.org). 
Third, consistent with the demands of the CHIP program type and CHIP 
expenditures, legislators may simply engage in statutory control of bureaucrats because 
of the control that they imposed in the previous legislative session. In other words, the 
demands on legislators are similar from session to session and they must engage in 
statutory control in order to meet the continued needs of the program they chose as well 
as the amount of expenditures they dedicate to their CHIP programs. I expect, however, 
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that legislators that impose a significant amount of control in one session will be less 
likely to impose similar levels in a subsequent session since many of the issues or needs 
were addressed in the first session. This does not mean that they will not engage at all, 
only that the level of control will be diminished. 
Chapter Summary 
The goal of this chapter was to provide a more in depth analysis of the research on 
the use of statutory control and address how this dissertation improves upon this research. 
In doing so, I focused predominantly on Huber & Shipan's Deliberate Discretion and 
examined how my empirical model expands upon the variables and measurements used 
in their model of statutory control. Based on the PA framework, the literature and Huber 
& Shipan, the chapter concluded with a discussion of the specific variables and the 
hypotheses to be tested in the dissertation. 
The next chapter introduces the policy area I have chosen to examine - the 
Children's Health Insurance Program ("CHIP") and examines the dependent variables to 
be tested in this study. In particular, I discuss the how the data was collected and coded to 
develop my two dependent variables, mandate length and amount of control, as well as 
how these measures improve upon the prevailing literature on statutory control of 
bureaucrats at the state level. 
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Chapter 4: 
Dependent Variables and Research Design 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, the goal of this dissertation is to improve 
upon the prevailing literature by testing an expanded empirical model of statutory control 
of bureaucrats that more appropriately captures the institutional variation that exists 
across the U.S. states and utilizes a new dataset of statutory control decisions over a 10-
year period. The previous chapter described the progression of statutory control research 
at the state level and examined the explanatory and control variables that I use in this 
study. This chapter continues the examination of my model, addresses the policy area 
from which I obtain my data, and begins the discussion of my dependent variables, 
mandate length and total control. In particular, I introduce the Children's Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) and discuss why the CHIP program is an ideal policy in which 
to examine statutory control of bureaucrats. Within this discussion, I also address how I 
collect and code the data to develop my dependent variables. The chapter concludes with 
an examination of my dependent variables and a discussion of how they improve upon 
previous studies of statutory control, in particular the research by Huber & Shipan. 
The Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) 
Addressing the growing popular support for expanding the insurance coverage to 
children in low-income families in the U.S., and an attempt to protect the existing 
Medicaid coverage for children and parents, the U.S. Congress passed the Children's 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) through the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 as Title XXI 
of the Social Security Act of 1997. The program provides individual states with funds to 
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assist in the development, implementation, and maintenance of their CHIP program 
designed to cover children in families ineligible for Medicaid coverage and unable to 
afford private insurance. The funds are in the form of grants, capped annually, that match 
the amount of state expenditures on the population of uninsured children. Nearly $40 
billion in matching funds were appropriated for the first 10 years of CHIP and, by fiscal 
year 2003, 48 states had programs approved by Congress and were receiving these 
grants42 (U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 2005). 
Although the CHIP legislation passed by Congress provides states with significant 
flexibility in the development and implementation of their programs, states were expected 
to meet specific requirements including setting income eligibility limits up to 200% of 
the federal poverty level (FPL) and choosing among 3 program designs: a separate or 
stand-alone CHIP model, a Medicaid expansion model, or a hybrid system that 
incorporates both the stand-alone design and an existing Medicaid design (Dubay et al. 
2002). Medicaid expansion programs extend CHIP enrollees the same benefits covered 
by the Medicaid plan, while the stand-alone CHIP programs provide enrollees with 
limited benefits primarily because of skepticism over the funding cap and the desire by 
states to adopt a program similar to a private system (Dubay et al. 2002). Although the 
stand-alone and hybrid programs provide states with more flexibility in program design 
(premiums, copayment amounts, and other forms of cost sharing), they also constrain 
their ability to use funds (Dubay et al. 2002). 
Since the initial enrollment of CHIP recipients in 1997, most states have altered 
their original designs, expanded, and in some cases constricted, their coverage through 
42
 Arkansas and Tennessee dropped their CHIP programs in 2002 due to Sect. 1115 demonstrations that 
offered Medicaid coverage that included all children under 100% of the poverty level up to the age 19 
(USDHHS 2005). 
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waivers and amendments, altered enrollment procedures, defined new co-payment 
standards, and modified benefits packages (Dubay et al. 2002). In addition to the nearly 
5.9 million low-income children enrolled in CHIP during 2003, 8 states enrolled nearly 
500,000 adults in CHIP through program waivers despite the erosion of private health 
coverage during this time (Broaddus & Park 2007). The adults included in many CHIP 
programs range from pregnant women, parents of uninsured children and, in Connecticut, 
to qualified, non-state residents. 
CHIP and Statutory Control 
For the purposes of assessing the impact of the political and institutional 
environments on statutory control decisions, CHIP is an ideal policy for various reasons. 
First, all U.S. states have passed CHIP legislation in one form or another, and have used 
legislation to both develop and implement their program. Individual state attention to the 
CHIP program is due in part to the popularity of the policy that provides health care for 
low-income children. Citizens favor protecting children and elected officials favor 
opportunities that allow them to appease their constituents and credit claim to improve 
their re-election chances. However, the CHIP policy is also attractive to individual states 
because federal matching grants are "too attractive to pass up" (Volden 2006, pg 296)43. 
At a time when many states were experiencing budget shortages, increased Medicaid 
expenditures, and increased levels of uninsured children (Lambrew 2007), the 
opportunity to acquire federal funds was welcomed by legislators seeking to offset and 
prevent further budget shortfalls as well as obtain funds for essential state programs. 
43
 Most states passed their CHIP legislation between the years of 1997 - 1999 with a few states doing so by 
2001. Tennessee was the last state to apply for matching funds in 2006. 
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Second, although the federal government required all states to enact some 
structural and procedural requirements, states were given considerable flexibility to 
develop, implement, and maintain their policy programs based on their own individual 
needs, culture, and resources (Broaddus & Park 2007). As a result, there exist significant 
differences in CHIP programs across state legislatures. Table 4-1 provides a brief 
description of some of the variation in CHIP programs that exist across the U.S. states. In 
particular, the table displays differences in the name 
Table 4 -1 
Variation in CHIP Programs across Eight States (2003) 
State 
Colorado 
Texas 
Illinois 
Missouri 
New Jersey 
Louisiana 
North Carolina 
New York 
Program 
Name 
Child . 
Health Plan 
Plus 
TexCare 
Kid Care 
MC+ for 
kids 
Family 
Care 
LaCHIP 
Health 
Choice 
Child 
Health Plus 
Design 
Type 
Separate 
Medicaid 
Medicaid 
Medicaid 
Combined 
Medicaid 
Separate 
Separate 
Enrollment 
52K 
730K 
70K 
112K 
117K 
88K 
120K 
807K 
Income 
Eligibility 
185% 
185% 
133% 
300% 
200% 
133% 
200% 
185% 
Waiting 
Period 
3 months 
No 
No 
6 months 
12 months 
3 months 
2 months 
No 
Continuous 
Eligibility 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Required 
Copayment 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Source: U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Congressionally Mandated Evaluation ofSCHIP: 
Final Report to Congress (Oct 26, 2005). 
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of individual state programs, the type of program (Medicaid expansion, separate CHIP 
program, or hybrid), the income level at which low-income children are eligible to 
receive coverage, the waiting period a participant must wait for coverage when 
converting from private insurance, whether a recipient has continuous eligibility of must 
reapply after a designated time, and whether a copayment is required for coverage. 
The differences between states also provide an ideal opportunity in which to 
examine the impact of changes to these environments on decisions whether to engage in 
statutory control and where such control was imposed (see Volden 2006). Because most 
states implemented their CHIP programs between 1997 and 1999, I am able to examine 
initial CHIP legislation in each state as well as observe subsequent legislation and 
statutory control strategies over time44. Although most of the institutional arrangements 
remain relatively stable within each state over time, the political environment and other 
factors (salience of the policy, budget shortfalls or surpluses) are subject to change and 
can influence whether legislators choose to engage in statutory control and where they 
impose such control* if at all. 
In the state of Connecticut, for example, legislators appeared to be at the forefront 
of CHIP legislation by making children in families below 300% of the FPL eligible for 
their CHIP program called Husky Care (Congress only mandated 200%), as well as by 
expanding coverage to pregnant women and some non-state residents. At the same time, 
Connecticut legislators reserved significant policy-making powers to bureaucrats 
developing and implementing the program. In 2001, however, legislators significantly 
4
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the nature of state legislation prevents me from comparing specific 
policy issues over time, yet because of the coding procedures used in this study, I can assess the type of 
language and constraints employed as well as any additional constraints placed on bureaucrats in their 
development and/or implementation of the policy (e.g. time, approval, and sanctions). 
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shifted their CHIP program and strategies as evidenced by an increase in policy language 
and procedural requirements. Was this shift the result of a change in partisanship or were 
there exogenous shocks such as a budget crisis or scandal that spurred legislators to limit 
bureaucratic discretion? An examination of Connecticut's program over time will allow 
us to better understand these decisions. 
The CHIP program is also an ideal policy because of its potential impact on the 
PA relationship between legislators and bureaucrats. In terms of the preference 
divergence, the major factor responsible for differences in preferences between 
legislators and bureaucrats is money. Although the CHIP program is considered a 
politically "safe program" because both constituents and elected officials favor the 
provision of insurance coverage to low-income children, the monetary investment states 
must incur in order to qualify for federal matching grants has made the program 
controversial and created disagreements over CHIP budgets, sources of funds, eligibility 
requirements, and enrollment levels. While legislators must take money and resources 
into consideration in the development and implementation of the CHIP policy, 
bureaucrats are less likely to do so, focusing instead on the best way to solve the problem 
and reach as many uninsured children as possible. The fiscal crisis that took place across 
the states between 2001 and 2003, for example, significantly altered state legislative 
preferences for many policies since the financial pie that states enjoyed had diminished 
significantly (Boyd 2003). Additionally, CHIP matching funds have not kept pace with 
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the rising cost of health care or the growing population of uninsured children. State 
programs were thus altered to account for limited funds and budget shortfalls45. 
The CHIP program also poses significant informational disadvantages for 
legislators attempting to write CHIP legislation. The technical and often complex nature 
of insurance coverage, health care services and procedures, as well as eligibility and 
income requirements are not likely to be possessed by the average legislator. This creates 
an incentive for legislators to provide more discretion to bureaucrats who possess both 
the policy and procedural knowledge to develop and implement the CHIP program. Their 
knowledge of the costs and procedures benefit legislators in their attempt to write 
legislation designed to achieve their goals and those of their constituents. At the same 
time, bureaucratic discretion insulates legislators and prevents them from incurring 
political costs, ultimately improving their reelection chances. 
Lastly, the CHIP program is ideal for this study because of the similarities the 
CHIP policy shares with the policy examined by Huber & Shipan. In Deliberate 
Discretion, Huber & Shipan examine the adoption of Medicaid managed care ("MMC") 
legislation across states, which like CHIP is federally imposed upon the states. Much like 
the CHIP authorization, Congress required states to follow certain guidelines, but 
ultimately provided them with significant discretion in the development and 
implementation of their program. CHIP, like MMC is accompanied by federal matching 
funds for states complying with the federal guidelines and is based on state enrollments 
and expenditures (Huber & Shipan 2002). Additionally, both policies possess similar 
potential impacts on the PA relationship between legislators and bureaucrats. Funding 
45
 This was one of the problems surrounding the 2007 reauthorization of CHIP after its initial 10-year 
authorization. States feared inadequate funding and the failure of the federal government to match their 
expenditures for the continued enrollment of children post 2007(Broaddus & Park 2007). 
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issues are likely to create divergent policy preferences and when combined with the 
informational disadvantages faced by legislators, the incentive for legislators to control 
bureaucrats in both MMC and CHIP legislation is significantly increased. 
CHIP Legislation: Data Collection & Coding 
In order to improve our understanding of the statutory control decisions made by 
legislators we must examine the manner in which they use language to control and 
oversee bureaucracies. This is especially important in terms of the PA relationship 
between legislators and bureaucrats since the theory suggests that the actions and 
strategies employed by legislators are influenced by preference divergence, information 
asymmetries, and the costs of control. 
To examine these decisions and assess the impact of these factors, I collected and 
coded 1654 enacted bills that refer directly to the development and/or implementation of 
the CHIP program across U.S. legislatures between 1997 and 200746. I obtain the bills 
using various sources including Lexis-Nexis, Lexis-Nexis State Capitol, individual state 
websites, and countless emails and telephone calls to legislative staff, legislative 
librarians and CHIP program administrators and staff47.1 chose to collect enacted bills for 
several reasons. First, enacted bills have been subjected to the bargaining and 
compromise that takes place in each individual chamber. Depending on the strength of 
46
 The choice of bills with "direct" references to CHIP program is due to the multitude of indirect 
references that simply use it as an example of structure or process but does not impact the policy itself. 
47
 CHIP bills were not collected in AK, SD, SC, & WY due to the difficulty obtaining CHIP legislation, 
and in TN were matching funds were not sought until 2006. The collection and coding process was 
hindered significantly by the fact that CHIP program names vary across states and do not always coincide 
with how they are referred to in legislation. Georgia's "PeachCare" for example, is not spelled consistently 
from bill to bill (e.g. "Peach Care" or "PeachCare"). As a result, bills were searched under "CHIP" 
"Children's Health Insurance Program" "Child Health" "Child Insurance" and variations of the individual 
state program name. 
94 
the majority party in the chamber, this process ensures that the bill that is passed by the 
chamber represents the true intent of the legislators and has been impacted by both 
endogenous (institutional arrangements) and exogenous (interest group influence) factors 
that are likely to be unique to that particular state. Additionally, enacted legislation has 
not yet been subject to executive action. This further ensures that the bill reaching the 
governor's desk encompasses the true intent of legislators. As a result, I can better assess 
the impact of legislative preferences on bureaucratic action and subsequently control for 
other factors that might influence this relationship. 
In addition to coding general bill information (state, year, chamber, and bill 
number), I code the CHIP legislation using an extensive coding scheme to capture the 
legislative policy foresight and to better understand statutory control strategies across 
states (see Appendix A). In particular, I first identify specific instances in which 
legislators' articulate instructions or mandates to bureaucrats regarding the CHIP 
program in the state. The term mandate refers to language used by legislators to articulate 
legislative policy intent or preferences and thus limits bureaucratic discretion. The policy 
intent articulated by legislators primarily involves setting the parameters of the policy 
area {policy mandates), the use of specific procedures or processes {procedural 
mandates), and instructions that require specific procedures and articulate how the 
specific policy should be impacted by the procedures {both procedure and policy 
mandates). I focus on mandates because they encompass only the language that directly 
relates to the development and/or implementation of the state's CHIP policy without any 
superfluous language that is common in some states (California and Massachusetts). This 
provides a much clearer measure of length of legislation and enables me to more easily 
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determine the specific language used by legislators to convey their policy intent and any 
additional mechanisms placed in mandates to further limit bureaucratic discretion. 
Once individual mandates are identified, I code them based on their type (policy, 
procedural, or both procedural and policy), and determine their length in words which 
makes up my first dependent variable, mandate length. This not only allows me to 
replicate Huber & Shipan's model, but also to compare results from the two empirical 
models. However, because I believe that mandate length is a necessary condition to 
constitute the amount of discretion provided to bureaucrats, I code CHIP legislation to 
allow me to develop a second dependent variable, total control. Total control is based on 
the type of mandate used (procedural, policy or both mandates), the specific language 
used by legislators to articulate the amount of discretion (no discretion, limited, or broad), 
as well as additional mechanisms designed to further constrain bureaucrats (time 
constraint, approval requirement, sanctions for non-compliance). I conclude by coding 
where the mandate was imposed (general legislation or appropriations bills) in order to 
evaluate statutory control decisions as a two stage process. I will discuss each of these 
coding procedures separately. 
Dependent Variable I: Mandate Length - Length of Words Pertaining to Mandates 
Table 4-2 provides a summary of the dependent variables used both in Huber & 
Shipan's study and my study. Mandate length is coded to measure the amount of 
discretion that is provided to bureaucrats in the development and implementation of the 
CHIP policy. This is done primarily to replicate Huber & Shipan's model, which 
measures discretion by length of the legislation, but also as evidence of the decision by 
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Table 4-2 
Dependent Variables for Huber & Shipan (2002) and Goodman (2009) 
Dependent 
Variables 
DVI 
DVII 
Huber & Shipan (2002) 
Bill Length 
• Longer bills 
constitute less 
discretion 
• Measures the amount 
of "new" words 
imposed in legislation 
None 
Goodman (2009) 
Mandate Length 
• Longer mandates constitute less 
discretion 
• Measures only the words that directly / 
indirectly refer to the CHIP policy 
• Elim inates superfluous words / language 
Amount of Control 
• Length alone does not provide the 
complete story of discretion / control 
• Examines (1) type of mandate (2) 
language used ("must" "may" "as 
agency sees fit ")(3) additional 
constraints in mandates (time, approval, 
& sanctions) 
legislators to engage in statutory control of bureaucrats. It is important to point out here 
that my measure of mandate length is a measure of words pertaining to CHIP mandates 
produced in a single legislative session. This is a critical point because, as will be 
discussed more fully later in this chapter, the nature of state legislation and the 
differences between types of state legislation (general legislation and appropriations 
bills), does not allow me to observe changes to specific CHIP issues or instructions 
across legislative sessions. Developing a measure of mandate length in a specific session 
allows me to compare the lengths of mandates across sessions and better assess the 
impact of the political and institutional arrangements in place during the particular 
session. These points will be discussed more fully in this and subsequent chapters. 
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Examining the length of legislation, Huber & Shipan posit, "the more words a 
legislature puts into legislation on the same issue, the more it constrains other actors who 
will implement policy on that issue. Similarly, the fewer words it writes, the more 
discretion it gives to other actors" (pg 73). The authors do not code the specific language 
that makes up the language of the bill and choose to abandon attempts to code any 
additional constraints imposed on agencies. The authors also acknowledge that their 
dependent variable "may be controversial" (pg. 73), but engage in numerous tests to 
make sure that legislation does not consist of merely general language48 or contain 
proportionally more procedural language than policy language. 
Despite the lengths that Huber & Shipan go to in order to justify their dependent 
variable, I am not convinced that bill length alone is a necessary condition to constitute 
discretion. Not only does the CHIP legislation coded for this study not share the same 
characteristics as MMC bills, legislators possess other less costly statutory options to 
control and oversee bureaucrats. Not only do different mandate types require different 
costs and demands for information, but legislators can use specific language and 
additional control mechanisms to constrain bureaucrats, rather than incur the costs of 
researching, writing, and passing longer, more detailed legislation. At the same time, 
using the length of legislation includes superfluous language and provides no evidence of 
the policy foresight that is crucial to understanding the intent of legislators. 
To improve our understanding of legislative attempts to control and oversee 
bureaucrats, I choose to construct a second dependent variable, total control. Total 
control measures the amount of control reserved by legislators in mandates based on the 
48
 General policy language is language in a statute that does not impact the policy specifically but discusses 
the state's specific reasons for legislation, its specific goals or needs, and in most cases, opportunities for 
the legislature to credit claim for the state's progressive stance on children's health care (see California). 
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type of mandate used, the specific language used by legislators, language used to 
establish the parameters of the policy, and any additional control mechanisms imposed to 
further constrain bureaucratic action. 
Dependent Variable II: Total Control 
Legislators choose their words carefully. This is especially true in legislation 
where problems of interpretation and ambiguity can mean the difference between 
achieving policy success and policy failure. Ambivalent or highly discretionary language 
("may," "can," "as the agency sees fit") provides bureaucrats with significant flexibility 
in policy development and implementation. Not only does this diminish the impact of the 
mandate, but it also provides bureaucrats with discretion whether to abide by the 
instructions or, more importantly, the ability to behave in a manner that can adjust 
procedures or outcomes closer to their preferred outcomes. 
On the other hand, language that limits bureaucratic discretion ("must," "should," 
"is required to") signals to bureaucrats that abiding by the particular mandate is of the 
utmost importance and that no flexibility in interpretation is acceptable49. As a result, 
these mandates impose a much higher level of constraint than mandates that use 
ambivalent or highly discretionary language. At the same time, if the discretion limiting 
language is accompanied by additional mechanisms designed to further control 
bureaucratic behavior (time constraints, approval requirements, sanctions), an even 
greater level of control is imposed upon bureaucrats. 
For more information regarding the use of language to creating and maintaining institutions, in this case a 
set of rules and procedures, see Crawford & Ostrom (1995). 
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If we take this research design an additional step and impose the language and 
additional constraints in mandates that vary in scope (requirements placed on bureaucrats, 
setting policy parameters, or both), we also further increase the amount of control 
imposed on bureaucrats. This is the rationale for my second dependent variable. More 
specifically, although I agree with Huber & Shipan that the length of a particular bill may 
be sufficient to limit the amount of bureaucratic discretion, based on these premises, I do 
not believe that it is a necessary condition. The type of mandate used, the specific 
language articulated by legislators, and additional control mechanisms may be more 
effective in achieving their goals and ensuring their preferred outcomes. I will discuss the 
separate parts of my second dependent variable, total control, more fully, focusing on 
how it is coded and impacts the relationship between legislators and bureaucrats. 
Mandate Types 
For the purposes of this dissertation, there exist three types of mandates: policy, 
procedural, and both procedural and policy mandates (hereafter "both" mandates). Policy 
Mandates are instructions by legislators that define, clarify, or set the parameters of the 
policy. More specifically, depending on the scope and detail of the language, policy 
mandates let bureaucrats know how legislators interpret the specific policy as well as 
what outcomes they prefer. California's Assembly Bill 1126 (1997) provides an example 
of a policy mandate: 
The discount shall reduce the portion of the family contribution described in 
subdivision(b) to the following: (1)A family contribution of four dollars ($4) per child 
with a maximum required contribution of eight dollars ($8) per month per family for 
applicants with annual household incomes up to and including 150% of the federal 
poverty level. 
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In this dissertation, policy mandates are broken down into two categories: policy 
terms and policy procedures. Policy terms are mandates that define a term or a process 
pertaining to the CHIP policy. For example, the Arkansas Senate Bill 684 (1999) states 
that '"Health Care Coverage' means health care insurance as defined by rules 
promulgated by the Arkansas Department of Human Services for the ARKids First 
Program." This is a specific definition of a policy term. Policy procedures, on the other 
hand, are policy mandates that define or clarify how the policy is to be developed or 
implemented. California Assembly Bill 1126 above is a good example of a policy 
procedural mandate. By specifically defining terms, bureaucrats are unable to interpret 
the policy in a manner that favors their preferences. This is also true with policy 
procedures. Without directly requiring bureaucrats to perform any action, legislators can 
effectively constrain their actions in policy development and implementation. 
Procedural Mandates are non-policy related instructions by legislators placed in 
legislation that directly requires the agency or agencies to "do something" in order to 
achieve the preferred outcomes. Examples of procedural mandates include legislators 
requiring bureaucrats to submit a report, hold a hearing, interact with an individual or 
group, create a committee, or develop specific procedures. California's AB 1126 (1997) 
provides an example: 
The board shall provide a family contribution discount to those applicants who 
select the health plan in a geographic area which has been designated as the 
Community Provider Plan. 
I emphasize the direct requirement by legislators for bureaucratic performance for both 
substantive and empirical reasons. Substantively, I believe that it is not a coincidence that 
legislators write bills with a particular agency or group of agencies in mind. Not only is it 
more costly to impose mandates to all agencies individually, but a direct requirement to a 
101 
single agency serves to signal that the mandate applies specifically to them while 
absolving other agencies from responsibility. Empirically, examining direct requirements 
also prevents potential coding problems that would arise while attempting to interpret 
legislative language. Coding legislation is difficult enough that when coders are required 
to make decisions based on their judgment, coding inconsistencies arise and the 
reliability of the data quickly diminishes. 
Both Procedural and Policy Mandates ("Both" mandates) are instructions by 
legislators that require an agency to not only do something, but also instructs bureaucrats 
as to how the requirement will impact the specific policy parameters. In other words, both 
mandates articulate a particular requirement for bureaucrats to utilize (develop 
enrollment procedures) followed immediately by an explanation of how this requirement 
will impact, alter, or expand the policy or the policy outcome. I code both mandates when 
it is not substantively possible to separate them50. California's AB 1126 (1997) provides 
an example of a both mandate: 
(d) The board shall provide a family contribution discount to those applicants who 
select the health plan in a geographic area which has been designated as the 
Community Provider Plan. The discount shall reduce the portion of the family 
contribution described in subdivision (b) to the following: (1) A family contribution 
of four dollars ($ 4) per child with a maximum required contribution of eight dollars 
($ 8) per month per family for applicants with annual household incomes up to and 
including 150 percent of the federal poverty level, (2) Six dollars ($ 6) per child with a 
maximum required contribution of eighteen dollars ($ 18) per month per family for 
applicants with annual household incomes greater than 150 percent and up to and 
including 200 percent of the federal poverty level. 
The type of mandate used to constrain bureaucratic strategies or behavior is an 
important factor in understanding legislator's statutory control strategies. This is 
Huber & Shipan found that, in the MMC statutes, it was difficult to "separate" out procedural 
instructions from policy instructions because the two were often intertwined (pg 61). This was one of their 
justifications for abandoning the coding of separate instructions into categories. Instead they lump 
procedural and policy instructions together into "text blocks". 
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especially true in the PA relationship between legislators and bureaucrats where different 
mandate types represent different costs to legislators and require different amounts of 
information to write policy specific legislation. Additionally, the mandate chosen 
signifies the particular goal that legislators are attempting to achieve, whether it is 
ensuring specific policy outcomes, appeasing particular constituents, or both. For 
example, legislators incur more costs imposing policy mandates than procedural ones due 
to the need for information about the policy (see Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Huber & 
Shipan 2002). However, even though they can influence procedures (see above), the fact 
that they are general statements that impact the policy without directly referring to a 
specific agency signifies to bureaucrats that the outcome is the central focus of the 
mandate and not the particular procedure. This goal may reflect uncertainty surrounding 
policy implementation or an attempt to appease favored groups who are more concerned 
about the policy outcome rather than the manner in which the policy is achieved. 
Imposing procedural mandates, on the other hand, requires information about 
agency capabilities and specific procedures, but less about the particular policy. As a 
result, it is argued that procedural instructions are less costly than policy instructions (see 
McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987; Huber & Shipan 2002). However, by focusing 
specifically on particular procedures or actions, legislators can signal the importance of 
the process or manner in which the policy is developed or implemented. This is 
accomplished in situations where the outcome is less in doubt or favored groups have 
stronger preferences for the way in which the policy is achieved. 
If my assumptions regarding policy and procedural mandates are accurate, then 
instances in which both procedural and policy instructions are used together should 
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reflect situations in which legislators possess the strongest incentive to control and 
oversee bureaucratic behavior. By requiring specific behavior or procedures, in addition 
to articulating the expected policy outcomes of that behavior, legislators incur the most 
costs, but they are also strongly signaling to bureaucrats that there is little to no discretion 
or flexibility in their actions or outcomes. These mandates are likely to be used in 
situations where legislators are less secure about both bureaucratic action and outcomes. 
Legislative Language 
To capture the impact of the language used by legislators to control and oversee 
bureaucratic behavior I code whether the mandate provides broad, limited or no 
discretion. Broad discretion is established by language such as "as the agency sees fit" or 
"when the agency deems appropriate," while limited discretion is established by language 
such as "the agency may" or "the agency can." Limited discretion minimizes the amount 
of flexibility possessed by bureaucrats in the development and/or implementation of 
policy. Lastly, mandates that use language such as the agency "must," "should," or "is 
required" are coded as no discretion. This language provides no flexibility for 
bureaucrats and constrains their behavior completely. 
Although coding mandates in this manner allows me to determine if there is any 
correlation between the mandate length and amount of control, more importantly, it 
enables me to obtain information about legislator's statutory control strategies generally 
and their desire to provide or limit discretion more specifically (policy foresight and 
intent). In particular, I can assess whether legislators that use language that provides no 
discretion are actually attempting to control and oversee bureaucrats, simply engaging in 
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cheap talk, or attempting to credit claim and appease their constituents. At the same time, 
observing the language used in different CHIP bills both within and across sessions will 
allow me to determine whether changes in the control placed in mandates are the result of 
state specific factors or factors that impact all states equally. 
Additional Bureaucratic Constraints 
In addition to the specific language used by legislators to control and oversee 
bureaucrats, my second dependent variable also consists of additional mechanisms placed 
in legislation to further constrain bureaucratic behavior and limit their discretion that are 
unrelated to the length of the bill. One mechanism is a time constraint. Time constraints 
are attached to procedural mandates and are used to restrict the amount of time the 
agency has to satisfy the mandate requirement. For the purposes of this study, there are 
three types of time constraints: no time constraint, time constraint with no specified time 
("within a reasonable time"), and time constraint with specified time ("by January 31, 
2008"). Time constraints with a specified time provide less discretion and flexibility to 
bureaucrats in carrying out the mandate. For example, the procedural mandate from CA 
AB 1126 (1997) with a time constraint would read: 
By January 31, 1998, the board shall provide a contribution discount to 
applicants who select a plan in an area which has been designated as 
the Community Provider Plan 
Previously, the board responsible for developing and implementing a contribution 
discount to applicants were not given a time in which this procedure had to be performed. 
This provides the board with significant discretion over when they will comply with the 
mandate. Even if a time constraint is implied, the fact that the legislators incurred the 
105 
costs of including it in the mandate suggests that the timeliness of procedural 
performance is important to them. 
Another mechanism used to further constrain bureaucrats and limit discretion is 
an approval constraint. Like time constraints, these mechanisms are added to procedural 
mandates that require the agency to have their actions or product approved either by the 
legislature, a non-legislative body, or both. Similarly, this mechanism affects the 
behavior and strategies of bureaucrats who must now satisfy the mandate requirement in 
a manner that the approving body will accept and support. In essence, the approval 
constraint acts like a secondary hurdle or a safety net for legislators in the event that the 
agency strays from legislative intent and attempts to move procedures or outcomes closer 
to their preferences. CA AB 1126 (1997) with an approval constraint would read: 
Following approval by the legislature, the board shall provide a family 
contribution discount to those applicants who select the health plan in a 
geographic area which has been designated as the Community Provider Plan 
Approval constraints are coded in four ways: no approval, approval by 
legislature, approval by non-legislative body (executive branch, another agency), and 
approval by both legislature and non-legislative body. An approval by the legislature 
itself is more constraining on bureaucrats since legislators are responsible for making 
sure that agencies behave in a manner that is consistent with their intent. With this 
responsibility, however, comes with additional costs to legislators. Additionally, an 
approval requirement by both the legislature and a non-legislative body is considered the 
most constraining on bureaucrats, since they must behave in a manner that satisfies the 
preferences of both legislators and a non-legislative body. 
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The third mechanism used by legislators to constrain bureaucratic action further is 
a sanction. Sanctions are punishments or penalties levied on agencies for non-compliance 
with a mandate. Sanctions can come in many forms (fines, reorganizations, firings) and 
can be imposed on its own to ensure that the procedural requirement is complied with or 
to further strengthen a time or approval constraint. The justification for sanctions centers 
on its deterrence for bureaucrats who know ex ante what they can expect for non-
compliance and thus providing additional force behind the mandate. Once again CA AB 
1126 (1997) with a sanction reads: 
By January 31, 1998, the board shall provide a family contribution discount 
to those applicants who select the health plan in a geographic area which 
has been designated as the Community Provider Plan. If the board fails to 
provide such a discount by the designated time, their authority will be transferred 
to the Department of Health until notice by the legislature. 
Sanctions are coded similarly to time constraints: no sanction, sanction not 
specified ("non-compliance will result in penalties"), and sanction specified ("non-
compliance will result in a budget reduction of $250,000). Although specified sanctions 
allow bureaucrats to know ex ante what the penalty for non-compliance, unspecified 
sanctions require subsequent legislative action, which will require additional time and 
resources on the part of legislators. A sanction combined with a time or approval 
constraint is even more constraining on bureaucrats and provides the least amount of 
discretion for policy development and implementation. 
The addition of constraints in a mandate usually only adds a few words to the 
length of the bill and would thus not represent any significant change to Huber & 
Shipan's analysis. However, the impact on the behavior or strategy of the agency and 
their discretion is substantial. By adding the few strategic words, legislators significantly 
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constrain bureaucratic behavior and signal to them the importance or necessity of 
satisfying the requirement either in a timely fashion or having their performance or 
product approved by another body. Additionally, using a sanction provides a threat to 
bureaucrats in the event of non-compliance and when combined with a time or approval 
constraint, provides the least amount of discretion and represents instances of significant 
legislative control and oversight. 
In Wisconsin AB 100 (1997), the following mandate provides the Department of 
Health and Family with significant discretion in the development of rules limiting access 
to their CHIP program, called Badger Care: 
"The department may promulgate rules limiting access to the program under 
this section to defined enrollment periods ". 
What makes this mandate even more powerful is that legislators also give the department 
discretion whether to promulgate the rules or not by using the word may. Not only can 
they develop their own rules without approval or review by another body (chamber, 
executive or agency), but they can decide whether they want to develop them in the first 
place. This degree of policy-making discretion would not be captured in Huber & 
Shipan's length of bill. If this mandate is indicative of the entire bill, then Huber & 
Shipan would consider it a shorter bill and thus one that provides more discretion to 
bureaucrats. However, if the word "may" was replaced by the word "must," this 
significantly changes the amount of discretion provided to bureaucrats without changing 
the length of the bill or having legislators incur any more costs associated with writing 
more detailed legislation. Instead of having the option of promulgating rules, the 
department must do so which transfers the burden of costs and time to bureaucrats who 
must now gather information, determine which rules are appropriate, and develop and 
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implement rules. If we compare the Wisconsin AB 100 (1997) with Wisconsin AB 100 
(2006), we see another variation in the amount of discretion provided to bureaucrats. AB 
100 (2006) states: 
"The department of health and family services may contract with the department 
to investigate suspected fraudulent activity on the part of recipients of medical 
assistance under subchapter IV, food stamp benefits under the food stamp 
program under 7 USC 2011 to 2036, supplemental security income payments 
under section 49.77, and under health care benefits under the Badger Care health 
care program under section 49.665 and to conduct activities to reduce payment 
errors in the medical assistance program under subchapter IV, the food stamp 
program under 7 USC 2011 to 2036, the supplemental security income payments 
program under section 49.77, the program providing payment for the support of 
children of supplemental security income recipients under section 49.775, and the 
Badger Care health care program under section 49.665, as provided in this 
section." 
In this mandate, legislators in Wisconsin instruct the department that they may contract 
with the department to investigate suspected fraudulent activity and follow with the 
specific areas where, if they choose to do so, they can investigate fraud. The language 
used by the legislators clearly makes investigation on the part of the department 
discretionary and, although they limit the amount of discretion by establishing the areas 
eligible for investigation, the department still has the ability to decide whether to 
investigate or not. Providing this sort of discretion to bureaucrats also creates the 
possibility of additional costs (time and resources and political costs) in the event that 
development or implementation produces unfavorable results. Legislators have to incur 
the costs of revisiting the legislation to correct the problem, and they will likely incur 
political costs as constituents blame them for a failed policy or unanticipated outcomes. 
Based on Huber & Shipan's dependent variable, the use of 131 words in this 
mandate would constitute much less discretion than the 17 word mandate in the previous 
example. However, the language states that the department may contract to investigate 
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fraud, providing them with significantly discretion whether to do so or not. Compare this 
to legislators using only 17 words to instruct the department that they must promulgate 
rules in the previous mandate. This would significantly limit their discretion in a fraction 
of the amount of words. 
Let's now compare the Wisconsin mandate Kentucky SB 128 (1998): 
"The cabinet for human services shall prepare a state child health plan meeting 
the requirements for the Title XXI of the Federal Social Security Act, for 
submission to the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services within such time as will permit the state to receive the maximum 
amounts of federal matching funds available under Title XXI. " 
This mandate is 61 words long, about half of the 2006 WI mandate and about three times 
as large as the 1997 WI mandate. However, if we examine the language and additional 
constraints used by legislators to convey their intent, this mandate eliminates the 
flexibility for the cabinet in preparing a health plan, and forces them to submit it to the 
Secretary of the HHS within an unspecified amount of time ("such time as will permit 
..."). In essence, bureaucrats in the department of human services have no flexibility in 
preparing the plan, no flexibility in submitting it to HHS, and only a limited amount of 
flexibility in both the timing of the submission and in developing the plan itself. Based on 
Huber & Shipan's criteria, if we examine this mandate to the others, its length would 
provide more discretion than the first Wisconsin mandate and less than the second, but 
based on the language and constraints placed in the mandate, it far exceeds both 
mandates in limiting bureaucratic discretion. 
These examples show that by examining the language and presence of additional 
constraining mechanisms provides a much deeper understanding of statutory control 
decisions than the length of legislation alone. Not only will language and constraints 
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allow me to compare them to Huber & Shipan's discretion measure but, it will enable me 
to better understand the conditions that prompt their use. Although time constraints and 
sanctions require less policy and agency specific knowledge and are cheaper to impose 
than writing more detailed legislation, we do not know how the political and institutional 
environments influence these decisions. Are they used to substitute for more detailed 
bills, or are they used in conjunction with more detailed legislation to further limit 
bureaucratic discretion? Or, in the alternative, are legislators simply engaged in cheap 
talk or attempts to credit claim? And under what circumstances would legislators impose 
approval or sanctions that require subsequent action on their part? An examination of 
these decisions will allow us to better understand and answer these questions. 
Amount of Mandates 
Although the discussion of total control has focused exclusively on the type of 
mandate, the language used and additional control mechanisms, it is important to mention 
that the individual mandate plays an equally important role in this variable as well. In 
particular, I assume that if legislators are going to incur the costs of writing a mandate 
that they are engaging in statutory control no matter what mandate type, language they 
use or whether additional mechanisms are included. The fact that the mandate was 
imposed in the first place is evidence of statutory control. As a result, it is very likely that 
states that pass more CHIP mandates are more likely to have higher total control scores 
simply because each mandate constitutes a level of control whether it is the minimum or 
the maximum. Even if a state passes mandates with minimal control, if they enact enough 
of them, they will be increasing their level of total control over bureaucrats. It is, 
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therefore, just as meaningful that legislators in a state enact 50 individual mandates with 
minimal control as it is for legislators in a state to pass five mandates with significant 
control imposed. This simply illustrates different legislative strategies used by legislators 
and the type of variation that we would like to see across states so that we can assess how 
the political and institutional arrangements impact these decisions. 
Where Mandates are Imposed 
One of the other contributions of this study is the examination of statutory control 
decisions as a two-stage process: whether to engage in control and second, if so, where 
that control is imposed, in general legislation or appropriations bills. The explanation for 
this second stage has been discussed extensively in previous chapters and will not be re-
addressed here. In furtherance of examining statutory control as a two-stage process each 
mandate is coded based on which mechanism is used to convey the legislator's intent. It 
is important to mention here, however, that structural and institutional differences exist 
between general legislation and appropriations bills at the state level. 
When legislators enact general legislation, the rules and regulations passed therein 
become law and remain in force until a subsequent bill alters the existing law or 
eliminates it. This status quo arrangement is not the case in appropriations bills. In fact, 
when legislators pass a budget or an appropriations bill, in most cases, the rules and 
regulations, along with any instructions, limitations, requirements, or restrictions, do not 
carry over to subsequent legislative sessions and must be re-addressed in subsequent 
appropriations or budget bills. Some states may simply use the same appropriations 
template and adjust budget amounts from session to session. However, in states that re-
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address policy intent in each new appropriations bill, legislators incur significant time 
and resources to write bills, and t engage in statutory control. As a result, this will impact 
the manner in which discretion and control are imposed by legislators and how the 
control changes over time, if at all. 
In addition, to the structural differences between general legislation and 
appropriations bills, differences across states in the budget cycle, session length, and 
average amount of appropriations bills. States that possess a biennial budget cycle have 
less time to research and write detailed legislation. If we combine this arrangement with a 
biennial legislative session and the passage, on average, of only a few appropriations 
bills, this significantly hinders the ability of legislators to engage in statutory control or 
correct problems that arise in the session or in the interim. Legislators in states that 
possess a budget cycle with two-annual budgets and pass more appropriations bills have 
more opportunities to not only to engage in statutory control, but also to correct or adjust 
appropriations if needed. These differences do not impact the ability of legislators to 
engage in statutory control in general legislation in the same manner, and thus examining 
the two control mechanisms in the same model would not only be substantively wrong, 
but the results would be highly suspect as well. 
Codins Limitations 
Although I designed the coding scheme for this dissertation to provide a more 
accurate assessment of the length of actual policy instructions in addition to the amount 
and degree of discretion that is provided (or not provided) to bureaucrats, there are some 
potential limitations to this process. As addressed by Huber & Shipan, coding legislation 
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is a difficult and often frustrating endeavor not just because of the sheer volume of words 
in some bills, but also because of the variation in bills that exists across states. Some state 
bills are thousands of pages long such as in California or Wisconsin. This makes 
searching for mandates or instructions extremely tedious and increases the likelihood of 
error due to simple fatigue. States also use different bill formats with some writing 
completely new bills when policy is altered while others merely note the changed section 
and which words or sections are replaced (see Massachusetts). This requires a bit of a 
learning curve when embarking on a new state which significantly slows down the 
coding process and increases the likelihood of error. 
One of the main challenges for any study that involves the coding of data is the 
reliability of the coding. In particular, it is very important to use consistent coding 
procedures in order to evaluate the data in the same manner, and be confident with the 
conclusions. This not only insures consistency in coding, but it provides more validity to 
the results. This is especially true in research, which requires coders to make subjective 
decisions as in this study. Interpreting language and attempting to assess legislative intent 
by the use of certain words is a difficult task for any individual. For the most part, 
identifying mandates is obvious and straightforward due to the language utilized by 
legislators and the coding scheme designed to use objective measures to capture the 
intent of legislators. However, in some cases, the language is difficult to interpret, such as 
the legalese that is used in Massachusetts' bills. As a result, identifying mandates in these 
instances is significantly more challenging. 
Although all 1654 bills were ultimately coded by me, I did hire a team of paid 
undergraduate research assistants to assist me in identifying, and in some cases, coding 
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mandates for my dependent variables. Each of the students were subjected to multiple 
training sessions and provided an extensive coding manual designed to make coding as 
objective as possible. To test for consistency of the coders and the coding process, a 
sample of bills was drawn from the total bills. I used Cohen's Kappa statistic (see 
Stemler 2001) to compute the reliability of the coding. 
1-Pc 
PA calculates the proportion of the units (mandates, in this case) on which the coders 
agree, and Pc is the proportion of the units (mandates) for which the agreement that is 
expected by chance. Scholarly research suggests that the acceptable benchmark for 
interpreting Kappa ranges from .61 to 1.00 (see Landis & Kock 1977; Stemler 2001). A 
score between .61 and .81 indicates substantial agreement in coding, and a score between 
.81 and 1.00 indicates almost perfect agreement. The range of agreement for coders in 
this study (including myself) was between .63 and .76 constituting substantial agreement. 
The areas in which less agreement occurred involved coding mandates as both 
procedural and policy as opposed to either individual policy or procedural mandates. 
This is not surprising since it is sometimes difficult to determine when a policy mandate 
refers to or is an extension of the proceeding procedural mandate. Other aspects of the 
coding process appear to have been fairly clear as evidenced by the level of agreement. 
As a result, these results provide support for the coding of this study as well as for future 
studies attempting to replicate my findings. 
As discussed previously, another limitation of the data involves the inability to 
examine specific CHIP issues over time. Because of the differences in the way states 
write and alter legislation, it is extremely difficult to track specific policy issues across 
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sessions and legislatures. Even if all states wrote legislation like California where altered 
and existing policy exist in the same bill, states simply do not address the same CHIP 
issues session after session. Examining a single CHIP issue (enrollment requirements, 
eligibility levels, etc) would only produce a very small dataset, which would not provide 
me with enough observations to adequately test the impact of political and institutional 
arrangements across sessions and across legislatures. 
Huber & Shipan address this problem by adjusting their dependent variable to 
examine new words added to MMC legislation in the 1995-1996 session across states. 
They justify this decision by showing that most MMC legislation was passed in this 
session and, consistent with their previous analysis, most was policy specific with little 
procedural instructions (pg. 143). This is not the case with CHIP legislation. In fact, 
although 38 states passed their initiated CHIP policies by the 1998-1999 legislative 
session, many of these bills did not constitute the bulk of CHIP legislation in many states. 
While states like Arizona, Texas, Kansas, Connecticut, and California passed large initial 
bills, most states passed CHIP legislation in piecemeal fashion - addressing specific 
issues, and in most cases, in separate bills, or passing smaller initial bills and significantly 
altering bills over the 10-year period. As a result, I made the decision to examine 
statutory control decisions over the 10-year period in order to obtain a better 
understanding of statutory control strategies. The longer time period enables me to 
determine whether legislators incur the costs of imposing constraints on bureaucrats once 
and hope for the best, or whether legislators engage in subsequent attempts at control 
based on changes to the partisanship or institutions (elections, term limits, procedural 
changes). At the same time, the longer time period allows me to determine whether 
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legislators follow the suggestions or demands of agencies who articulate their preferences 
to legislators who, in return, write legislation in order to credit claim or appease their 
constituents or the bureaucracy. 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I introduce the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), the 
policy area that provides the nearly 8,300 mandates from 1624 bills across a 10-yar 
period, that are used to construct my two dependent variables. I also introduce and 
describe my two dependent variables, mandate length, which measures the amount of 
words pertaining to mandates and total control, which measures the amount of control 
reserved by legislators in the mandate. Lastly, I provide examples to support my 
contention that bill length alone may be sufficient to constitute less discretion provided to 
bureaucrats, but it is not always necessary to do so. 
The next three chapters represent the main empirical analysis of this dissertation. 
Chapter 5 focuses on examining my first dependent variable, mandate length, to 
determine if sufficient variation exists across states, within states, in both general 
legislation and appropriations bills, and over legislative sessions to justify assessing the 
causes of the differences. I repeat this process in chapter 6 using my second dependent 
variable, total control. Given the variation my dependent variables, chapter 7 and 8 
explore the causes of the variation in my dependent variables. 
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Chapter 5: 
A Map of Statutory Control Patterns across State Legislatures and Over Time: 
Mandate Length 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the Children's Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP), and discussed the operationalization and measurement of my two dependent 
variables - mandate length and total control. The discussion of the coding process, the 
construction of the dependent variables, and the challenges associated with their creation 
concluded the examination of the variables in my model of statutory control. This chapter 
is the first of two chapters to examine what the data tells us about my dependent 
variables. More specifically, in this chapter I inspect the data as it relates to mandate 
length to make sure that there is sufficient variation across states, within states, in both 
general legislation and appropriations bills, and over legislative sessions to warrant an 
empirical analysis to assess the causes of the differences. 
This may seem like strange place to address these questions, but because I 
examine a new policy area, introduce a unique coding process, and use a new dataset, it is 
important to make sure that the data provides the necessary information to assess the 
causes of differences in statutory control decisions both across states, within individual 
states, and over time. If there is no variation in decisions by legislators across states that 
possess different political and institutional environments then we can be less confident 
that these factors are influencing control decisions in the CHIP legislation. At the same 
time, if we observe no difference in decisions in a particular state across legislative 
sessions then the statutory control snapshots used in previous studies will suffice in 
examining statutory control and over time and studies like this one will have little 
additional benefit. Legislators may simply not be the strategic actors balancing costs and 
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resources in their attempt to control their agents as I have predicted. However, if variation 
exists in these phenomena across states and within states over time, then we can be more 
confident that something is causing these differences whether specific to the individual 
state, all states, or by legislative session. At that point, we can take the next step and test 
our empirical model to assess which factors are responsible and to what extent. 
An examination of the data is even more important for this study due to the use of 
two dependent variables. In either case, I must be able to show sufficient variation and be 
able to show that the two variables are substantively meaningful. In particular, although I 
agree that the length of a mandate is sufficient to limit bureaucratic discretion, I argue 
that it is not a necessary condition. In other words, longer mandates are more likely to 
provide less discretion to bureaucrats, but because of the language used by legislators to 
convey their intent in addition to additional constraints (time, approval requirements, 
and/or sanctions), some shorter mandates may be more constraining to bureaucrats than 
longer ones. Support for this finding could significantly influence the manner in which 
state legislators view and engage in statutory control of bureaucrats. Rather than incur the 
costs of researching and writing longer, more detailed policy instructions and directives, 
legislators can simply utilize more constraining language and include mechanisms to 
limit bureaucratic discretion and shift the burden of costs to bureaucrats. 
I begin the chapter by providing a brief examination of the data in general, 
specifically the amount of variation that exists in CHIP legislation enacted and mandates 
produced between 1997 and 2007 across states and whether legislators imposed their 
CHIP intent in appropriations bills or general legislation. The remainder of the chapter 
focuses on my first dependent variable, mandate length. I observe whether there exists 
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any variation in the variable across states, within states over legislative sessions, and 
across states over time. I conclude the chapter by examining a mixed effects model to 
provide additional evidence of which theoretical variables will produce the highest 
explanatory payoffs in my empirical model. 
Total CHIP Bills & Mandates 
As a reminder, the database consists of 8,274 mandates from 1,652 bills collected 
and coded across 45 state. Figure 5-1 ranks from largest to smallest the amount of CHIP 
related bills enacted by each state during the 10-year period. Figure 5-1 clearly shows 
that significant variation exists across state legislatures. The mean amount of CHIP bills 
enacted by state is 36 with nearly 70% of states producing less than that amount. Total 
enacted CHIP bills ranges from seven bills in Idaho and eight in Delaware to 91 in 
Connecticut and 189 in California. Although we will not be able to assess the causes of 
this variation in this chapter, Figure 5-1 does provide some evidence that something is 
causing differences across states. This is even more intriguing given the specific policy 
area that is mandated on the states and involves complying with specific requirements 
and thresholds to receive federal funding. 
More appropriate for the purposes of this study, however, is the information in 
Figure 5-2, which orders from largest to smallest, the total amount of CHIP mandates 
produced across states. It is clear from Figure 5-2 that there exists significant variation in 
CHIP mandates produced across states with a mean of 444 mandates. However, this 
average is skewed by the 1255 mandates produced by the California legislature. 
Eliminating California from the model drops the mean to 299, but nearly 90% of states 
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Figure 5-1: Total CHIP Bills by State 
(1997-2007) 
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Figure 5-2: Total CHIP Mandates by State 
(1997-2007) 
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fall below the average. Only Massachusetts, Colorado, Connecticut, Arizona, Virginia, 
and California produce more mandates than the mean. New Mexico produced the least 
amount of mandates (23) from 15 bills while California produced the most (1,255) 
mandates from 189 bills. 
As discussed in the last chapter, the number of mandates produced does not 
necessarily say anything about the amount of discretion in individual mandates, but it 
does provide information regarding statutory control strategies. The decision to write 
CHIP legislation and produce mandates suggests that legislators possess an incentive to 
engage in statutory control and oversight of bureaucrats, and in some cases, legislators 
engage in enacting shorter, but more mandates as opposed to fewer, but longer mandates. 
It is important to reiterate here that we do not know the relationship between the bills 
enacted and the mandates produced in each state due to differences in the way legislation 
is written and the manner in which this data was coded. However, whether legislators 
address a new CHIP issue, alter or eliminate an existing issue, or simply submit policy 
templates in subsequent sessions, the fact that they do constitutes statutory control. 
As discussed in relation to the PA model, if legislators anticipated that 
bureaucrats would not pursue their policy preferences or preferred outcomes then there 
would be no reason to incur the costs of engaging in statutory control in the first place. I 
therefore assume that legislators in states that enact more bills and/or produce more 
mandates are further limiting bureaucratic discretion regardless of the amount of control 
that is imposed in the individual mandate or bill. This is an important issue that will be 
addressed more fully in the discussion of my second dependent variable, but is important 
to mention here in relation to enacted bills and mandates produced across states. 
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Aside from the indirect evidence more CHIP bills and mandates provide me, 
examining the amount of bills and mandates across states allows me to observe certain 
trends that will be important when examining the impact of my explanatory variables in 
the next chapter. Not surprisingly, some of the states identified by Huber & Shipan as 
policy leaders in the area of health care produced more CHIP mandates than other states 
(California and New York). However, like Huber & Shipan, my data also reveal that 
states seen as policy leaders produced very little mandates (Hawaii and Minnesota) and 
states not expected to engage in statutory control did so at surprising levels (Arizona, 
Indiana). In the case of Minnesota, the CHIP program is one of many children's health 
programs in the state (see also Minnesota Care) and was subsumed by the larger 
Medicaid program when adopted in 1998. However, Minnesota was at the forefront of 
health insurance for children and laid the foundations for much of the CHIP program in 
1987. As a result, legislators in Minnesota may have had much of the policy specifics in 
place by the adoption of CHIP and thus did not need to address many of the issues that 
other states adopting the program for the first time would have to address. 
Type of Mandate Bill 
As mentioned previously, research on statutory control decisions have ignored the 
use of appropriations bills as a viable bureaucratic control and oversight mechanism 
despite the extensive research surrounding their use and effectiveness. This study, 
however, examines whether legislators impose their CHIP policy intent in general 
legislation or appropriations bills. Figure 5-3 displays this distribution. Ordering states 
from top to bottom based on the extent that they used only general legislation to impose 
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Figure 5-3: Use of Legislation Type by State 
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statutory control decisions, Figure 5-3 shows that, with the exception of three states 
(West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Nevada), legislators across state legislatures used 
appropriations bills extensively to convey their CHIP policy intent. Three states, 
Michigan, Alabama, and New Mexico, only used appropriations bills. More specifically, 
of the 8,274 coded mandates in this study, 2,966 or 36% were imposed in appropriations 
bills. This is a staggering statistic considering that previous research of statutory control 
decisions excluded these bills from their models altogether. Although these studies have 
provided important information about statutory control decisions, the exclusion of a 
mechanism that was utilized 36% of the time raises questions about their findings, and 
provides enough evidence to justify the addition of a second stage in the examination of 
statutory control decisions. 
CHIP Related Statutory Control Decisions across States, 1997-2007 
Although the variation in the amount of CHIP bills, mandates, and location of 
statutory control decisions suggests that something is causing differences in statutory 
control decisions across states and provides important evidence to move forward with the 
empirical analysis, the crucial variation for this study lies in the mandates themselves. 
Remember that the focus of this research is to assess how the statutory control decisions 
are impacted by the political and institutional arrangements present in the particular state, 
if at all. If there is no variation in these decisions across states that vary in political and 
institutional environments, then we can be sure that partisanship and institutions do not 
matter and continuing with this analysis would be futile. Therefore, despite the variation 
that we have observed thus far, determining whether variation exists in my dependent 
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variables is the ultimate goal. The remaining section of this chapter is dedicated to 
investigating whether differences in mandate length exists. In particular, I investigate the 
variation that exists in both general legislation and appropriation bills across states and 
over time for the first dependent variable and discuss any trends or outliers that might 
assist me in identifying potential causes of these differences in the next chapter. 
Mandate Length: The Amount of Words Pertaining to Mandates 
In justifying their use of bill length as a measure of the amount of discretion 
provided to bureaucrats, Huber & Shipan find significant variation in MMC bills passed 
by state legislatures during the 1995-1996 legislative session (pg 146). Choosing a 
similar policy area to Huber & Shipan, and one that is ideal to examine statutory control 
(see chapter 4), I should also expect to see variation in the length of mandates across 
states. In particular, given the incentive to engage in statutory control of bureaucrats, I 
should observe states with different political and institutional arrangements vary in the 
amount of words pertaining to CHIP mandates. Graph 5-1 provides evidence of this 
variation. In particular, Graph 5-1 shows that the average sum of the length of words 
pertaining to CHIP mandates significantly across states throughout the 10-year 
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period of this study, excluding California. States range from an average of 467 words in 
mandates per session in New Mexico to 10810 words on average per session in Virginia. 
The mean average sum of words pertaining to mandates is 2878.4 words per session and 
nearly 71% of the states fall below the mean length. California, which averages 27644 
CHIP mandate words per session, has both the smallest and largest individual mandates51. 
The smallest was placed in AB 1126 (1997) and consisted of three words: "employ 
necessary staff," while the longest mandate was placed in AB 1533 (2005) consisting of 
10,172 words defining policy restrictions. 
51
 California is excluded from Graph 5-1 because its average sum of mandate words per session 
significantly skews the distribution and greatly impacts the visual representation of the variation that exists 
across states. 
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Graph 5-1 also shows that many states that were leaders in enacting the most 
CHIP bills and mandates also wrote the longest mandates, including California, Virginia, 
Arizona, and Connecticut. In Virginia, legislators produced the second most CHIP 
mandates (728) in 58 bills and averaged 10810 words pertaining to mandates per session, 
the second most of any state in the study. The situation in Colorado is similar. Legislators 
in the state enacted the third most bills (84) and the fourth most mandates (470), and 
averaged 7581 words in mandates per session, well above the mean average for states. 
Although it is reasonable to expect that the states that enacted more bills and 
produced more mandates would average the most words per session, in some instances 
this was not the case. Graph 5-1 shows that some states that enacted fewer CHIP bills and 
mandates chose to incur the costs of producing longer, more detailed mandates and 
produced a larger average sum of mandate words per session. In particular, Pennsylvania 
averaged 7350 words pertaining to mandates per session, the fifth most of any state, but 
did so in only 128 individual mandates from 16 CHIP bills. Legislators in Oregon also 
averaged well above the mean sum of mandate words per session (3609) in 135 
individual mandates in 13 CHIP bills. Although, at this point, we do not know why 
legislators in Pennsylvania and Oregon incurred the costs of writing more CHIP 
mandates across the 10-year period, but the fact that they did suggests that some state 
specific factors may be influencing decisions by legislators to engage in statutory control 
of bureaucrats. Whether these factors vary over time (political factors) or vary by state 
(institutional arrangements) will be the focus of chapter 7. Yet, this is the type of 
differences across states that I need to observe to justify moving forward. 
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The results observed in Graph 5-1 are also similar to Huber & Shipan's finding 
that states considered health care policy leaders do not necessarily produce longer MMC 
bills during the 1995-1996 legislative session (pg. 146). In particular, the authors find that 
Florida, Minnesota, and Hawaii, known to be health care policy leaders, wrote 
significantly less new words (4,356, 1074 and 951 respectively) while Arizona, not 
considered a policy leader, wrote significantly more new words (7240). Although Huber 
& Shipan conclude that being a policy leader does not guarantee longer MMC legislation, 
or vice versa, their study only examines a snapshot of statutory control decisions. Using 
my dataset of 10 years of CHIP mandates and Huber & Shipan's typology of health care 
policy leaders (see Huber & Shipan 2002, 146) a different picture of statutory control 
decisions emerges. In particular, Graph 5-1 confirms that health care policy leaders such 
as New Jersey, California, and to a lesser extent Florida, wrote more mandate words per 
session than other states that are not considered policy leaders. Minnesota and Hawaii, 
however, do not behave like a policy leaders when examined over the 10-year period. 
Legislators in these states average significantly less mandate words per session than other 
policy leaders. Even more surprising are legislators in Arizona who do not behave like 
non-health care policy leaders by averaging the 6 most mandate words per session. 
Without running the empirical models and assessing the impact of the political 
and institutional arrangements within the state, I can only speculate as to possible causes 
of these differences. I suspect that one of the possible reasons for legislators in Minnesota 
producing less mandate words per session is related to the discussion of the Minnesota 
CHIP program above. Possible causes of the situation in Hawaii, however, involve the 
nature of the state's CHIP program and the multiple children's programs that exist in the 
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state. In particular, Hawaii's CHIP program is a Medicaid expansion and the state 
provides healthcare assistance to children through Covering Kids, an umbrella program 
that encompasses CHIP, Keiki Care, Quest, Medicaid fee service, and Med-Quest. 
Additionally, legislators' in Hawaii have consistently provided bureaucrats' extensive 
policy-making discretion over their CHIP program. These factors are likely to limit 
instances in which legislators will engage in statutory control of bureaucrats in CHIP 
legislation. Not only will many of the instructions and procedures relating to children's 
health be addressed in other policy areas but, the fact that legislators routinely defer to 
bureaucrats suggests that they will produce shorter, less detailed CHIP related mandates. 
The CHIP program in Arizona is separate from Medicaid and, as a result, legislators 
likely incurred the costs of writing longer, more detailed legislation to establish the 
parameters of the program and provide extensive instructions and requirements to ensure 
that they behaved in a manner that was consistent with their CHIP policy intent. 
Mandate Length and Type of Legislation: General Legislation vs. Appropriations Bills 
To account for the structural and institutional differences in general legislation 
and appropriations bills, I examine mandate length in both mechanisms separately in 
order to determine whether the type of legislation influences statutory control decisions. 
Table 5-2 displays a statistical comparison of the control mechanisms, Table 5-3 displays 
the correlation matrix assessing the relationship between mandate length in general 
legislation and appropriations bills, and Graphs 5-2 and 5-3 display from smallest to 
largest, the sum of words pertaining to mandates produced by states per session in 
appropriations bills and general legislation respectfully. These visualizations show 
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differences in the sum of mandate length by session in both mechanisms across states, 
with more variation in the use of general legislation. 
Table 5-2 reveals that the mean sum of mandate length for all legislation types is 
2879 words per session, yet if we separate the bill types, the mean drops to 1374 for 
mandates in appropriations bills and 2241 for those in general legislation per session. It 
also shows that there is a wider variation in the amount of words pertaining to CHIP 
mandates in general legislation than appropriations bills. Table 5-3, on the other hand, 
shows us that there is a slight negative relationship between the two control mechanisms. 
Table 5-2: Comparison of the Sum of Mandate Length Per Session by CHIP Legislation Type 
Variable 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum & Maximum 
Both General 
Legislation & 
Appropriations Bills 
(8274 mandates) 
100% 
2879 
2578 
467 -10810 
General Legislation 
Only 
(5308 mandates) 
64% 
2241 
1834 
196 - 7757 
Appropriations Bills 
Only 
(2966 mandates) 
36% 
1374 
1739 
37 - 6554 
Table 5-3: Correlation Matrix Examining the Relationship between General Legislation & 
Appropriations Bills 
Variable 
General Legislation 
Appropriations Bills 
General Legislation 
1 
-.169 
Appropriations Bills 
1 
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This strongly suggests that one control mechanism is not substitutable for the other. In 
other words, legislators do not impose mandates in appropriations bills simply because 
they do so in general legislation. This provides some support for my argument regarding 
weighing the competing costs of engaging in one control mechanism rather than the 
other. The slightly negative relationship, I suspect, relates to those stats that are precluded 
from imposing statutory control in appropriations bills or that choose not to based on the 
rational calculation. 
In examining the variation that exists in mandate length across states it makes 
little sense to examine states that use one control mechanism predominantly. Although at 
this point we cannot be sure what is influencing the decision of legislators to favor one 
legislation type over the other, my hypotheses suggest it is the political and institutional 
factors within the state. In particular, given the opportunity to choose between general 
legislation or appropriations bills, legislators in a divided government (or unified 
legislature based on Huber & Shipan's classification) may favor general legislation if 
confronted by a governor with powerful budget powers, or favor appropriations bills if 
confronted by a governor with extensive veto powers. Consequently, it makes more sense 
to examine the sum of mandate length per session in states that utilize both general 
legislation and appropriations bills. The fact that these states routinely use both 
mechanisms to convey their policy intent raises the possibility that they are not 
constrained by these factors and, if variation exists in their decisions, that other factors 
may be influencing their decisions. 
Figure 5-3, at the beginning of this chapter, displays the percentage of use of 
general legislation and appropriations bills across all states in this study. Seven of the 45 
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states - New York, Kansas, Rhode Island, Iowa, Vermont, North Carolina, and Idaho -
use both mechanisms between 40-60% throughout the 10-year period of this study. In 
three of these states (New York, Kansas, and Vermont) not only did legislators enact 
roughly the same amount of appropriations and general legislation bills, but the sum of 
mandate length per session in appropriations bills and general legislation only differed by 
an average of less than 500 words per session. Again, we do not know whether this is the 
result of a favorable bargaining environment or the lack of policy conflict, or simply 
comparable appropriations or legislative powers between the legislators and the governor, 
but it suggests that legislators were less constrained in imposing statutory control in both 
mechanisms or even that a statutory control strategy was unnecessary. 
In the remaining states (Iowa, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Idaho), the sum 
of mandate length per session was significantly different. In fact, although legislators 
enacted roughly the same amount of bills, there was a predominant preference for one 
mechanism over the other and a significant difference in the average sum mandate length 
per session. In Iowa, legislators enacted 52 appropriations bills and 64 general legislation 
bills, but imposed longer, more detailed mandates in general legislation than they did in 
appropriations bills. In fact, the average sum of mandate length for general legislation 
was 2590 words per session compared to 537 words per session for appropriations bills. 
Similar results occurred in North Carolina where legislators enacted 89 general 
legislation bills and 63 appropriations bills and imposed on average 3360 words 
pertaining to mandates per session in general legislation and on average 1246 words per 
session in appropriations bills. Idaho legislators imposed, on average, 1245 words per 
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session in general legislation (29 bills) and, on average, 212 words per session in 
appropriations bills (20 bills). 
These results suggest that, in each of these states, legislators passed, on average, 
longer, more detailed mandates in general legislation than they did in appropriations bills 
despite. Even if we account for the difference in the amount of mandates imposed in each 
mechanism, the difference in mandate length is significant and likely the result of more 
detail in addition to the sheer number of mandates. In fact, if legislators in these states 
were more constrained in one mechanism we should expect to see control behavior 
similar to legislators in the four states above; utilizing only one mechanism. In North 
Carolina, Iowa, and Idaho, however, legislators use both mechanisms to convey their 
intent but impose more detailed mandates in general legislation. 
Although this is exactly the type of variation in the use of appropriations bills and 
general legislation that we want to observe, what accounts for these differences? Aside 
from the influence of partisanship, one possible reason for this variation might be 
associated with the differences the appropriations processes across states discussed 
previously. In particular, some states vary in the amount of appropriations bills that they 
enact each legislative session. While most states pass, on average, one to five 
appropriations bills per session, other states like Alabama, Idaho, and Mississippi enact, 
on average, over 100 appropriations bills per legislative session, with Arkansas passing 
the most with an average of 500 individual bills. It can be argued that those states that 
pass more individual bills are more likely to have shorter mandates since they have the 
ability to re-address an issue, if necessary, in a subsequent bill or make adjustments to 
appropriations in the event of a changing budget environment (windfall, shortage, 
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emergency). Consequently, in states that only pass a handful of appropriations bills, 
legislators are more likely to include all policy instructions and procedural requirements 
since they have a fewer opportunities to address appropriations or alter them in 
subsequent bills. This may explain the statutory control environments in Iowa or Idaho 
where legislators pass on average more than 20 appropriations bills per session, but not in 
North Carolina where legislators pass, on average, only three appropriations bills. 
Determining what influences their statutory control decisions may be more complicated 
but the presence of this contextual variation provides sufficient evidence to move forward 
to the empirical analysis to assist me in determining the answer. 
CHIP Mandate Lensth Over Time: 1997-2007 
If the analysis were to stop here, we would have some contradictory results to 
Huber & Shipan's research and have an incomplete understanding of the statutory control 
strategy that exists across state legislatures. In particular, Huber & Shipan's snapshot of 
statutory control decisions only provides information for one legislative session, and 
although my full measure of mandate length provides information across six legislative 
sessions, it tells us very little about what happens from session to session across that time 
period. One of the goals of this dissertation, however, is to improve our understanding of 
the use of statutory control by examining decisions over time, to better understand the 
strategies utilized by legislators confronted by different political and institutional 
arrangements. Not surprisingly, if we examine mandate length over legislative sessions, 
we are presented with a much different picture of statutory control strategies used to 
control and oversee bureaucrats. 
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Before looking at statutory control strategies across legislative sessions, it is 
important to remember that because I cannot track specific CHIP issues across legislative 
sessions due to the nature of state legislation (general legislation versus appropriations 
bills) and the limitations of my dataset, mandate length is the measure of words 
pertaining to CHIP mandates produced in a single legislative session. Examining 
statutory control at the legislative session level is also important because of other 
institutional differences that exist across states that influence the ability of legislators to 
engage in statutory control. For example, it would be substantively incorrect to examine 
the amount of control imposed in a single year when, in addition to differing between 
annual and biennial sessions, some legislators are precluded from introducing 
appropriations bills in the first year of a session (Connecticut and Louisiana). At the same 
time, other states start at different points in the year (Louisiana, New Jersey, Kentucky, 
and Mississippi) or depending on whether it is an even or odd numbered year (Kansas, 
Indiana, Maine, to name a few). Examining control in a single year would allow me 
control for these institutional constraints as well as more adequately assess the impact of 
the institutional and political arrangements on statutory control decisions in the state. 
In addition to measuring mandate length at the session level, I also assume that 
the sum of mandate length in one session is carried over to the next session in general 
legislation. In other words, if no new mandates are produced in the subsequent session, 
than the sum of mandate length for that session equals the length in the previous session. 
This point becomes even more important when examining the following visualizations of 
the sum of mandate length over time. In particular, because of these constraints, the 
distribution represents the amount of new words pertaining to mandates that are enacted 
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in that session and does not represent a change in sum of mandate length from the 
previous session. In other words, changes to the distribution are the result of legislators in 
the state producing less or more words pertaining to CHIP mandates in the subsequent 
session. If no new words pertaining to mandates are produced in a given legislative 
session, the graph will display this as a "0" but, as I discussed above, theoretically the 
amount of control imposed carries over to the subsequent session in general legislation. 
Given these constraints and the explanation of measuring sum of mandate length, 
I examine the statutory control decisions made by New Jersey and Massachusetts 
legislators across legislative sessions. New Jersey and Massachusetts are ideal states in 
which to examine statutory control decisions over time primarily because of the 
similarities between the two states. Not only are both states leaders in enacting CHIP bills 
and mandates, but both also produce longer mandates in general as well as when mandate 
length is separated by general legislation and appropriations bills. In particular, New 
Jersey legislators produced 276 mandates from 45 bills with a per session average of 
7557, while the mean for all states was 2879 words. Massachusetts legislators produced 
351 mandates from 49 bills and averaged 6377 words per session. 
Without addressing the political or institutional environments, we might expect 
that legislators in the two states would behave similarly given their comparable standing. 
At the same time, given the research design by Huber & Shipan and the prevailing 
research, a snapshot of statutory control decisions would lead us to believe that legislators 
in both states consistently incurred the costs of writing longer, more detailed legislation 
to ensure that their preferences and outcomes were realized. However, if we examine 
their decisions across legislative sessions, we see a much different picture. 
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Graph 5-4 displays the sum of mandate length for the states of New Jersey and 
Massachusetts across the six legislative sessions in this study. As we can see, not only 
would presenting the total mandate length for all legislative sessions provide us with a 
much different understanding of statutory control decisions in each state, but despite 
having similar totals, New Jersey and Massachusetts have engaged in significantly 
different statutory control strategies over time52. More specifically, a snapshot of 
legislative behavior in Massachusetts in the 1997-1998 session, as done in the prevailing 
literature, would lead researchers to believe that legislators engaged in a significant 
amount of statutory control since they produced mandates 
It is important to remind the reader that the distribution for session to session does not represent a change 
in the amount of words pertaining to mandates, only the imposition of new words with each new session. 
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that totaled in excess of 10000 words. The snapshot of statutory control would not allow 
us to see that Massachusetts legislators produced much shorter mandates in each 
subsequent session for the remainder of the study. In particular, following the CHIP 
adoption bill in the 1997-1998 legislative session totaling nearly 11000 words, 
Massachusetts legislators produced mandates that totaled about 7000 words in the 1999-
2000 session, followed by nearly 8000 new words in 2001-2002, only to produce less 
than 6000 in each of the remaining three sessions. The snapshot of statutory control 
decisions would also not allow us to see that despite only producing just over 5000 words 
pertaining to mandates in the 2005-2006 session, Massachusetts legislators did so in the 
most bills of any session in the study (75 bills). Is there a reason why in the 1997-1998 
session 81 CHIP bills produced over 11000 words but in the 2005-2006 session 75 bills 
only produced just over 5000 words? Examining statutory control decisions over time 
enables me to make this observation and the empirical models will allow me to answer. 
A snapshot of statutory control decisions in New Jersey would lead Huber & 
Shipan to believe that, compared to other states, New Jersey was producing shorter, less 
detailed legislation. When we examine the behavior of legislators across sessions, 
however, nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, despite the nearly 4000 words 
produced in the 1997-1998 session, legislators in New Jersey produced nearly 11000 new 
words in the 1999-2000 and 2005-2006 legislative sessions, while producing 
considerably less new words in between (6000 and 4000 respectfully). Although we do 
not know at this point what caused such differences in the amount of new words in 
mandates, but observing all six sessions provides more information about what control 
was imposed and how it relates to previous and subsequent sessions. 
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Just as important as showing why a snapshot of statutory control decisions limits 
our understanding of legislative control of bureaucrats, it also allows me to observe the 
variation that exists between two states that based on their total bills and mandates were 
expected to behave similarly. Although this was not the case in the 1997-1998 session, 
comparing average mandate lengths for New Jersey and Massachusetts does show that 
legislators in both states did share some similar behavior, just not to the same level. 
Legislators in both states produced less new words in the 2001-2002 and 2003-2004 
sessions, and again in 2007-2008, as well as produced more words in 2005-2006. 
Although we cannot be sure what is causing these similarities and differences, 
Graph 5-4 provides me with information that I would not have obtained had I relied 
solely on a snapshot of statutory control decisions, but also information about the type of 
factors that may be influencing legislative decisions to incur the costs of writing longer, 
more detailed legislation. In particular, the similarities suggest that there may be similar 
forces impacting all states (national economy) while the differences might suggest that 
state specific factors are influencing decisions (partisanship or institutional 
arrangements). These assumptions can be further evaluated by examining mandate length 
across all states over all legislative sessions. 
Displaying the average sum of mandate length for all states across all legislative 
sessions, Graph 5-5 shows that, on average, states displayed similarly strategies in some 
sessions but not in others. In particular, in addition to averaging just over 6000 words 
pertaining to mandates in the CHIP adoption sessions in 1997-1998 or 1999-2000, states 
produced, on average, roughly the same amount of new words in the 2001-2002 and 
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2003-2004 sessions, before imposing about 9000 words in the 2005-2006 session. The 
average amount of new words in the 2007-2008 session was significantly less. 
Although the visual representation of the average sum of mandate length across 
states over time in Graph 5-5 displays similar shifts in strategy and changes to the amount 
of words pertaining to CHIP mandates specifically, we cannot be sure if the factors 
influencing these shifts. I suspect that for most states that passed their first CHIP bills in 
1997-1998 or 1999-2000 legislative sessions, the initial policy intent and instructions 
were included in these mandates and did not need to add more or re-address them as 
bureaucrats began working on developing and 
Legislative Sessions 
Sum of Mandate Length Fitted Values 
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implementing the program. In the 2001-2002 session, although Graph 5-5 displays a 
similar average amount of new words as the previous session, Graph 5-4 revealed that 
this was not the case in New Jersey where legislators incurred the costs of imposing 
longer mandates than the average for all states. I also suspect that the increase in new 
words in the 2005-2006 session was, in part, the result of states coming out the fiscal 
crises in the precious session, only to be followed be the imposition of fewer new words 
in the 2006-2007 session as a result of questions surrounding the reauthorization of 
CHIP. In particular, legislators likely scaled back CHIP legislation or were reluctant to 
incur costs due to concerns over obtaining matching funds from the federal government 
that was concerned about rising health care costs and expansion of benefits and eligibility 
that was beyond the original scope of the program. 
At this point we do not know whether these assumptions regarding these trends 
across states and legislative sessions are correct, but the evidence of variation in mandate 
length both across states, across legislative sessions and in both general legislation and 
appropriations bills suggests that something is causing these differences. Are similar 
forces influencing all states equally as shown in Graph 5-5 or are the state specific factors 
that simply coincided with other states? At the very least, by observing mandate length 
across states and over legislative sessions provides me with a much more complete 
picture of legislative strategies concerning bureaucratic control and some areas in 
particular to focus on when I proceed to determining their differences. 
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Additional Explanation of Variation: Mixed Effects Model 
The examination of mandate length thus far has confirmed that there exists 
contextual variation in the variable across states, in both general legislation and 
appropriations bills, as well as over legislative sessions both within individual and across 
states. These visual inspections have also given us some insight into the type of factors 
that might be causing this variation, specifically state-specific factors or those that 
influence all states equally. One mechanism that can provide a deeper understanding of 
this variation is a mixed effects model. A mixed effects model aggregates mandate length 
to the specific state and sums the average in order to determine how much of the variance 
in the mandates are attributed to factors that vary by year but not by state (national issues, 
national economy, federal mandate), factors that vary by state but not over time 
(institutional arrangements that vary between states but remain relatively stable across 
time), and factors that vary across states and across years (partisan makeup of the 
legislature or government that varies over time). Like the graphs displaying statutory 
control decisions over time, observing the magnitude of these factors will provide me 
with a much better idea which of the theoretical variables will produce the highest 
explanatory payoffs in my empirical model. 
The results of the mixed effects model estimates 55% of the explanatory power to 
come from factors that vary across states and time, 39% to come from factors that vary 
across states but not over time, and 6% of the explanatory power to come from factors 
that vary by time by not state. In other words, if I could identify all of the variables to 
account for 100% of the variance in mandate length across states, I would expect that 
nearly half of the explanatory power to come from variables that are unique to the 
145 
individual state but do vary over time (partisanship), more than a third to come from 
variables that are unique to the individual states but do not vary over time (institutional 
arrangements), and less than ten percent to come from variables not unique to specific 
states that vary over time (national economy). 
The results of the mixed effects model suggests that factors that vary across states 
and over time provide the most explanatory power while less power is attributed to 
factors that vary across states but not over time. These results are encouraging especially 
if we consider the discussion of mandate length and the variation observed in this 
chapter. In particular, there has been considerable evidence of the impact of state specific 
factors and, to a lesser extent, factors that influence all states equally. The mixed effects 
model suggests that these observations are correct and that political and institutional 
factors are driving most of the variation in mandate length. What we do not know is 
whether the political factors are related to the bargaining environment or policy conflict, 
or which institutional factors are influential. We will have to wait to test the empirical 
model to answer these questions. Yet, before proceed to testing our hypotheses in our 
empirical model, we must determine if total control possesses the same variation 
observed here. The next chapter is dedicated to this determination. 
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Chapter 6: 
A Map of Statutory Control Patterns across State Legislatures and Over Time: 
Total Control 
In the examination of mandate length in chapter 5, we observed sufficient 
variation within individual states, across states, between general legislation and 
appropriations bills, and over legislative sessions to justify proceeding to the empirical 
analysis to determine the causes of the variation. In this chapter, I focus on the variation 
in my second dependent variable, total control. In particular, I begin by discussing the 
motivation behind creating a new dependent variable and how it is measured. I follow 
this discussion by examining the relationship between my two dependant variables and 
argue that despite their similarities in assessing the total level of control in mandates, the 
mandates that make up total control provide us with a much more complete 
understanding of statutory control decisions and strategies both within states and over 
time. In particular, total control provides information not only about the amount of 
control imposed in mandates, but, more importantly, it provides information about the 
type of control imposed by legislators and how, if at all, strategies change over time. This 
information takes us much further than speculating about the amount of discretion based 
on the length of mandates and brings us closer to a more complete understanding of 
legislative control of bureaucrats. 
I support the argument in favor of total control by examining the variation that 
exists in the type of mandates imposed by legislators {procedural, policy, and both 
mandates), as well as in the types and amounts of additional control mechanisms imposed 
in mandates (time constraints, approval requirements, and sanctions for non-compliance). 
I conclude the chapter by examining a mixed effects model to determine what factors 
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account for the variance in total control and provide guidance about which theoretical 
variables are most likely to produce the highest explanatory payoffs. 
Total Control - The Amount of Control Reserved for Legislators 
Unlike my first dependent variable, which I constructed to replicate Huber & 
Shipan's length of legislation, total control has no previous study or variable for which I 
can compare or look to for guidance. As a measure of the amount of control reserved by 
legislators in each legislative session, I construct total control for this study based on the 
specific language used by legislators to convey their CHIP policy intent, requirements 
imposed in mandates, and any additional constraints placed in the legislation to limit 
bureaucratic discretion. As a result, it is even more important to determine whether 
sufficient variation exists in the variable to justify its use as a measure to assess the 
amount of discretion not provided to bureaucrats, or in this case, the amount of control 
reserved for legislators in CHIP legislation. Like my first dependent variable, I should 
also expect to see variation in the amount of control placed in mandates across states and 
across legislative sessions. More specifically, given the incentive for legislators to engage 
in statutory control of bureaucrats, I should observe states with different political and 
institutional arrangements vary in the language used by legislators to convey their policy 
intent as well as in their use of additional constraints to further limit discretion. 
Creation of a New Dependent Variable: Total Control 
The motivation to construct a new variable measuring discretion was more than 
Huber & Shipan's own acknowledgment that length of legislation "may be controversial" 
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(Huber & Shipan 2002, pg. 73), or their abandonment of coding the substantive content 
of MMC legislation, as discussed previously. My motivation was based on the 
contrasting empirical research attempting to assess the impact and effectiveness of 
various mechanisms, the inability of these mechanisms to provide information about 
legislative policy foresight, and the presence of alternative less costly mechanisms that 
can assist legislators in overcoming the challenges associated with their PA relationship 
with bureaucrats. In particular, the ability to examine the actual language used by 
legislators to impose policy instructions and requirements on bureaucrats and additional 
mechanisms to further constrain their actions. 
Although many of the challenges and difficulties associated with coding 
substantive policy was discussed previously, there are few additional issues that relate 
specifically the creation of this variable that should be addressed before I proceed to 
examining the data. First, in developing a score of the total control in each individual 
mandate, I assume that individual mandates imposed within the same legislative session 
do not overlap and represent unique issues as they relate to the CHIP policy. I make this 
assumption because of the need to establish a process by which I can appropriately 
measure the amount of control in each session, but also because it is an accurate 
assessment of the legislative process. In particular, it is unlikely that legislators would 
address the same issues or impose control on the same issues in different bills or pass 
bills that contradict one another within the same session. Bills that refer to the same 
issues are often subsumed into one bill and inconsistencies are resolved to preserve 
valuable time and resources, and to improve the likelihood of passage, so that legislators 
can ultimately credit claim and improve their reputations. 
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Second, given this first assumption, I develop total control based on the amount 
of control imposed by legislators in each individual mandate, whether they are 
procedural, policy, or both mandates. As discussed previously, each mandate type 
represents different levels of control and costs for legislators, with both mandates being 
the most constraining on bureaucrats and the most costly for legislators to impose, 
followed by policy mandates, and then procedural ones (see chapter 4). In each 
legislative session, however, I assume that a level of control is imposed upon bureaucrats 
when legislators enact a bill that produces CHIP mandates. The individual mandate may 
constitute the very lowest amount of control (a three word mandate in California 
mentioned above) and provide broad bureaucratic discretion, but the fact that a 
procedural requirement or policy instruction was imposed in the first place suggests that 
legislators intended to engage in statutory control. Taking this assumption an additional 
step, the fact that legislators in a state enact more mandates, despite their amount of 
control, constitutes more control of bureaucrats. This strategy may very well be the result 
of the political or institutional environment from which the legislators reside, but more 
mandates mean more instructions and/or directives that bureaucrats must address or 
incorporate into the development and implementation of the CHIP policy. 
Lastly, given a score for each individual mandate, I aggregate the scores for all 
mandates to the session level. Aggregating the sum of the amount of control to the 
session level enables me to compare the amount of control imposed in each state, as well 
as across states and across sessions. This is an important distinction given the nature of 
state legislation, the limitations of my dataset, and the institutional constraints confronted 
by legislators in many states discussed previously. At the same time, my main 
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explanatory variables vary, if at all, at the session level. If control of the legislature, 
chamber, or governorship shifts to the opposing party, this will take place at the 
beginning of the next legislative session. At the same time, the session level enables me 
to better present the variation in strategies both across states and within states. Not all 
states enact mandates in all sessions and if I were to aggregate control scores to the state 
level, this variation would be missed and our understanding would be incomplete. 
Total Control: Coding Process 
Based on the theoretical discussions in chapter 4 and the assumptions and 
explanations discussed above, I coded each of the 8,274 CHIP mandates obtained from 
1,674 bills in 45 states across six legislative sessions and obtained a score for the total 
control in each mandate. Appendix B provides a complete description of the process 
utilized to code each mandate type, but Table 6-1 provides a summary of this process. 
Each column displays the factors involved in coding each mandate type and the 
scores given for each factor. Higher numbers represent more control legislators impose in 
mandates and thus less bureaucratic discretion. At the bottom of each column is the total 
possible control score for each mandate type. In other words, the closer the mandate score 
approaches the control score, the less discretion provided to bureaucrats and the more 
control reserved for legislators. 
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Table 6-1: Coding Procedures for Total Control 
Procedural Mandates 
Procedural Requirement 
(report, hearing, contact, body 
& procedure) 
No Procedure = "0" 
Yes - Non - Legislative = " 1 " 
Yes - Legislative = "2" 
Yes - Legis & No-Legis = "3" 
Discretionary Language 
Specificity 
Broad ("as agency sees fit") = 
"0" 
Limited ("may" ) = " 1 " 
No Discretion ("must") = "2" 
Additional Constraints 
Time Constraints 
No Constraint = "0" 
Constraint - Not Specified = 
Constraint - Specified = "2" 
Approval Requirements 
No Approval Necessary = "0" 
Approval by Non-Legis body = 
((1 V) 
Approval by Legis body = "2" 
Approval by Non & Legis 
bodies = "3" 
Sanctions 
No Sanction = "0" 
Sanction - Not Specified = " 1 " 
Sanction - Specified = "2" 
Total Possible Score = 12 
Policy Mandates 
General Language 
No General Language = "0" 
Not General Language = " 1 " 
General Language = "2" 
Both Not & General Language = 
"3" 
General Language Specificity 
Not Applicable = "0" 
Minimal Specificity = " 1 " 
Moderate Specificity = "2" 
Significant Specificity = "3" 
Mandate Subject Matter 
Define Not Terms = "0" 
Define Not Procedures = " 1 " 
Define Terms = "2" 
Define Procedures = "3" 
Defines Both Not & Terms = "4" 
Defines Both Not & Procedures = 
Define Specificity 
Not Applicable = "0" 
Minimal Specificity = " 1 " 
Moderate Specificity = "2" 
Significant Specificity = "3" 
Total Policy Score = 14 
Both Mandates 
Combination of: 
Procedural Mandate 
Calculation 
Policy Mandate Calculation 
Each of the mandates are 
calculated and added together to 
obtain a score of both mandate 
Total Both Score = 26 
Total Control Across States 
Total control is the sum of the amount of control in procedural, policy, and both 
mandates. More specifically, it is the score for the amount of control legislators impose in 
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all mandates produced throughout the six sessions based on discretion limiting language, 
additional control mechanisms, policy limiting definitions, and general policy language. 
Graph 6-1 reveals the variation in the average total control across states per session. 
It is clear from the distribution that there exists significant variation in the average 
total amount of control across states over the six legislative sessions in this study. 
Specifically, the mean average total control for all states is 242 with 70% of all states 
falling below the mean, compared to 71% for mandate length. The distribution ranges 
from an average total amount of control per session of 47 by legislators in New Mexico 
to 1155 by legislators in Virginia. 
The variation displayed in Graph 6-1 is also similar to the variation observed in 
mandate length in terms of states that enact more CHIP bills and mandates. Although 
some of the leaders in CHIP bills and mandates also impose more control in mandates 
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(Arizona, Indiana, Connecticut), other leaders produce mandates with significantly lower 
than the mean average of control (Kansas, Illinois, Michigan). This is also true for those 
states considered health care policy experts. Legislative health care experts in Minnesota 
and Hawaii produce low levels of total control per session while non-expert legislators in 
Arizona produce the most control. In terms of statutory control, however, this makes 
sense for Arizona legislators who likely lack specific health care knowledge and 
understanding of both technical information and procedures. To obtain this information 
and protect their preferences, Arizona legislators impose mandates with little discretion 
and specific requests to not only provide reports and develop procedures, but also to meet 
with specific constituents and health care related groups. 
Without fully examining the factors that make up my second dependent variable, 
Graph 6-1 and the analysis above provide evidence that the two dependent variables are 
quite similar in terms of amount of control and exceptions to Huber & Shipan's findings. 
In fact, if we compare the two dependent variables we see that they two are highly 
correlated as evidenced by Graph 6-2 which collapses the sums of mandate length and 
total control for all states (except California) across all legislative sessions. More 
specifically, the graph takes all mandate lengths and total controls and collapses them to 
the bill level, then the session level and finally to the state level. Graph 6-2 thus examines 
all mandate lengths and control scores for every state throughout all six sessions in this 
study. It is clear from the distribution that mandate length and the total control are highly 
correlated. In fact, a correlation reveals a score of .956 supporting a strong relationship. 
At the same time, examining mandate length and total control across states, there is 
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no support for my contention that legislators can impose more control in CHIP mandates 
rather than writing longer, more detailed mandates. Based on the sum of all mandate 
lengths and the sum of total control across all sessions, legislators that produce more 
mandates and pass longer mandates also impose the most control in mandates. 
At first glance, this result does not bode well for the total control as a viable 
alternative to mandate length. On its face, Graph 6-2 suggests that Huber & Shipan's 
decision to calculate the length of legislation was correct; that the length of legislation is 
sufficient to determine the amount of discretion imposed by legislators, and necessary. 
However, simply examining the amount of discretion is not the important story in this 
study. The important story in this study is the fact that there is more to the level of 
discretion provided to bureaucrats than simply the amount of words in legislation or the 
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total control imposed by legislators. More specifically, I argue that the factors that make 
up the total control contribute much more to our knowledge and understanding of 
statutory control decisions and the strategies employed by legislators than a simple 
measure based on length of a mandate or the total control imposed in a mandate. 
Although discussed previously in chapter 4, it is important to reiterate the benefit 
and value of total control to the research on statutory control of bureaucrats. First, rather 
than speculating about the amount of discretion imposed in legislation based on the 
length of the bill or mandate, total control focuses on the content of legislation. 
Specifically, I develop the variable based on the language used by legislators to convey 
their policy intent and the additional control mechanisms included to control bureaucratic 
behavior and ensure their preferred outcomes. As shown in chapter 4, if a bill or mandate 
does not contain language that limits bureaucratic discretion or flexibility (using words 
such as "must" rather than "may"), imposes additional constraints on their behavior 
(specified time, approval requirements, sanctions for non-compliance), or specifically 
defines policy terms or procedures, no matter how long or detailed the bill or mandate is, 
bureaucrats can and will find ways to develop and implement the policy in a manner that 
achieves their preferred outcomes. As I have shown in chapter 4, even mandates 
classified by Huber & Shipan as providing vast discretion to bureaucrats based on its 
short length can effectively direct bureaucrats, constrain their behavior, and limit their 
policy-making discretion and flexibility. We have also seen long, detailed mandates that 
use ambiguous language and unspecified requirements that provide bureaucrats with 
extensive discretion and flexibility. We cannot be sure how much discretion the amount 
of words provides to bureaucrats. 
156 
Second, in addition to enabling me to assess the amount of control or discretion 
placed in an individual mandate, total control allows me to observe specifically how 
legislators limit discretion. By examining the type of mandates used by legislators 
(procedural, policy, and both mandates), I am able to observe what aspects of the policy 
that are important to legislators as well as information about the specific costs incurred by 
legislators in their attempt to control and oversee bureaucrats. This is invaluable 
information, especially in terms of the PA relationship between legislators and 
bureaucrats. For example, procedural mandates require bureaucrats to "do something," 
whether it is to develop procedures, hold a hearing, create a study group, or consult with 
a specific group. At the same time, by requesting that bureaucrats perform duties, 
legislators also shift the burden of the costs (time and resources) to bureaucrats and/or 
constituent groups. For these reasons, I consider procedural mandates less costly for 
legislators to require and impose in legislation. Consequently, by requiring bureaucrats to 
"do something" as opposed to defining the parameters of the policy itself {policy 
mandates), legislators signal to bureaucrats that the manner in which the policy is 
developed and implemented is their main concern. Whether this is a decision made based 
on time and resources or timing in the statutory control process, we do not yet know. 
However, examining a snapshot of mandate length cannot tell us any of this information. 
Third, having this additional information about the types of mandates and 
additional control mechanisms provides a more complete understanding of the specific 
statutory control strategies employed by legislators across states. No longer are we 
constrained by simply comparing the lengths of bills or mandates when procedural, 
policy, and both control allows us to observe which legislators incur the costs of 
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imposing policy mandates rather than the less costly procedural mandates, or which 
legislators strengthen their mandates by including additional control mechanisms. Now 
we can better assess the impacts of the political and institutional arrangements in the 
particular state. Does the capacity of legislators affect the decision of which type of 
mandate or control mechanism legislators impose? Or, are decisions based purely on the 
political environment and the incentives legislators have for controlling bureaucrats? 
Mandate length can help us understand which of these factors influence the amount of 
discretion, but procedural, policy, and both control can accomplish this and provide us 
with information about different strategies both in general and over time. 
Even though the factors that make up total control provide me with little 
additional power in assessing the total amount of discretion in mandates, they are 
extremely valuable to improving our understanding statutory control decisions and 
strategies both within states, across states, and over legislative sessions. The important 
part now is to make sure that the different aspects of total control possess the same 
variation that I observed in my first dependent variable. This shall be the focus of the 
remainder of this chapter. In particular, I will investigate whether variation exists in the 
use of different mandate types and additional control mechanisms across states, and in the 
amount of control in different mandates across states, within states, between general 
legislation and appropriations bills, and across legislative sessions. 
Variation in Use of Mandate Types 
Of the 8,274 total CHIP mandates, 2,952 are procedural mandates (36%), 3,171 
are policy mandates (38%), and 2,151 are both mandates (26%). Displaying the 
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percentage of use of procedural, policy, and both mandates across all states throughout 
the study, Figure 6-1 reveals that, much like the differences between states that enacted 
more CHIP bills and mandates, there exists significant variation in the use of the different 
mandates across states. While legislators in many states used similar amounts of each 
mandate type (see West Virginia, Massachusetts, Washington, Texas, Arizona, Oregon, 
and Kentucky), legislators in other states favored one mandate type over the others as 
evidenced by the predominant use of policy mandates in New York, New Mexico, 
Missouri, and Alabama. If our assumptions are accurate, we might expect to observe 
legislators using more procedural mandates than policy and both mandates because of 
the higher costs associated with researching policy and procedural information and 
writing policy and both mandates. Consequently, we should also expect to see legislators 
that use more both mandates to impose less policy mandates for these very same reasons. 
The data reveal that this is not always the case. Legislators in no state use 
predominantly procedural mandates. In fact, New Hampshire was the only state where 
legislators used procedural mandates 50% of the time, followed closely by legislators in 
Ohio and Utah. Figure 6-1 shows that most legislators opted for more control and higher 
costs associated with policy and both mandates. Even the states that incurred more costs 
to impose both mandates also incurred the costs of writing and including policy 
mandates. For example, Louisiana legislators utilized policy mandates 38% of the time 
(43 of 114 mandates) and policy mandates 35% of the time (40 mandates). Similar 
percentages are found in Delaware, Montana, and Nevada while other states behaved in a 
more expected manner. Of its 185 total mandates, Michigan legislators, for example, 
utilized both mandates 42% of time throughout the 10-year period (78 mandates) and 
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Figure 6-1: 
Variation in Use of Mandate Types Across State Legislatures 
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policy mandates only 18% of the time (33 mandates). A similar strategy was used by 
Montana legislators who used policy mandates 45% of the time (49 total) and both 
mandates 31% of the time (34 total). 
Again, at this point we do not know for sure why states vary in their use of 
mandate types or whether the choice is influenced by political or institutional 
arrangements, but we can speculate more generally about the increased use of both and 
policy mandates. As discussed previously, most state legislators lack sufficient time and 
resources to dedicate to all policy areas, especially like CHIP that involves technical and 
specialized knowledge of health care procedures and processes that the average state 
legislator is not likely to possess. This brings us back to the Texas and California 
examples of the legislative dilemma discussed at the beginning of the study: do 
legislators who lack the time and resources defer to bureaucrats who are experts in a 
specific policy area or do they incur the costs of overcoming information asymmetries 
and controlling bureaucratic behavior to ensure their preferred policy outcomes? It would 
seem that, on the one hand, legislators would be more likely to use both mandates and/or 
policy mandates to maintain a certain level of control over bureaucrats, as well as shift 
the burden of costs to bureaucrats and constituents. Although it is cheaper and easier to 
impose procedural mandates in legislation, they do not provide the same level of control. 
On the other hand, legislators able and willing to incur the costs associated with statutory 
control can control their behavior. The use of policy and both mandates in these 
situations are preferable to procedural mandates. 
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Variation in Use of Additional Control Mechanisms 
Examining the use of procedural mandates across states a little closer, displaying 
from top to bottom, the use of additional control mechanisms by state throughout the 
period of the study, Figure 6-2 reveals that time constraints are used more frequently than 
either approval requirements or sanctions. In fact, in the 1,674 CHIP bills coded for this 
study, sanctions for non-compliance were only used 12 times throughout the 10-year 
period of the study, three times by legislators in the state of Washington alone. In terms 
of the costs associated with imposing additional constraints, the predominant use of time 
constraints makes sense considering that they require no additional actions on the part of 
legislators unless they are combined with an approval by a legislative body. 
Displaying the use of additional control mechanisms across states throughout the 
six legislative sessions, Figure 6-2 reveals significant variation in the use of additional 
control mechanisms by states that used more procedural mandates. In particular, New 
Hampshire legislators used time constraints in 23 of its 46 procedural mandates, 16 of 
which were specified times rather than unspecified. In Ohio, legislators only used 10 time 
constraints - all specified - in its 44 procedural mandates. Utah legislators, whom 
imposed the third most procedural mandates, like those in New Hampshire, included 
time constraints in 30 of its 49 procedural mandates, 25 of which were specified times. 
In states where legislators predominantly used both and policy mandates, we 
observe similar differences in the use of additional control mechanisms. For example, 
legislators in Delaware, Louisiana, and Montana used procedural mandates in less than 
20% of their mandates. Montana legislators used 12 time constraints in 25 procedural 
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Figure 6-2: Total Use of Additional Constraints in Procedural 
Mandates by State 1997-2007 
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mandates and 10 time constraints in 34 both mandates. Legislators in Louisiana and 
Delaware were less concerned, using them in less than half of their mandates. 
Although the variation in the type of mandate use of additional control 
mechanisms provides me with information about the policy intent of legislators and their 
desire to impose more or less control on bureaucrats, without observing the actual 
language imposed by legislators, this variation means very little. As we discussed in 
chapter 4, legislators can write long, detailed mandates constraining bureaucratic 
behavior and setting strict policy parameterswith the help of specific time constraints, 
multiple approval requirements, and specified sanctions, but if the language that they use 
to convey these mandates does not eliminate any discretion or flexibility in carrying out 
the requirements or interpreting the policy in a different way, then all the time and 
resources incurred by legislators' has the potential of being wasted. In other words, it 
does not matter which mandate type is used or how many additional control mechanisms 
are imposed in a mandate, if legislators use language like "may" or "as the agency sees 
fit," they ultimately lose control and bureaucrats gain discretion. In these instances, 
bureaucrats increase their chances of successfully maximizing their profits or pursuing 
their own goals. With this in mind, I examine total control imposed in each mandate type. 
As mentioned above, my second dependent variable provides a score for each mandate 
based on the mandate type imposed by legislators, any additional control mechanisms, 
and, most importantly, the specific language they use to convey their policy intent. 
The Amount of Control in Procedural, Policy & Both Mandates 
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Table 6-2 provides a comparison of the average amount of control in procedural, 
policy and both mandates51'. It is clear that the amount control in procedural mandates is 
significantly smaller than those for policy and both mandates. In fact, there considerable 
variation in the amount of control within the different mandate types and there is more 
variation in policy and both mandates than in procedural mandates. These results support 
Figure 6-1 at the beginning of the chapter that showed the percentage of use of mandate 
types across states. Most states used less procedural mandates when compared to policy 
and both mandates, and we know that they, on average, imposed less control as well. 
Table 6-2: Variation in the Average Amount of Control 
in Procedural, Policy, & Both Mandates by Session Across States 
Mandate Type 
Procedural 
Policy 
Both 
Mean 
48.5 
102.7 
90.5 
Standard Deviation 
50.2 
89.1 
109.9 
Minimum & Maximum 
2.8-228.4 
15.3-352.4 
4.4-599.2 
Amount of Control in Procedural Mandates 
The sum of the amount of control in procedural mandates is based on the 
requirement that bureaucrats do something (create a body, hold a hearing, consult with a 
group, create a body, or develop procedures), the specific language used to impose policy 
intent, and additional control mechanisms imposed in the mandate to further limit 
53
 California was excluded from this analysis because it significantly skew the results, In the subsequent 
graphs, including California depresses the distribution and cause the variation that exists across states to be 
less apparent. 
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bureaucratic discretion. Displaying from left to right the sum of the amount of control in 
procedural mandates across states, Graph 6-3 reveals that legislators vary in the amount 
of procedural control imposed in mandates. 
Although the mean sum of the amount of control in procedural mandates per 
session for all states is 48.9, this number alone means very little unless we examine it in 
conjunction with scores for individual states. In particular, 68% of all states fall below the 
mean score per session, while the remaining 32% of states range from 49.7 in Maryland 
to 228.3 in Virginia54. This suggests that the variation across states comes from these 14 
states, most of which are also leaders in the enactment of CHIP bills and mandates. 
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The sum of procedural control per session for California is 324. 
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Although it makes sense that states that enact more bills and mandates will have higher 
procedural session control scores due to the_sheer number of bills and mandates, Graph 
6-3 reveals that this is not true for all states. In fact, despite legislators in Virginia, 
Indiana, Arizona, and Colorado imposing procedural mandates that reserve a significant 
amount of control for themselves and limit bureaucratic discretion, legislators in New 
York engaged in a much different statutory control strategy as evidenced by their session 
procedural control score of 7.5, well below the mean of 48.9. In particular, although New 
York legislators imposed procedural mandates with some constraining language and 
specified time constraints, it produced very few procedural mandates opting to use 
primarily policy and both mandates to control and oversee bureaucrats. This strategy was 
similar to the one used by legislators in Illinois and Kansas, two additional states 
classified as a CHIP bill and mandate enactment leaders. Legislators in Illinois received a 
procedural session control score of 14.8 despite enacting 78 bills and 180 individual 
mandates, while their counterparts in Kansas received a score of 11.2, both significantly 
lower than the mean for all states. However, as in New York, legislators in Illinois chose 
to use only 39 procedural mandates of its 180 mandates, while Kansas legislators used 
33 of its 116 total mandates. 
Contrast these procedural session control scores with the 65.2 achieved by 
Oregon legislators. In Oregon, legislators imposed significant control through discretion 
limiting language in 25 of its 33 procedural mandates, directing bureaucrats to engage in 
significant procedural requirements in 33 of 57 mandates, and specified time constraints 
and approval requirements consistently in their 135 mandates in 13 CHIP bills. These 
results are similar to those in Nebraska where legislators received a score of 57.3. In both 
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Nebraska and Oregon legislators are not leaders in the enactment of bills or mandates yet 
still imposed significantly more control on bureaucrats in 23 bills and 133 mandates. 
In addition to differences between states that enacted more and less CHIP bills 
and mandates, there exists variation in the sum of the amount of control between states 
regarded as health care policy experts and non-experts (see chapter 5). Although I found 
that state legislators considered health care experts in California, New Jersey, and to a 
lesser extent Florida, wrote more mandate words per session than other non-expert states, 
legislators in Minnesota and Hawaii did not behave like policy leaders. In these states, 
legislators wrote significantly less mandate words per session than other policy leaders. I 
also found that non-policy expert legislators in Arizona wrote the 5th most mandate words 
per session of any state, expert or not. Graph 6-3 confirms similar results when using my 
second dependent variable, total control. In particular, policy experts in Florida and New 
Jersey, as well as non-policy expert legislators in Arizona, receive higher procedural 
session control scores, while expert legislators in Minnesota and Hawaii receive lower 
procedural session control scores. These results may reflect the number of bills and 
mandates enacted, but the fact the policy expert legislators in Minnesota and Hawaii are 
not enacting more bills or using specific language and specified additional control 
mechanisms in their mandates suggests that they are not behaving like policy experts. 
Amount of Control in Policy Mandates 
The sum of the amount of control in policy mandates is based on mandate 
definitions (policy terms or procedures) and the type and amount of general policy 
language imposed within the mandate. Legislators in states that receive higher control 
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scores in policy mandates are more likely setting the parameters of the CHIP program by 
defining policy procedures with significant specificity and including both general policy 
and not-general policy language in individual mandates. Graph 6-4 reveals that although 
most legislators are engaging in this type of policy control, all are not thus risking the 
development and implementation of the CHIP program that is not consistent with their 
intent. In particular, 68% of states fall below the mean sum of the amount of control in 
policy mandates per session (102.7), and the remaining 32% of states range from a policy 
session control score of 107.4 in North Carolina to a score of 352.4 in Colorado. 
The distribution in Graph 6-4 suggests that much of the variation comes from the 
14 states with the highest policy session control scores. While legislators in Indiana, 
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Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Arizona all used general policy and not-general policy 
language extensively in their policy mandates, legislators in Indiana and Virginia spent a 
great deal of time and resources defining CHIP related terms and providing extensive 
support for their definitions. Pennsylvania and Arizona legislators, on the other hand, 
incurred the costs of defining terms and procedures, a strategy that seems appropriate for 
legislators in Arizona who are not considered health experts and want to ensure that 
bureaucrats not only know what they prefer but also pursue those ends. 
The one glaring policy session control score in Graph 6-4 is the one given to 
legislators in New York. Recall that New York legislators consistently provided 
bureaucrats with extensive discretion in the procedural mandates it imposed throughout 
the 10-year period, as evidenced by their low procedural session control score, despite 
being a leader in enacting CHIP bills and mandates and producing longer mandates. It 
appears, however, that the strategy used by legislators in New York was to focus their 
time and resources on writing policy mandates with substantial controls for bureaucrats 
including discretion limiting language, defining CHIP terms and procedures with 
significant specificity, and including substantial general policy language to further set the 
parameters of the policy and further limit bureaucratic flexibility. At the same time, 
legislators in New York used fewer both and procedural mandates, but when they did, 
they did not exercise the same level of control or incur the same costs. Whether this was 
the result of uncertainty over partisanship or the institutional arrangements in the state is 
left to be determined, but exactly the type of variation that I was hoping to observe. 
Another interesting result from Graph 6-4 is the sum of the amount of control in 
policy mandates per session in the states of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Montana. 
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Legislators in these states are not leaders in enacting CHIP bills and mandates, nor are 
they leaders in writing longer mandates. However, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Montana 
legislators imposed considerable amount of control per session in their policy mandates. 
Montana legislators received a policy session control score of 89.8 while their 
counterparts in Mississippi received a score of 95, and Louisiana a score of 144.5. These 
scores suggest that legislators in these states imposed significant control and limited 
discretion in fewer policy mandates. In fact, legislators in each of these states not only 
used language eliminating bureaucratic discretion, but also provided significant 
specificity to the policy terms and procedures they defined for bureaucrats. 
Amount of Control in Both Mandates 
Both mandates are triggered when legislators impose a procedural requirement 
followed by a description of how the requirement will affect or shape the development or 
implementation of the policy. As mentioned above, I consider these mandates the most 
costly to impose and the most constraining on bureaucrats. Additionally, I argued why I 
thought that legislators, given the ability and incentive, might choose to incur the costs of 
not only requiring bureaucrats to do something and imposing additional control 
mechanisms, but by also articulating how the policy outcomes that they expect. Graph 6-
3 reveals that there is considerable variation in the sum of the amount of control in both 
mandates per session. In particular, 73% of states fall below the mean sum of the amount 
of control in both mandates (90.5), with the remaining 27% ranging from a score of 105 
in Pennsylvania to 599.2 in Virginia. Again, most of the variation in the control in both 
mandates comes from the 12 states with the highest both session control scores. 
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As we have seen in the two previous graphs, although the states that receive 
higher amount of policy session control scores are predominantly those that enacted the 
most CHIP bills and mandates, this is also not the case with both mandates. As 
mentioned previously, New York legislators invested their time and resources in 
imposing more control in policy mandates than in procedural or both mandates. In fact, 
legislators in New York, despite being a leader in enacting 
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CHIP bills and mandates, received a 6of/? session control score of 19.1, significantly 
lower than the mean of 90.5 for all states per session. Only 20 of New York's 213 total 
mandates were both mandates, most of which involved non-discretion limiting language 
directed at the development of procedures with unspecified time constraints and 
unspecified definitions of terms. Legislators in Kansas received a policy session control 
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score 42.0, also much less than the mean score for all states. Despite enacting 78 CHIP 
bills and 118 individual mandates, Kansas legislators "hoped for the best" regardless of 
mandate type as they use no controlling language and no control mechanisms and policy 
procedure definitions with little supporting or general policy language. 
More interesting for this analysis however, is the differences in sum of the amount 
of control in both mandates between states that used more and less both mandates. We 
might expect that legislators in states that are going to incur the costs of researching and 
writing both mandates would want to use constraining language, additional control 
mechanisms and significantly specified policy term and procedural definitions to ensure 
that the time and resources invested would produce their desired results. For many states, 
this was the strategy of choice, but not for all. Legislators in states that used both 
mandates over 30% of their total mandates, including Connecticut, Virginia, and 
Massachusetts, procedural requirements and policy impact was reinforced with more 
constraining language, specified time constraints and approval requirements, as well as 
significant supporting language for policy terms and procedures. Yet, in other states like 
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Delaware, the predominant use of both mandates 
was not supported by similar constraints. Even though these states enacted less bills and 
mandates, both mandates in these states provided more discretion to bureaucrats with 
unspecified control mechanisms and minimally specified policy terms and procedures. As 
a result, legislators received lower both session control scores. 
The examination of the sum of the amount of control in policy mandates, as in the 
examinations of procedural and policy mandates, clearly reveals significant variation 
across states. Although many of the states that possess higher control scores have 
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obtained them simply because they have enacted the most CHIP bills and mandates, the 
fact that significant variation exists within states that predominantly used one mandate 
type over another as well as states that imposed more control in less mandates is 
important for this study. It should not be a surprise to anyone that a state that produces 
more mandates will have a higher control score, but when a state like Nebraska that 
enacts few bills and mandates yet imposes more constraining language and more 
constraining control mechanisms, there is a reason for it. Or, in a state like New York 
where legislators are leaders in enacting CHIP bills and mandates and neglect imposing 
control in procedural and both mandates to focus predominantly on incurring the costs to 
limit bureaucrat's discretion in policy mandates, there is a reason for it. Even legislators 
in Mississippi, Louisiana, or Montana that enact few mandates but protect their 
preferences by limiting behavior with considerable control. Again, there is a reason for it. 
Amount of Control in Mandate Types: General Legislation vs. Appropriations Bills 
Establishing variation in the use and amount of control in different types of 
mandates and additional control mechanisms provides the first evidence that the 
significant differences exist in the factors that make up my second dependent variable. In 
the previous chapter, however, we also observed differences in the sum of mandate 
length between general legislation or appropriations bills, providing evidence that 
legislators may strategically impose their CHIP policy intent in general legislation or 
appropriations bills. Seven states that routinely used both general legislation and 
appropriation bills between 40-60% of the time reveals that legislators in New York, 
Kansas, Rhode Island, and Vermont did not vary significantly in the mandate length in 
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roughly the same amount of bills, and legislators in Iowa, North Carolina, and Idaho 
enacted longer, more detailed mandates consistently in general legislation. Here I 
investigate whether similar variation exists in these states using my second dependent 
variable, total control55. 
Table 6-3 displays a statistical comparison of the two control mechanisms 
together and separately56, while Table 6-4 reports the correlation matrix examining the 
relationship between general legislation and appropriations bills, and Graph 6-6 and 6-7 
display from smallest to largest, the average sum of total control in all states per session 
in appropriations bills and general legislation. Table 6-3 reveals that the mean sum of 
total control is 241.7 per session for both mechanisms and if we split the bills by type of 
control mechanism, the mean drops to 129.6 for appropriations bills and 171.8 for general 
legislation. Unlike our analysis of mandate length, there is roughly the same amount of 
variation in total control, on average, in both appropriations bills and general legislation. 
This makes more sense now that we have replaced mandate length as a measure of 
control or discretion with a more substantive measure. Despite the similarities in the 
amount of control the two mechanisms, Table 6-4 reveals a similar relationship between 
general legislation and appropriations bills found in chapter 5. There is a slight negative 
relationship supporting my argument that legislators impose their policy intent 
strategically and that the two mechanisms are not interchangeable. 
I use total control for this analysis rather than examine each mandate type separately to establish 
variation in the variable as a whole. I assume that if variation exists in the direct variable, then variation 
will also exist in the factors that make up the variable. 
56
 Graph 6-5 does not include Nevada, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia because these states do not use 
appropriations bills, and Graph 6-6 does not include Alabama, Michigan, and New Mexico because these 
states do not use general legislation. Both graphs exclude California. 
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Table 6-4: Comparison of the Sum of the Amount of Total Control 
in CHIP Bills by Legislation Type 
Variable 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum & Maximum 
Both General Legislation & 
Appropriations Bills 
(8274 mandates) 
100% 
241.7 
230.6 
47.2-1154.9 
General Legislation 
Only 
(5308 mandates) 
64% 
171.8 
122.5 
13.3-593.8 
Appropriations Bills 
Only 
(2966 mandates) 
36% 
129.6 
171.2 
3.5-579.8 
Table 6-5: Correlation Matrix Examining the Relationship between 
General Legislation & Appropriations Bills 
Variable 
General Legislation 
Appropriations Bills 
General Legislation 
1 
-.170 
Appropriations Bills 
1 
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If we compare Graphs 6-5 and 6-6 to those displayed in chapter 5 (Graphs 5-2 and 
5-3), the first thing that stands out is that many of the states with higher session scores for 
total control in general legislation and appropriations bills are the same states that 
produce more words pertaining to mandates. In particular, Colorado, Virginia, and 
Arizona receive higher scores for total control in mandates in appropriations bills as they 
did for the sum of mandate length, while Connecticut, Arkansas, and Oklahoma receive 
the lowest scores. At the same time, Pennsylvania, Oregon, and Connecticut receive 
higher scores for total control in general legislation as they did for mandate length, while 
Wisconsin, Delaware, and Hawaii received the lowest scores in both analyses. Although 
this provides us with some information about the relationship between my two dependent 
variables, it also suggests that we may find similar results to the investigation of the 
seven states that routinely used both mechanisms between 40-60% of the time throughout 
the 10-year period of the study. In fact, when we examine the sum of total control for 
New York, Iowa, North Carolina, Kansas, Idaho, Rhode Island, and Vermont in both 
general legislation and appropriations bills, this is the case with one exception. 
Like in our investigation of the sum of mandate length, the sum of total control 
does not vary significantly between appropriations bills and general legislation for 
legislators in Vermont, Kansas, and Rhode Island. In fact, difference between the two 
mechanisms in Vermont is 13.7 in favor of general legislation, 24.1 in favor of 
appropriations bills in Kansas, and 18.6 in favor of general legislation in Rhode Island. 
Additionally, there are significantly higher scores for total control in general legislation 
than for appropriations bills in Idaho (77.5 to 29.5), North Carolina (239.4 to 70.8), and 
in Iowa (188 to 60.1). These are roughly the same results we found in chapter 5, except 
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for the fact that the score for the sum of the amount of control in New York differed by 
98.1 in favor of general legislation. 
In the previous chapter, the sum of mandate length was similar in New York for 
both control mechanisms. I cannot be sure what is causing this change in New York, but I 
can speculate that the amount of policy mandates New York legislators imposed in 
general legislation as opposed to appropriations bills is likely to have caused the 
difference. Although their overall per session score is higher, the magnitude of their score 
is also impacted by the fact that legislators in New York also go to great lengths to limit 
bureaucratic discretion through specific language and additional control mechanisms also 
contributes to the larger difference in scores between the two control mechanisms. 
It may very well be that the same justifications for the variation in mandate length 
in the previous chapter also apply to total control in this chapter. Without considering the 
impact of the political environment at this point, the differences in the appropriations 
process across states may have influenced the type of language used by legislators and 
the use of additional mechanisms to control and oversee bureaucrats. In particular, 
legislators in states that only have a few opportunities to address policy in appropriations 
bills are more likely to use constraining language and specified additional control 
mechanisms may not have a chance to alter policy decisions in the future. This may be 
the case for North Carolina, which passes, on average, only three appropriations bills per 
session. Legislators in the state receive a score of 70.8 per session from 63 appropriations 
bills across the 10-year period of the study. Although this is significantly less than the 
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score of 239.4 per session that they impose in general legislation in 89 bills, it does 
represent a considerable amount of control per session in appropriations bills . 
A more appropriate example might be the situation in Idaho where legislators 
enacted roughly the same amount of general legislation bills (29) as appropriations bills 
(20) in the 10-year period. However, their score for the sum of total control per session 
for each control mechanism differs by 48 (77.5 for general legislation and 29.5 for 
appropriations bills). Idaho legislators, however, have the opportunity to pass, on 
average, more than 20 appropriations bills per session. As a result, they are not 
constrained in each appropriations bill like their counterparts in North Carolina. Idaho 
legislators can correct wayward bureaucrats in subsequent bills if they so choose. Granted 
this involves additional time and resources, but in the event that they need to re-address 
an issue, they can do so (budget shortfall, windfall, emergency). Consequently, the higher 
score per session for North Carolina may reflect the fact that they lack subsequent 
opportunities to correct or adjust their CHIP policy through appropriations bills. 
This investigation has demonstrated that variation in total control between the use 
of general legislation and appropriations bills across states does exist. I am still unsure 
about the impact of the political environment on these differences, but my assumptions 
regarding the impact of the appropriations processes appears to hold some validity with 
both dependent variables. Until we test these hypotheses in the next chapter, we will not 
know for sure. At the very least, we have observed the type of variation necessary to 
justify moving forward to assessing the causes of the differences empirically. 
57
 Again, some of the variation in scores for the sum of the amount of control are attributed to the amount 
of bills enacted, which in North Carolina's case the distribution is 89 general legislation bills compared to 
63 appropriations bills, but the 175.5 difference between the two control mechanisms is also obviously 
related to the specific language and additional control mechanisms imposed within the bills as well. 
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Amount of Control Over Time: 1997 - 2007 
In the previous chapter, I argued that had the analysis stopped with the 
observation of differences in mandate length per session and between general legislation 
and appropriations bills, we would not only have some contradictory results to Huber & 
Shipan, but also an incomplete understanding of the statutory control decisions across 
states. I argued that we could determine the true impact of political and institutional 
environments on the amount of words pertaining to mandates based on a "snapshot" of 
statutory control decisions. To expand upon the prevailing literature on statutory control 
of bureaucrats, I proceeded to examine mandate length in two states - New Jersey and 
Massachusetts - across legislative sessions. This examination revealed a different 
statutory control strategy than concluded by the "snapshot" of decisions and displayed 
different strategies by two states that we might have expected to behave similarly. 
In the previous chapter I argued that that these two states were ideal for 
examining statutory control decisions across time because the enacted roughly the same 
amount of bills and mandates, and both are leaders in session mandate length generally 
and when separated by legislation type. In terms of the total control, both states once 
again share similar results. Not only are legislators in the two states possess higher scores 
for amount of total control per session (514.1 and 588.8 respectfully), but they also used 
about the same percentage of procedural, policy, and both mandates, and control 
mechanisms. As a result, we should see legislators in both states adopting similar 
strategies over time. However, rather than examine the total control, it makes more sense 
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to investigate whether these similarly situated states vary in the use of procedural, policy, 
and both mandates since these are my main variables of interest5 . 
Graphs 6-8, 6-9, and 6-10 displays the average amount of session control in 
procedural, policy, and both mandates across all six sessions in New Jersey and 
Massachusetts. It is once again very clear from the graphs that a snapshot of these 
decisions would fail to adequately capture the strategy legislators in these states adopt in 
attempting to control bureaucrats. The different levels of control in each mandate type 
across sessions suggests that a simple snapshot would provide a limited understanding of 
the amount of control imposed in the states as well as how they are attempting to control 
and oversee bureaucrats. 
More importantly for this study, each of the graphs displays significant variation 
in total control imposed by legislators in New Jersey and Massachusetts in each of the 
mandate type. Not only did legislators in each state impose different amounts of control 
in each mandate type, but their choices and the sequence of their choices provides a much 
clearer understanding of their statutory control strategies. In particular, New Jersey 
legislators impose few controls in relatively few mandates at the adoption of their CHIP 
program. Each of the graphs displays a relatively low average amount of control in 
procedural, policy and both mandates in the 1997-1998 session. However, if we look at 
the 1999-2000 session in each of the graphs we see legislators imposing significantly 
more control in each mandate type, with the most control being imposed in policy 
mandates, despite the fact that they did so in roughly the same amount of mandates (34 
procedural to 30policy). It appears from the distribution that legislators in New Jersey 
58
 It should be noted that an examination of the total amount of control reveals significant variation in the 
strategies between legislators in New Jersey and Massachusetts, similar to that shown using mandate length 
in chapter 5. 
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Graph 6-8: Amount of Procedural Control by Legislative Sessions 
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Graph 6-10: Amount of Both Control by Legislative Sessions 
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may have realized that their initial mandates were either not specific enough or did not 
provide sufficient instructions about what bureaucrats should do {procedural mandates) 
and how they define and interpret the CHIP policy {policy mandates). At the same time, 
legislators also expanded the CHIP program in this session, which may be another factor 
for the increase in amount of control in each mandate type. 
In the 2001-2002 session, it appears that New Jersey legislators attempt to further 
reinforce their directives with the use of more both mandates combined with less control 
imposed in procedural and policy mandates. These mandates may not have been as 
successful as legislators had hoped as evidenced by the imposition of more control in 
policy and both mandates in the 2003-2004 session, followed by more control in all three 
mandate types in the 2005-2006 session. Once again, New Jersey legislators expanded 
the CHIP program in both sessions to create the "The Family Health Care Coverage Act" 
which combined adult and child health insurance under one umbrella program. Yet, aside 
from the expansion of the program, we can also speculate that legislators in New Jersey 
were playing "catch-up" and trying to reel in bureaucrats that were developing and 
implementing the CHIP policy as evidenced by the limited control imposed at the 
adoption of their program. At the same time, the expansion of the program throughout the 
six sessions is consistent with the use of more policy and procedural mandates as they 
expanded the policy parameters. 
The situation in Massachusetts is quite different from New Jersey. Legislators in 
the state incurred substantial costs of imposing considerable amounts of control in both 
procedural and both mandates in the adoption session of their CHIP program (1997-
1998) as well as a moderate level of control in policy mandates. Compared to legislators 
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in New Jersey, Massachusetts legislators imposed a considerable total control in each of 
the three mandate types, and followed their investment with similar levels of control in 
procedural and policy mandates in the 1999-2000, but in their use of both mandates. The 
2001-2002 session brought less new controls in all three mandate types which seems 
reasonable considering the time and resources they incurred in the previous two sessions. 
The expansion of enrollment and expansion of CHIP benefits to pregnant women is likely 
the cause of much of the new control imposed in the 2003-2004 session, and seems 
consistent with the increase in control in procedural and both mandates as legislators 
were altering the parameters of the CHIP policy. Unlike legislators in New Jersey, aside 
from the expansion of their program, Massachusetts legislator's use of the different 
mandate types seems to suggest that the investment that they made at the beginning of the 
program was sufficient to control and oversee bureaucrats. 
As mentioned in the discussion of mandate length, these observations concerning 
the statutory control strategies in New Jersey and Massachusetts would not have been 
available had I only examined one legislative session. Observing the use and timing of 
different mandates provides me with important information about when legislators 
attempted to control bureaucrats as well as how they went about achieving that goal. 
However, what about the rest of the states? In the previous chapter we investigated 
mandate length for all states across all legislative sessions and found even more 
information regarding these factors. Would we find similar information examining the 
amount of control in different mandate types across all states? 
Graph 6-11 displays the average total control in procedural, policy, and both 
mandates across all states throughout all six sessions of this study. It is obvious from the 
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distributions that, in addition to significant differences in total control imposed in each 
mandate type across all six legislative sessions, the total control imposed in each mandate 
type across time provides some additional information about their combined use. For 
example, as we saw in Massachusetts, the most control imposed in procedural mandates 
takes place at the adoption of the program. In terms of the PA relationship between 
legislators and bureaucrats this seems reasonable considering legislators who lack the 
requisite knowledge of the CHIP policy and/or the procedures and processes necessary to 
develop and implement the program are likely to require bureaucrats to provide the 
information (e.g. submit reports, develop procedures) or meet with 
Graph 6-11: Amount of Control in Mandate Types Across Legislative Sessions 
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experts or constituents groups with information or input (consult or hold a hearing). Once 
this information is acquired concerned groups are involved in the process, and legislators 
have set the parameters of the policy, it is more likely that legislators will use policy and 
both mandates to correct an agency that has strayed from legislative intent or to alter the 
parameters when CHIP policies are restricted or expanded in subsequent sessions. The 
amount total control imposed in the 2001-2002 session in both policy and both mandates 
provides some support for this assumption as well as from the investigation of New 
Jersey and Massachusetts above. Additionally, the less total control imposed in the 
remaining sessions supports my assumptions regarding legislators anticipating changes to 
the reauthorization of CHIP, as we observed similar trends in the examination of mandate 
length in the previous chapter. 
I am also not surprised that the amount of total control placed in policy and both 
mandates follow a similar path. On the one hand, the use of both mandate types requires 
elevated costs and a certain knowledge and understanding of the policy area in order to 
effectively define or clarify the policy area. I make this assumption because the sessions 
in which total control in both mandates is less than policy mandates are in sessions where 
the amount of control in procedural mandates is higher. I also expected to see the use of 
more both mandates in the later sessions of the study where CHIP expansions require 
bureaucrats to develop new procedures, meet with new groups, or hold more hearings, yet 
combined with how the procedures will impact or affect the policy. This is because 
legislators at this point have a few years experience dealing with the CHIP policy and a 
greater understanding of its development and implementation. 
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Like mandate length, the investigations above have revealed significant variation 
in mandate types both within states and across states over time. Aside from the fact that 
we would have missed most of this variation by examining a snapshot of control 
decisions, we now have a much better understanding of the amount of control legislators 
have imposed across the six sessions as well as how they have attempted to control and 
oversee bureaucrats. Although this information does not reveal the causes of these 
strategies, it does provide us with a better idea about potential causes. To improve our 
understanding of these potential causes, I run a mixed effects model to find out which 
theoretical variable will provide the highest explanatory payoffs in my empirical analysis. 
Mixed Effects Model 
As a reminder, the mixed effects model aggregates the amount of control to the 
specific state and sums the average control in order to determine how much of the 
variance in the mandates are attributed to factors that vary by time but not by state 
(national issues, national economy, federal mandate), factors that vary by state but not 
over time (institutional arrangements that vary between states but remain relatively stable 
across time), and factors that vary across states and across years (partisan makeup of the 
legislature or government that varies over time). Unlike the previous chapter, I test the 
mixed effects model using the direct measure of total control in addition to the separate 
measures for the each mandate type. The results of the mixed effects model for all 
variables are presented in Table 6-4. 
188 
Table 6-6: Mixed Effects Results of Amount of Control & Mandate Types 
Variable 
Amount of Control 
Procedural Mandates 
Policy Mandates 
Both Mandates 
Vary Across States & 
Time 
(Political Factors) 
40% 
39% 
42% 
42% 
Vary Across States -
Not Time 
(Institutions Factors) 
48% 
45% 
47% 
49% 
Vary Across Time — 
Not States 
(National Factors) 
12% 
16% 
11% 
10% 
In the previous chapter examining the variance in mandate length revealed that 
61% of the explanatory power was likely to come from factors that vary across states and 
time (political arrangements in each state), 35% to come from factors that vary across 
states but not over time (institutional arrangements), and 4% of the explanatory power to 
come from factors that vary by time but not states (national factors). The mixed effects 
estimates in this chapter provide significantly different results. 
Examining the direct measure of total control and when split into mandate type, 
we clearly see that the overall structure of explanatory power is relatively consistent 
across all mandate types. In particular, if I could identify all of the variables to account 
for 100% of the variance in mandate length across states, then I would expect between 
39% and 42% of the explanatory power to come from variables that are not only unique 
to the individual state and are not constant over time such as partisanship, between 45% 
and 49% of the explanatory power to come from variables that are unique to the 
individual states but do not vary over time such as institutional arrangements, and 
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between 10% and 16% to come from factors not unique to individual states and do not 
vary over time such as the national economy. 
These are interesting findings considering the results of the mixed effects model 
examining mandate length, but not the fact that nearly all of the explanatory power is 
derived from political and institutional factors. Although there are some similar aspects 
of the CHIP program across states, the flexibility legislators had in developing and 
implementing their own programs would justify the heightened influence of state-specific 
partisan and institutional factors. The procedures required of bureaucrats and the policies 
defined are based, for the most part, on state needs and preferences. I do suspect that 
some national factors such as the uncertainty surrounding CHIP reauthorization may 
affect decisions to engage in statutory control and the amount of control imposed in 
mandates, but for the most part, the decisions are going to be made by legislators within 
the state based on their specific programs. 
Chapter Summary 
The goal of this chapter was to assess whether sufficient variation existed in my 
second dependent variable, total control to justify moving forward to identify the causes 
of the differences. Although I found the direct measure of total control to be significantly 
similar to mandate length, I emphasized the true story that this dissertation is attempting 
to tell: that there is more to the level of discretion provided to bureaucrats than simply 
the amount of words in legislation. In fact, the value and benefit of the total control is 
based on the substantive content of legislation rather than simply relying on the amount 
of new words to determine the level of discretion. After elaborating on this contribution 
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and discussing the rationale for developing and coding mandate types, I proceeded to 
replicate the examination of the variation in mandate length in chapter 5. Like mandate 
length, I was able to observe differences not only in the use of different mandate types 
and additional control mechanisms, but also in the total control imposed by legislators in 
procedural, policy and both mandates within states, across states, between general 
legislation and appropriations bills, and over legislative sessions. A mixed effects model 
also provided additional information about which of my independent variables will likely 
provide more explanatory power when examining the three mandates types empirically. 
Based on the variation in this and the previous chapter, I believe that sufficient 
evidence of differences exist across states, within states, and over time to move forward 
to the empirical tests. More specifically, now that I know that sufficient variation exists in 
both of my dependent variables, and the factors that make up total control, I am ready to 
find out why these differences exist. Is it merely the political environment or the 
institutional arrangements that are driving decisions by legislators to engage in statutory 
control, or is there some interaction between the two as found by Huber & Shipan? Do 
my results change depending on the dependent variable being tested? In particular, how 
does mandate length compare to Huber & Shipan's length of legislation? And, most 
importantly for this study, how does separating my second dependent variable into 
specific mandate types impact my findings? How does the political or institutional 
environment influence the decision to use specific mandates or control mechanisms? 
Each of these questions will be addressed in the next two empirical chapters. 
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Chapter 7: 
Assessing the Causes of Mandate Length across States and Over Time 
In the previous two chapters, we observed significant differences in mandate 
length and total control across states, within states, across legislative sessions imposed, 
and in both general legislation and appropriations bills. In this chapter, I begin the 
empirical analysis by assessing the causes of this variation in mandate length. Following 
a re-introduction of my conceptual model as well as the one used by Huber & Shipan, as 
well as the hypotheses and the expected results, I begin building a model of statutory 
control and test my hypotheses that relate to the impact of political and institutional 
arrangements on mandate length. In particular, I examine the direct and combined effects 
of the political environment, legislative capacity, and the legislative veto, as well as the 
impact of institutional control variables. Within this discussion, I address any 
comparisons or differences to the findings made by Huber & Shipan, and conclude the 
chapter by assessing the impact of alternative explanations for mandate length and thus 
the level of discretion provided to bureaucrats by legislators. 
Conceptual Models Revisited 
Table 7-1 provides a comparison of the conceptual model developed for this study 
and the one used by Huber & Shipan. In addition to the explanation of the individual 
measures, I also include the expected findings based on theoretical framework in the PA 
model. Table 7-2 displays the conceptual variables and corresponding hypothesis to be 
tested in the empirical models. 
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Table 7-1: Conceptual Models, Measurements, & Expectations 
Conceptual Variable 
Policy Conflict 
The degree to which legislators and the 
executive agree on policy goals. Conflict 
is likely to be greater during divided 
government, than unified government 
Bargaining Environment 
The degree to which both chambers 
agree on policy goals. Given divided 
government, conflict is likely to be 
greater when each chamber is controlled 
by different parties, than the same party. 
Legislative Capacity 
The degree to which legislators have the 
time and resources to engage in statutory 
control. Legislative capacity is likely to 
increase with the level of compensation 
Non-Statutory Control Mechanisms 
Legislative Veto 
The ability of legislators to alter or 
deny agency rules & regulations 
without engaging in statutory 
control 
Bureaucratic Autonomy 
The degree to which bureaucrats have 
the knowledge and ability to influence 
legislation 
Executive — Legislative Relations 
The degree to which governors can 
influence the legislative process 
Huber & Shipan 
Measurement & Expectation 
Dummy Variable 
(1 = divided government) 
Expectation - Divided government will 
increase the likelihood of legislators 
engaging in statutory control (+) 
Dummy Variable 
(1 = divided government, given divided 
legislature) 
Expectation - Given divided government, 
a unified legislature will increase the 
likelihood of legislators engaging in 
statutory control (+) 
Legislator compensation 
(salary of legislators) 
Expectation - the higher the compensation 
will increase the likelihood of engaging in 
statutory control (+) 
Legislative Veto 
Dummy Variable (1 = existence) 
Expectation - The presence of a legislative 
veto, the less likely legislatures will engage 
in statutory control (-) 
Salary of Administrative Heads 
Expectation - the more autonomous 
bureaucrats are, the more likely legislators 
will engage in statutory control (+) 
Gubernatorial Power 
Expectation - the more power governors 
possess in the legislative arena, the more 
likely legislators will engage in statutory 
control (+) 
Goodman 
Measurement & Expectation 
Same as Huber & Shipan 
Expectation - same (+) 
Same as Huber & Shipan 
Expectation - same (+) 
Legislator Professionalism 
(Squire 2007) 
Committee System Strength 
(Hamm, Hedlund & 
Martorano 2007) 
Expectation - same (+) 
Legislative Veto 
(Legislative Veto Scale) 
Expectation - same (-) 
Bureaucratic Autonomy 
Scale 
(ASAP Data) 
Expectation - same (+) 
Gubernatorial Power 
(Gubernatorial Effectiveness 
Scale) 
Expectation - same (+) 
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Table 7-2: Conceptual Variables & Corresponding Hypotheses 
Conceptual Variable 
Policy Conflict 
Bargaining 
Environment 
Legislative Capacity 
Non-Statutory Control 
Mechanisms 
Legislative Veto 
Bureaucratic 
Autonomy 
Gubernatorial 
Effectiveness 
Hypothesis 
Hi - State legislators within a divided government will be more likely to engage in 
statutory control of bureaucrats than state legislators within a unified government. 
H2 - Given divided government, legislators in a unified legislature are more likely 
to engage in statutory control of bureaucrats than legislators in a divided 
legislature. 
H} - More professionalized state legislators will be more likely to engage in 
statutory control of bureaucrats than less professionalized state legislators 
H4- state legislators with strong committee systems will be more likely to engage in 
statutory control of bureaucrats than legislators with weaker committee systems 
H5 - state legislators that possess extensive non-statutory control mechanisms are 
less likely to engage in statutory control of bureaucrats than state legislators that 
have less extensive non-statutory control mechanisms. 
H6 - state legislators confronted by more autonomous bureaucrats are more likely 
to engage in statutory control than state legislators that are confronted by less 
autonomous bureaucrats 
H7 - state legislators that face a highly effective governor are less likely to engage 
in statutory control of bureaucrats than those that face less effective governors. 
Empirical Tests 
Before we move to the empirical tests, it is important to address a few issues. 
First, I estimate the models using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and a simple 
linear model. For these models I examine the sum of mandate lengths across all 
legislative sessions. I choose to examine the sum of mandate lengths because in order to 
assess whether legislators engage in statutory control, and to what extent, I must be able 
to observe changes in the amount of words pertaining to CHIP mandates across all 
sessions. Additionally, in order to make the results of my models more understandable 
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and interpretable, I divide the mandate length by 100000. Mandate length is measured in 
terms of hundred thousands of words. 
Second, I present the estimates of my models using all states regardless of region. 
This is a deviation from Huber & Shipan's models that report estimates for non-southern 
states only59. The authors justify their decision based on scholarly research that considers 
southern Democrats as more conservative than Democrats elsewhere, and policy 
differences between the parties to be smaller in the south than elsewhere (Huber & 
Shipan 2002, p 155). However, running my models with all states and then excluding the 
southern states, I obtain virtually the same results. Despite the potential differences 
between southern and non-southern Democrats, I suspect that the initial popularity of the 
CHIP program was not initially a divisive policy because of the popularity of assisting 
low-income children and the potential for federal matching funds. As discussed later in 
this chapter, the CHIP policy likely became more polarizing in later sessions when 
legislators sought policy expansions and the uncertainty over the reauthorization of the 
CHIP program caused legislators to be more cautious of spending funds they were not 
sure were going to be matched by the federal government. As a result, it is reasonable to 
expect that southern and non-southern Democrats would behave similarly, at least in 
initial sessions after CHIP adoption. 
Third, there are four control variables tested in various empirical models. First, 
unlike in chapters 5 and 6 where I excluded California in order to better display the 
variation across states, the statutory control decisions in the state are included in the 
empirical models. As a result I employ a dummy variable for the significant amount of 
59
 Huber & Shipan's model with southern states does not confirm their hypotheses. States excluded include 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Texas. 
195 
legislation passed in the state since the amount of mandates enacted and the length of 
mandates imposed by California legislators are likely to skew the results of my analysis. 
The second control variable is a measure of the amount of words pertaining to 
CHIP mandates enacted in the previous session. This measure enables me to obtain a 
clearer picture of the extent to which legislators engage in statutory control across 
legislative sessions. In other words, by controlling for mandate length in the previous 
session, I can prevent the overestimation of control decisions because of the amount of 
words enacted in one session combining with control decisions in the subsequent session. 
The third and fourth controls are CHIP expenditures and CHIP program type. 
CHIP expenditures is an average per capita CHIP expenditures in each state in three 
separate years (1999, 2002, 2004) and controls for the differences in demand for 
children's insurance across states. CHIP program type measures whether legislators 
adopt a Medicaid expansion program, a CHIP stand-alone program, or a combination, or 
hybrid, of the first two programs60. As discussed previously, I control for CHIP program 
type because of the fact that legislators are likely to face different costs and demands 
depending on the type of program that they adopt. In particular, I posit that Medicaid 
expansions require less time, information, and resources to incorporate the CHIP program 
in the Medicaid framework since many of the rules and procedures are already in place 
and functioning. In stand-alone CHIP programs, legislators must start the program anew, 
establishing, developing, and implementing a completely separate program. Even if CHIP 
shares similar rules and procedures, legislators will have to incur the costs of dealing with 
CHIP type is coded "0" for Medicaid expansions, " 1 " for Hybrid and "2" for Stand Alone programs. 
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two separate policy areas instead of one. I posit that Hybrid programs require fewer costs 
than stand-alone programs and more than Medicaid expansions. 
It is important to mention here that although I control for CHIP expenditures and 
CHIP program types, I acknowledge that the choices made regarding these variables -
how much to spend and what program to adopt - are done so by the legislators and are 
reflective of the capacity that they possess. In other words, the capacity of legislators 
dictates the choices that they make. It is not likely that legislators would choose to adopt 
a stand-alone CHIP program if they did not believe that they could endure the costs and 
demands the program required. It also makes little sense to allocate funds to and 
resources to their CHIP program that they know that they cannot afford. As a result, I 
consider CHIP expenditures and CHIP program types to be extensions of legislative 
capacity or the mechanisms by which capacity influences the length of CHIP mandates, 
rather than exogenous forces that influence mandate length independently. 
Lastly, Table 7-3 displays the coding process adopted by Huber & Shipan to 
combine their measures for policy conflict and bargaining environment and thus test their 
combined impact on legislation length. Specifically, unified legislature takes the value of 
" 1 " when both legislative chambers are controlled by one party that does not control the 
executive branch {unified legislatures against the governor), and divided legislatures 
takes the value of " 1 " when one party controls the executive branch and one legislative 
chamber. The excluded category in Table 7-5 involves instances when both chambers and 
the governor share the same party (unified legislatures with the governor). 
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Table 7-3: Huber & Shipan 's Coding of Policy Conflict & Bargaining Environment 
Variable 
Unified Government 
Divided Government 
Unified Legislature 
Unified Legislatures With the 
Governor 
(Excluded Variable) 
Unified Legislatures Against the 
Governor 
Divided Legislature 
Divided Legislatures 
N/A 
Building an Empirical Model of Statutory Control 
In this section, I begin building an empirical model of statutory control to test my 
hypotheses regarding the impact of the political and institutional arrangements on 
mandate length. In order to address the shortcomings of previous research, expand upon 
the prevailing literature, and take a step closer to a more complete understanding of 
statutory control, I begin this process with a clean slate. More specifically, I first test a 
baseline model examining the impact of the political environment and subsequently add 
variables to assess the impact of the new measures on mandate length, as well as the 
changes to previous models because of the additions. The progression of empirical tests 
eventually leads me to the model used by Huber & Shipan and clearly shows that the 
factors that influence statutory control decisions in CHIP legislation are not as 
complicated as the authors suggest. 
The Impact of the Political Environment and Legislative Capacity on Mandate Length 
Table 7-4 displays the results of the empirical models testing the impact of 
partisanship and legislative capacity on mandate length. Column 1 reports the results of 
the baseline model examining the direct impact of the political environment on mandate 
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length. Based on my first two hypotheses, I expect legislators to pass longer, more 
detailed mandates when they possess an incentive to control and oversee bureaucrats 
{unified legislatures against the governor), but not where the costs of doing so are too 
high or the likelihood of policy enactment is in question {divided legislatures). 
The results of column 1 confirm my expectation that legislators in unified 
legislatures against the governor not only engage in statutory control of bureaucrats, but 
they do so by significantly limiting discretion for bureaucrats across all six legislative 
sessions. At the same 
Table 7-4: Assessing the Impact of the Political Environment & Legislative Capacity 
on Mandate Length 
Variable 
Political Environment 
Unified Legis Against the 
Gov 
Divided Legislature 
Legislative Capacity 
Committee System Strength 
Legislative Professionalism 
Constant 
N 
Adjusted R2 
* p < . l 
**p<.05 
***p<.01 
1 
Political 
Environment 
70.23*** 
(9.35) 
8.06 
(15.33) 
-30.39 
(33.63) 
234 
.190 
2 
Political 
Environment & 
Committee System 
Strength 
28.42*** 
(10.60) 
-37.71** 
(15.63) 
4.97*** 
(.741) 
-145.77 
(35.31) 
234 
.319 
3 
Political Environment 
& Legislative 
Professionalism 
10.68 
(8.00) 
-77.47*** 
(12.70) 
255.45*** 
(17.91) 
-101.73 
(25.06) 
234 
.568 
4 
Political Environment, 
Committee System 
Strength & Legislative 
Professionalism 
15.95* 
(8.47) 
-74.13*** 
(12.77) 
-1.47* 
(.805) 
285.89*** 
(24.40) 
-76.12 
(28.61) 
234 
.572 
time, the measure of divided legislatures is not significant suggesting, at this point, that it 
has no impact on mandate length. However, this is a baseline model and it is not 
designed to provide a complete explanation of statutory control as evidenced by its low 
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explanatory power (adjusted R2). I suspect that the impact of divided legislatures will be 
different in subsequent models. 
These results are even more interesting if we consider that Huber & Shipan find 
that partisanship only matters when legislators possess sufficient capacity to engage in 
statutory control (Huber & Shipan 2002). This is not what I find, particularly in regards 
to unified legislatures against the governor, where Huber & Shipan suggest legislators 
possess the most incentive to engage in control. In fact, these results suggest that the 
political environment has the ability to impact mandate length on its own. 
In columns 2 through 4, I include my measure of committee system strength, 
legislative professionalism, and both measures jointly to the baseline model respectfully. 
It is important to reiterate here that I do not test Huber & Shipan's measure of legislative 
capacity, legislator compensation. I choose not to because I do not believe that 
compensation is sufficient on its own to encompass the level of capacity necessary to 
engage in statutory control. More specifically, I do not believe that the decision to engage 
in statutory control is based solely on individual motivations as explained by Huber & 
Shipan. Instead, I posit that it is a collective agreement on the part of legislators based on 
shared preferences or a shared desire to ensure the realization of their preferred outcomes. 
At the same time, other institutional factors exist in state legislatures, such as committee 
system strength and legislative professionalism that better represent the shared capacity 
of legislators and are thus more appropriate measures to use to assess their impact of 
capacity on mandate length. As a result, I test these measures instead of compensation. 
In terms of the PA relationship between legislators and bureaucrats, I posit that 
legislators with stronger committee systems are better able to not only acquire and 
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disseminate the necessary information to develop and implement the CHIP program. This 
is primarily because of their ability to control legislation both in the committee and on the 
chamber floor, as well as their long standing relationships with bureaucrats. As a result, I 
expect legislators with stronger committee systems and the incentive to control 
bureaucrats to impose longer, more detailed mandates. Column 2 in Table 7-4 reveals 
supports these assumptions. The measure of committee system strength is significant (at 
the p<. 001 level) and in the correct, positive direction. At the same time, the baseline 
model maintains the significance of unified legislatures against the governor and divided-
legislatures even with the inclusion of committee system strength. 
For legislative professionalism, the PA model posits that legislators that spend 
more time in session, have larger staffs and legislative resources, as well as receive 
higher salaries, are better able to alleviate information asymmetries and incur the costs of 
engaging in statutory control. In particular, legislators that spend more time in session 
have more time to research, gather, and disseminate information regarding the 
development and implementation of the CHIP policy, and have more time and resources 
(e.g. staff, facilities) to engage in the bargaining process and ultimately write longer, 
more detailed mandates. As a result, I expect to see more professionalized legislators 
with an incentive to control and oversee bureaucrats write longer, more detailed CHIP 
mandates. Column 3 in Table 7-4 reveals that this is, in fact, the case. Not only is 
legislative professionalism significant (at the p<. 001 level), but it is also in the correct, 
positive direction. The inclusion of the professionalism, however, does cause unified 
legislatures against the governor to lose its significance despite improving the 
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explanatory power of the model (adjusted R ) from .319 with committee system strength 
to .568. The significance of divided legislatures however, remains significant. 
Including both committee system strength and legislative professionalism in the 
same model in column 4 reveals that both committee system strength and legislative 
professionalism are significant (atp<.l andp<.001 level respectfully). Committee system 
strength however, is in the wrong, negative direction despite slightly improving the 
explanatory power of the model (from .568 to .571). This result is expected, however, not 
just because of the degree of impact in the empirical results, but because legislative 
professionalism, as a measure of legislative capacity, encompasses more aspects of the 
legislature that reflect their capabilities. In either event, Table 7-4 reveals that while the 
political environments are consistent with my theoretical expectations, both of my 
legislative capacity measures display significant individual direct effect on mandate 
length. More specifically, the effect of capacity is not contingent upon the political 
environment as found by Huber & Shipan. 
The Impact of the Legislative Veto on Mandate Length 
Having established the direct, individual impact of committee system strength and 
legislative professionalism on mandate length, I continue building my model of statutory 
control by adding a measure of power of the legislative veto that exists across states. As 
discussed above, the legislative veto enables legislators to control bureaucratic behavior 
outside of the legislative process and in an on-going process, thus enabling them to 
diminish the incentive to write longer, more detailed mandates as a means of controlling 
bureaucrats. 
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In this study, I test an index of legislative veto powers based on the premise that 
veto power is not black or white. In fact, unlike the prevailing research that examines a 
dummy variable for the presence of a veto and posits that it is effective only in unified 
legislatures against the governor, I believe that the differences in veto powers across 
states (advisory vs. veto, number of veto players, etc.), make some vetoes effective 
regardless of the political environment. For example, a veto in divided legislatures that 
requires legislators to convince a single committee in one chamber to veto or alter agency 
rules and regulations is much more effective in shaping bureaucratic behavior than a veto 
in a divided legislature that provides legislators with only an advisory power or which 
requires them to convince both chambers to override a veto. The bargaining environment 
in the first example is more favorable to legislators looking to control bureaucrats even in 
divided legislatures. At the same time, legislators with these veto powers are able to 
alleviate the costs associated with exercising their veto and ensuring sure that their 
decision is not overridden. Based on these examples, I expect legislators with more 
powerful vetoes to write shorter, less detailed mandates, than legislators that possess no 
veto power or weaker vetoes. 
Table 7-5 displays the results of including the index of the veto powers into a 
model with committee system strength and legislative professionalism. Table 7-5 reveals 
that, like committee system strength and legislative professionalism, the legislative veto 
has is influential in determining mandate length. More specifically, column 1 in Table 7-
5 reveals that the legislative veto possesses a direct effect on mandate length as evidenced 
by its significance (at thep<.01 level). The effect is also in the correct, negative direction 
confirming that the legislative veto diminishes the incentive for legislators to engage in 
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control. The direct effect of the veto, however, also results in divided legislatures losing 
its impact on mandate length. 
Table 7-5: Assessing the Impact of the Legislative Veto on Mandate Length 
Variable 
Political Environment 
Unified Legis Against 
the Gov 
Divided Legislature 
Legislative Capacity 
Committee System 
Strength 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
Legislative Veto 
Constant 
N 
Adjusted R2 
* p < . l 
** p<.05 
***p<.01 
1 
Legislative Veto 
83.89*** 
(10.27) 
13.44 
(15.18) 
-5.59*** 
(1.86) 
-1.60 
(34.44) 
234 
.217 
2 
Committee System 
Strength & 
Legislative Veto 
42.56*** 
(10.94) 
-33.38* 
(15.22) 
5.18*** 
(.722) 
-6.51*** 
(1.69) 
-117.10 
(35.10) 
234 
.358 
3 
Legislative 
Professionalism & 
Legislative Veto 
21.92** 
(8.65) 
-72.12*** 
(12.59) 
251.65*** 
(17.63) 
-4.23*** 
(1.36) 
-78.85 
(25.68) 
234 
.584 
4 
Committee System 
Strength, Legislative 
Professionalism & 
Legislative Veto 
24.96*** 
(8.93) 
-70.06*** 
(12.66) 
-1.08 
(.804) 
274.38*** 
(24.38) 
-3.92*** 
(1.38) 
-61.67 
(28.63) 
234 
.584 
When I include the veto in a model with my measures of capacity, it maintains its 
significance and as do my measures of capacity. More specifically, in column 2, 
committee system strength and veto are significant (both at p<. 001 level) in the correct 
direction and in column 3, the same is true for legislative professionalism and the veto (at 
p<.001 andp<.01 levels respectfully). Column 3 reveals that both political measures are 
significant with legislative professionalism. When I include both measures of capacity in 
the model in column 4, legislative professionalism and legislative veto are significant and 
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in the correct direction, as are the measures for political environment. However, 
committee system strength loses its significance when professionalism is included in the 
model. The results of Table 7-5 reveal both a direct effect of the legislative veto as well 
as a consistent impact on mandate length even when included in models with my 
measures of legislative capacity individually and jointly. 
The Impact of Institutional Controls on Mandate Length 
In this section, I test the impact of my institutional control variables on mandate 
length in order to assess whether statutory control is a function of the amount of 
expenditures dedicated to CHIP, the type of CHIP program, or the previous session's 
mandate length. Table 7-6 displays the results of the models. Column 1 in Table 7-6 
displays the results of the impact of CHIP expenditures on mandate length. I posit that 
the amount of statutory control in legislation may be a function of the amount of money 
legislators dedicate to the CHIP program. In other words, legislators that dedicate more 
money to their program are more likely to engage in writing more detailed mandates in 
order to direct, clarify, or restrict the use of CHIP expenditures. States that allocate fewer 
funds to their programs are likely to have fewer issues to address. 
The results of column 1 provide support for my expectations. CHIP expenditures 
impacts mandate length in a manner consistent with the PA theory. Not only do 
legislators impose longer, more detailed mandates in unified legislatures against the 
governor, but divided legislatures is also significant and in the correct, negative direction. 
This result suggests that despite the incentive to engage in control, the costs associated 
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with the executive and both chambers controlled by different parties, and the uncertainty 
over the enactment, cause legislators to refrain from engaging in statutory control. 
Table 7-6: Assessing the Impact of Institutional Controls on Mandate Length 
Variable 
Political 
Environment 
Unified Legis Against 
Gov 
Divided Legislature 
Institutional 
Controls 
Previous Session 
Mandate Length 
CHIP Expenditures 
CHIP Type 
Constant 
N 
Adjusted R2 
* p < . l 
** p<.05 
***p<.01 
1 
CHIP Expends 
26.79*** 
(6.86) 
-48.36*** 
(10.94) 
.210*** 
(.012) 
-45.26 
(22.82) 
234 
.628 
2 
CHIP Type 
44.86*** 
(10.87) 
-23.08 
(16.57) 
23.02*** 
(5.48) 
-84.73 
(34.97) 
234 
.244 
3 
CHIP Expends 
& CHIP Type 
18.76** 
(7.75) 
-58.13*** 
(11.75) 
.203*** 
(.012) 
8.53** 
(3.92) 
-64.94 
(24.38) 
234 
.634 
4 
Previous 
Session Length 
52.85*** 
(8.21) 
-7.22 
(13.20) 
.092*** 
(.009) 
-53.51 
(28.84) 
234 
.410 
5 
Previous 
Session Length 
&CHIP 
Expends 
27.04*** 
(6.88) 
-47.48*** 
(11.04) 
.006 
(.001) 
.002*** 
(.001) 
-46.42 
(22,92) 
234 
.630 
6 
All Controls 
18.71** 
(7.92) 
-58.21*** 
(12.12) 
-.0003 
(.001) 
.203*** 
(.001) 
8.57** 
(4.13) 
-64.96 
(24.45) 
234 
.635 
In column 2, I assess the impact of the type of CHIP program adopted by 
legislators. As discussed previously, the type of CHIP program represents different costs 
and demands on legislators. Medicaid expansions are already established programs with 
much of the infrastructure, rules, and procedures already in place. As a result, legislators 
will not possess the same need to engage in statutory control as the other programs to 
incorporate the CHIP specifics into the existing program. A hybrid program with an 
existing Medicaid element represents slightly more costs for legislators since they will 
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likely have to develop and implement a CHIP portion of the program, while a CHIP 
stand-alone program is developed anew and represents significant costs because of 
establishing new policy parameters and procedures. As a result, I expect to see higher, 
positive coefficients suggesting that legislators are imposing longer, more detailed 
mandates in hybrid and stand-alone CHIP programs. The results in column 2 support this 
assumption. Not only is CHIP type significant (at p<.001 level), but it has a large, 
positive coefficient confirming my expectations. 
These findings are further bolstered when I combine CHIP expenditures and 
CHIP program type in column 3. In addition to the significance of unified legislatures 
against the governor and divided legislatures (at the p<.05 and p<.001 levels 
respectfully), CHIP expenditures remain significant and positive, and CHIP type is 
significant and in the correct positive direction. Even more important is the fact that these 
results are true for legislators in both unified legislatures against the governor and 
divided legislatures. 
In this study, I posit that the level of discretion given to bureaucrats may be a 
function of the amount of statutory control imposed by legislators in the previous session. 
In particular, it is less likely that legislators that engage in writing longer, more detailed 
mandates in one session will have less need to impose longer, more detailed mandate in 
the next session since it is likely that they have already articulated the necessary CHIP 
policy intent and procedural instructions. At the same time, if the statutory control is 
intended to control and oversee bureaucrats, then it is also likely that legislators will 
provide bureaucrats with sufficient time to act as well as assess whether bureaucrats are 
behaving in a manner that is consistent with their intent. All of these factors diminish the 
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need and incentive to engage in statutory control in the following session. Without 
controlling for the mandate length in the previous session, we also run the risk of 
erroneously attributing the impact on mandate length to other factors such as legislative 
capacity or the political environment when it may simply be a matter of need or timing. 
Column 4 does not support these assumptions. In fact, the results suggest that 
legislators impose longer, more detailed mandates following a session in which they 
enacted longer, more detailed mandates. The fact that the coefficient for previous 
session's mandate length is fairly small suggests that the increase in mandate length is 
not substantial, but it is an increase nonetheless. Interestingly, the impact of the previous 
mandate length is not as significant at CHIP expenditures or the combination of CHIP 
expenditures and CHIP type. In fact, when I include CHIP expenditures with previous 
mandate length in column 5, previous mandate length is no longer influential and, once 
again, CHIP expenditures is significant as are both unified legislatures against the 
governor and divided legislatures and in the correct direction. 
Taking the analysis an additional step, including CHIP type in a model with both 
CHIP expenditures and the previous mandate length provides similar results. The 
previous session's mandate length is significant while CHIP expenditures, CHIP Type, 
and both unified legislatures against the governor and divided legislatures are significant 
and in the correct directions. These results and the fairly high correlation between 
previous session length and CHIP expenditures (.677), clearly suggest that much of the 
explanatory power of the previous session's mandate length is captured by the CHIP 
expenditures. As a result, I exclude previous session's mandate length from future 
models and focus exclusively on the impact of CHIP expenditures and program type. 
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Now that I have established the direct impact of CHIP expenditures and CHIP 
program type, I include the measures in a model with legislative professionalism, 
committee system strength, and legislative veto. Table 7-7 displays the results of these 
models and provides some interesting results. On the one hand, all of the political 
environment measures and institutional control mechanisms are consistent and 
completely robust across all specifications and in a manner that is consistent with the 
theoretical expectations. On the other hand, while both of my capacity measures lose 
their significance when included in a model with CHIP expenditures alone. When 
combined with CHIP program however, the two institutional control variables 
Table 7-7: Assessing the Impact of Legislative Capacity & Institutional Controls on Mandate 
Length 
Variable 
Political Environment 
Unified Legis Against Gov 
Divided Legislature 
Legislative Capacity 
Committee System Strength 
Legislative Professionalism 
Legislative Veto 
Institutional Controls 
CHIP Expenditures 
CHIP Type 
Constant 
N 
Adjusted R2 
* p < . l 
** p<.05 
***p<.01 
/ 
Committee 
Strength & 
CHIP 
Expends 
28.15*** 
(8.43) 
-46.82*** 
(11.68) 
-.313 
(.695) 
.138 
(1.39) 
,214*** 
(.016) 
-39.02 
(27.51) 
234 
.625 
2 
Committee 
Strength & 
CHIP Type 
38.67*** 
(10.63) 
-49.34*** 
(15.24) 
3.27*** 
(.841) 
-10.95*** 
(1.97) 
27,91*** 
(6.84) 
-115.91 
(33.97) 
234 
.399 
3 
Committee 
Strength <£ 
CHIP 
Expends & 
Type 
26.30*** 
(8.28) 
-56.24*** 
(11.81) 
-1.28* 
(.747) 
-2.89* 
(1.65) 
.206*** 
(.001) 
17.40** 
(5.36) 
-41.38 
(26.96) 
234 
.640 
4 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
&CHIP 
Expends 
27.79*** 
(8.29) 
-45.76*** 
(13.02) 
-21.41 
(56.10) 
.273 
(1.57) 
.226*** 
(.044) 
-41.82 
(25.44) 
234 
.625 
5 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
& CHIP Type 
19.91*** 
(8.68) 
-77.34*** 
(12.86) 
232.17*** 
(20.62) 
-6.04*** 
(1.69) 
9.95* 
(5.54) 
-87.60 
(26.02) 
234 
.588 
6 
Legislative 
Professionalism & 
CHIP Expends & 
CHIP Type 
25.21*** 
(8.17) 
-50.89*** 
(12.87) 
-92.76* 
(59.45) 
-2.15 
(1.72) 
.257*** 
(.004) 
16.86*** 
(5.32) 
-51.43 
(25.14) 
234 
.639 
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cause committee system strength and professionalism to have a negative effect, which is 
inconsistent with my theory. These results suggest that despite the direct effect of my 
capacity measures, when combined with CHIP expenditures and CHIP program type, the 
institutional controls are the factors that influence mandate length. 
Given the discussion above regarding the relationship between capacity and CHIP 
expenditures and CHIP program type, these results make sense. In fact, the decision to 
engage in statutory control is more than a story about the impact of capacity on mandate 
length. Although capacity has its own effect, the real story is about the mechanisms by 
which capacity is influential. In other words, it is about how legislators choose to manage 
their CHIP programs; how much money they allocate and the type of program they adopt. 
Legislators are aware, ex ante, of what they are capable of and as a result will choose to 
allocate an amount of funds or choose a program that reflects this capacity. 
Interactive Effects on Mandate Length 
At this point in the analysis I have better idea about the direct effect my political 
and institutional arrangements have on mandate length. Both of my measures of 
legislative capacity and legislative veto impact mandate length directly and behave in a 
manner that is consistent with my theoretical expectations. At the same time, it is 
apparent that my institutional control variables are driving statutory control decisions. In 
this section, however, I address whether there exist interactive effects between these 
variables. In other words, despite a direct impact, does their impact on mandate length 
change depending on the political environment? 
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This is an important section because it takes me another step to building a more 
complete model of statutory control, but it also enables me to test some of the results 
found by Huber & Shipan. Although the direct impact of my capacity measures on 
mandate length contradicts the Huber & Shipan's findings that a threshold of capacity is 
necessary to engage in statutory control, I have not included an interaction term for the 
combined impact of unified legislatures against the governor and capacity. Huber & 
Shipan find that this interaction leads legislators to enact longer, more detailed legislation 
than they would generally. At the same time, Huber & Shipan posit that the legislative 
veto will only be effective in unified legislatures against the governor. To test these 
hypotheses, I include interactions for the combined impact of unified legislatures against 
the governor with committee strength, legislative professionalism, and veto in Table 7-8. 
Table 7-8 reveals that there does not appear to be a lot of empirical support for the 
combined impact of unified legislatures against the governor and my capacity measures, 
especially after the robust findings of the direct measures of capacity. In column 1 in 
Table 7-8 the interaction with committee system strength is significant and in the correct 
direction, but the political measures are insignificant and in the incorrect directions, and 
thus are inconsistent with the theory. The results of column 2 are similar in that the 
interaction with committee system strength is significant, as are the political measures, 
but unified legislatures against the governor is in the incorrect, negative direction as is 
the direct measure of committee system strength. I find similar results using legislative 
professionalism. Based on these results, I am less inclined to believe that the interaction 
variable belongs in the model. It does not provide any additional explanatory variable and 
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Table 7-8: Testing the Combined Impact of Political & Institutional Environments 
on Mandate Length 
Variable 
Political Environment 
Unified Legis Against Gov 
Divided Legislature 
Legislative Capacity 
Committee System Strength 
Unified Legis Against Gov 
X Comm System Strength 
Legislative Professionalism 
Unified Legis Against Gov 
X Legis Professionalism 
Legislative Veto 
Unified Legis Against Gov 
X Legislative Veto 
Institutional Controls 
CHIP Expenditures 
CHIP Type 
Constant 
N 
Adjusted R2 
* p < . l 
** p<.05 
***p<0i 
; 
Unified X 
Committee 
System 
Strength 
-17.41 
(30.23) 
7.29 
(15.07) 
7.84*** 
(2.57) 
-30.27 
(33.05) 
234 
.218 
2 
Unified X 
Committee 
System 
Strength w/ 
Comm 
System 
Strength 
-4387.01* 
(2590.71) 
-5698.71**** 
(1163.26) 
-2.45*** 
(.842) 
6.25*** 
(2.19) 
-2.22 
(1.64) 
207*** 
(.001) 
24.61*** 
(5.85) 
-34.71 
(26.65) 
234 
.651 
3 
Unified X 
Legislative 
Profess 
-5592.48**** 
(1211.27) 
127.05 
(1172.21) 
454.73*** 
(35.25) 
-11.84 
(25.88) 
234 
.528 
4 
Unified X 
Legislative 
Profess w/ 
Legis Profess 
-4571.07*** 
(1297.04) 
-4956.55*** 
(1179.00) 
-61,47 
(54.62) 
278.08*** 
(41.52) 
-3.25** 
(1.58) 
.148*** 
(.004) 
27.52*** 
(5.12) 
-46.11 
(23.03) 
234 
.697 
5 
Unified X 
Legis Veto 
10854.85**** 
(1137.44) 
748.75 
(1449.52) 
-13.23*** 
(2.47) 
-28.20 
(31.78) 
234 
.277 
6 
Unified X 
Legis Veto w/ 
Legis Profess 
3724.75**** 
(976.22) 
-5193.38**** 
(1277.61) 
-89.82 
(58.96) 
1.49 
(2.37) 
-6.45*** 
(2.91) 
.249*** 
(.004) 
15.83*** 
(5.29) 
-66.94 
(25.89) 
234 
.645 
many of the main explanatory variables lose their impact. Regardless, the inclusion or 
exclusion of the interaction does not change the fact that the models are influenced most 
by the level of CHIP expenditures in the state and the type of CHIP program. 
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The interactions with the legislative veto, on the other hand, appear to work well 
in the models, both as a direct effect and with professionalism. The political environment 
measures are consistent with the theory and the veto is significant when the controls are 
included. The veto interaction also improves the explanatory power from .639 in Table 7-
7 to .645 in Table 7-8. 
Testing Huber & Shipan 's Baseline Model 
The last empirical model I test in this section is the one used by Huber & Shipan 
in their analysis of MMC legislation following the 1995-1996 legislative session. In 
particular, in addition to the combined political measures for unified legislatures against 
the governor and divided legislatures, their baseline model includes interaction variables 
between unified legislatures against the governor and legislative capacity, divided 
legislatures and committee system strength as well as unified legislatures against the 
governor and the legislative veto. The model also includes controls for Medicaid 
expenditures (which I replace with CHIP expenditures) and a dummy variable for 
California. I also test their model using CHIP expenditures and CHIP program type for a 
comparison. Table 7-9 provides the results. 
Column 1 displays Huber & Shipan's baseline model and reveals that, although 
their coefficients are in the correction directions, all of their variables are insignificant 
except for CHIP expenditures and CA dummy. The results in column 2 are similar except 
for the significance of the veto interaction. Both models however, are influenced by 
CHIP expenditures and in column 2, also by CHIP program type. 
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Table 7-9: Testing Huber & Shipan 's Baseline Model Using Mandate Length 
Variable 
Political Environment 
Unified Legis Against the Gov 
Divided Legislature 
Legislative Capacity 
Unified Against Gov X Comm Strength 
Divided Legislatures X Comm Strength 
Legislative Veto 
Unified Against GovX Veto 
Controls 
CHIP Expenditures 
CA Dummy 
CHIP Type 
Constant 
N 
Adjusted R2 
Legend 
Huber & Shipan 
Baseline Model 
32.36 
(25.89) 
-12.84 
(42.90) 
.262 
(1.97) 
-1.13 
(3.40) 
-2.30 
(2.06) 
.126** 
(.003) 
61.82* 
(30.02) 
-33.96 
(23.20) 
234 
.632 
*p<.l 
**p <.05 
2 
Goodman 
Replication 
6.24 
(26.47) 
-52.27 
(42.42) 
2.22 
(2.00) 
-.745 
(3.35) 
-5.11* 
(2.14) 
.181*** 
(.001) 
14.82*** 
(4.44) 
-77.30 
(24.46) 
234 
.643 
***p<.001 
The results of the replication, however, are less surprising if we consider the 
progression of the model building in this chapter. Not only have I found that the political 
environment has a consistent and robust direct effect on mandate length, but I have also 
found a direct effects for committee system strength, as well as the direct legislative veto 
and its interaction term. In each of these cases, the impact is lost when we control for 
CHIP expenditures and program type. The amount of money legislators dedicate to CHIP 
clearly creates a necessity to engage in statutory control and direct, clarify, and constrain 
the allocation of funds. At the same time, stand-alone CHIP programs require more 
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mandates to acquire information and expertise, but also to set up and implement the 
program. Additionally, the interaction between the veto and unified legislatures against 
the governor further diminish the incentive to engage in statutory control, while the 
interaction with committee system strength provided no new explanatory power, was 
insignificant in some cases, and lost its impact because of CHIP expenditures and 
program type. As a result, I am not surprised by the results given the inclusion of these 
interactions, the exclusion of the direct institutional measures, and the consistent impact 
of CHIP expenditures. 
Alternative Explanations for Mandate Length 
In the last section of this chapter, I explore the possibility that other factors may 
be influencing statutory control decisions. In particular, I examine whether mandate 
length is a function of the ability of bureaucrats to withstand legislative directives and 
influence policy {bureaucratic autonomy), the competing power of the governor 
{gubernatorial effectiveness), or a function of the electoral competition in the state. Table 
7-10 provides the results of testing these factors using the model of statutory control 
developed in this chapter. 
Bureaucratic Autonomy 
Using the ASAP data (see Wright & Bowling 2004) which provides survey 
responses from state health administrators across all states over 20 years regarding the 
impact of the governor and legislators on agency budgets and general agency 
responsibilities, I develop an autonomy score for each state bureaucracy and assess its 
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impact on control decisions. I posit that more autonomous bureaucrats have the ability to 
withstand legislative directives as well as influence policy development and 
implementation. These factors increase the incentive for legislators to control their 
behavior and ensure their preferred outcomes. As a result, I expect to see a positive 
coefficient for bureaucratic autonomy signifying that legislators impose more words in 
mandates to control bureaucrats. 
Table 7-10: Assessing the Impact of Alternative Explanations on Mandate Length 
Variable 
Political Environment 
Unified Legis Against Gov 
Divided Legislature 
Legislative Capacity 
Committee System Strength 
Bureaucratic Autonomy 
Gubernatorial 
Effectiveness 
State Competition 
Legislative Veto 
Legislative Veto Index 
Unified Against Gov X 
Veto 
Institutional Controls 
CHIP Expenditures 
CHIP Type 
Constant 
N 
Adjusted R2 
* p < . l 
** p<.05 
***p<.01 
; 
Bureaucratic 
Autonomy 
17.39 
(11.19) 
-42.47*** 
(15.54) 
28.30*** 
(3.92) 
-178.74 
(36.73) 
234 
.337 
2 
Bureaucratic 
Autonomy yv/ 
CHIP 
Expends & 
CHIP Type 
34.44*** 
(10.77) 
-54.46*** 
(11.69) 
-3.01*** 
(1.15) 
15.61* 
(9.43) 
.371 
(2.39) 
-5.82* 
(3.07) 
.198*** 
(.001) 
6.34 
(8.38) 
-72.18 
(29.06) 
234 
.651 
3 
Gubernatorial 
Effectiveness 
31.41*** 
(11.93) 
-31.40* 
(16.70) 
17.81*** 
(3.63) 
-148.94 
(40.18) 
234 
.263 
4 
Gubernatorial 
Effectiveness w/ 
CHIP Expends 
& CHIP Type 
44.70*** 
(10.83) 
-55.24*** 
(11.75) 
-.941 
(.999) 
-4.66 
(5.10) 
1.25 
(2.33) 
-7.89*** 
(2.97) 
(.001) 
20.33*** 
(6.37) 
-44.68 
(29.27) 
234 
.648 
5 
State 
Competition 
14.68 
(10.89) 
-49.50*** 
(15.45) 
1.69*** 
(.215) 
-158.94 
(34.03) 
234 
.360 
6 
State Competition 
w/ CHIP Expends 
& CHIP Type 
39.53*** 
(10.24) 
-57.02*** 
(11.70) 
-1.90** 
(.879) 
.271 
(.354) 
1.00 
(2.37) 
-7.25** 
(2.94) 
.195*** 
(.001) 
14.41** 
(6.36) 
-58.59 
(27.67) 
234 
.647 
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Column 1 in Table 7-10 reveals that this is the case for the direct measure of bureaucratic 
autonomy. In fact, one unit increases in bureaucratic autonomy results in a significant 
increase in the number of words pertaining to CHIP mandates across all six legislative 
sessions. The inclusion of bureaucratic autonomy also affects the significance of unified 
legislatures against the governor. When we include bureaucratic autonomy into the 
model of statutory control in column 2 of Table 7-10, it is significant but in the wrong 
direction. CHIP expenditures however, remains significant and appears to be affecting 
the influence of bureaucratic autonomy. 
Gubernatorial Effectiveness 
Like bureaucrats, governors have the potential to raise the costs for legislators to 
engage in statutory control because of their ability to significantly alter or veto 
legislation, and thus raise the uncertainty over legislators achieving their preferred 
outcomes. Using a measure of gubernatorial effectiveness developed for this study based 
on the power of appointment, budget, and veto, in addition to tenure potential, I provide a 
score for each governor based on, ranging from " 1 " (weak) to "5" (strong). I do not 
expect legislators to incur the costs of writing detailed mandates when confronted with 
stronger governors who can significantly influence legislation. 
Like bureaucratic autonomy, column 3 of Table 7-10 reveals that legislators 
impose longer, more detailed mandates when confronted by a more powerful governor. 
However, this impact is lost when we control for CHIP expenditures and CHIP program 
type. In fact, the results of my model remain consistent despite controlling for 
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gubernatorial effectiveness; CHIP expenditures and CHIP program type remain 
significant while the direct measure for committee system strength is insignificant. 
State Competition 
I posit that states with more competitive electoral districts increase the incentives 
of legislators to engage in statutory control. In particular, I expect legislators in 
competitive districts to impose longer, more detailed mandates in order to protect their 
preferences as well as lock in their preferred policy outcomes in the event that they lose 
control of the chamber. Using state district level competition scores developed by 
Holbrook & Van Dunk (1993), I provide a score of competitiveness for each state and 
test whether legislators that are uncertain about whether their party will maintain control 
incur the costs of writing longer, more detailed mandates. Like the two previous 
explanations, state competition is influential on its own but when included with the other 
variables its influence is lost without significantly changing my results. At the same time, 
CHIP expenditures and CHIP program type remain significant and influential. 
Chapter Summary 
The results of my empirical tests assessing the causes of the variation in mandate 
length provide considerable support for my theory. First, the effects of my measures of 
the political environment consistent and robust across most model specifications, the 
results are consistent with the PA model and the expectations of this study. When 
confronted with an executive with divergent policy preferences (e.g. unified legislatures 
against the governor) legislators engage in writing longer, more detailed mandates and 
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thus attempt to control and oversee bureaucratic behavior. When confronted with another 
chamber and an executive with divergent preferences, legislators pass less detailed CHIP 
mandates or simply do not engage in statutory control. The costs are simply too high and 
the likelihood of passage too uncertain. 
Second, although my measures of legislative capacity have a direct affect on the 
level of discretion provided to bureaucrats, their significance rest with the mechanisms by 
which capacity is influential. More specifically, committee system strength and legislative 
professionalism are influential because of the level of expenditures dedicated to the CHIP 
program and the type of CHIP program adopted by the legislature. Legislators that 
dedicate more expenditures to CHIP and are confronted by more demands as a result of 
adopting a hybrid or stand-alone CHIP program, write more detailed mandates in order to 
manage their programs. However, only those legislatures that possess the capacity to 
undertake more demanding programs or dedicate more funds and resources do so. 
Lastly, the results of this chapter allow me to confirm Huber & Shipan's finding 
regarding the legislative veto. In particular, confronted with a governor with divergent 
policy preferences (e.g. unified legislatures against the governor), legislators that possess 
a veto enact shorter, less detailed mandates because the veto controls bureaucratic 
behavior outside of the legislative process and thus diminishes the incentive to control 
bureaucrats through statutory control. However, using my index of veto powers I am able 
to confirm that legislators with stronger veto powers are able to diminish the incentive to 
engage in statutory control. 
Although the analysis revealed in this chapter brings us a step closer to a better 
understanding of statutory control, the analysis is not over. The results of this chapter are 
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based on the impact of the political and institutional arrangements on mandate length, a 
measure of words in mandates that allows us to speculate about statutory control 
strategies. The measures does not tell us anything about what aspects of the policy are 
most important to legislators, what costs they are willing to incur to control bureaucrats, 
and how they go about achieving these goals. My measure of total control in CHIP 
mandates, however, provides a mechanism in which to obtain this information and allow 
us to take yet another step to an even greater understanding of statutory control decisions. 
This is the focus of the last empirical chapter. 
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Chapter 8: 
Assessing the Causes of the Total Control in Mandates across States and Over Time 
In this chapter, I continue the empirical analysis by focusing on the causes of the 
variation in my second dependent variable, total control. Although I developed total 
control as an alternative to speculating about the level of discretion and legislative intent 
based on the amount of words in legislation, its true contribution lies in the added 
information and understanding about statutory control and legislative strategies that make 
up the variable. In particular, the procedural, policy, and both mandates that make up 
total control are based on the substantive content in mandates and enable me to observe 
how legislators limit discretion, to determine which aspects of the policy are important to 
legislators as well as what costs they are willing to incur in order to control bureaucrats. 
This knowledge of legislative policy foresight and the strategies that they employ provide 
me with a much more complete understanding of statutory control of bureaucrats. 
I begin the chapter by testing the model of statutory control developed in chapter 
7 using total control. In particular, I assess the impact of the political and institutional 
variables on the sum of the amount of procedural, policy, and both control imposed in all 
mandates across all legislative sessions. This analysis will allow me to compare total 
control and mandate length, as well as acquire important information that I can use to 
examine the causes of the variation in the amount of control in procedural, policy, and 
both mandates. Following this analysis, I delve deeper into the individual mandates that 
make up total control by observing the impact of changes to the political and institutional 
environments on the amount of control in each mandate type, as well as the impact of 
these environments on the use of additional control mechanisms. 
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Empirical Tests 
As in the last chapter, I begin this section by addressing a few empirical issues. 
Like mandate length, I estimate the models using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
and a simple linear model. I also test the empirical models using total control, which is 
the sum of all mandate controls in all CHIP bills across all legislative sessions 
{procedural, policy, and both control). In the subsequent sections, I examine procedural, 
policy, and both control, which are the sums of all controls in each mandate type in all 
CHIP bills across all legislative sessions. Additionally, I divide each of my control 
measures by 1000 to make the results more understandable and interpretable. 
I present the results of my models using all 45 states in my study regardless of 
regions, since estimates of my models excluding southern states provides virtually the 
same results (see chapter 7 for further explanation). I also test my model of statutory 
control with the three control variables that were significant and influential in the 
previous chapter: CHIP expenditures, CHIP program type, and previous session's 
control. I exclude the CA dummy variable because it is highly correlated with CHIP 
expenditures and when included it significantly alters the robustness of the variables and 
the overall fit of the model. Additionally, the previous chapter revealed that CHIP 
expenditures and previous session's control captured much of its explanatory power. 
A Comparison of Total Control and Mandate Length 
In this section, I use the model of statutory control developed in chapter 7 to 
assess the impact of my political and institutional variables on the total control. I choose 
to use this model because of the similarities between my two dependent variables 
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observed in chapter 6 and the expectation that, as a result, I should observe similarities. 
Table 8-1 and 8-2 display the results of the models testing the impact of political 
and institutional arrangements on total control using committee system strength and 
legislative professionalism respectfully. In addition to legislative capacity measures, I 
also include both a direct and an interaction measure for the legislative veto index, and 
each of the three institutional controls: CHIP expenditures, CHIP program type, and the 
previous session's total control. 
Table 8-1: Assessing the Impact of Political & Institutional Environments on Total Control 
With Committee System Strength 
Variable 
Political Environment 
Unified Legis Against Gov 
Divided Legislature 
Legislative Capacity 
Committee System Strength 
Legislative Veto 
Unified Against Gov X Veto 
Institutional Controls 
CHIP Expenditures 
CHIP Type 
Previous Session's Control 
Constant 
N 
Adjusted R2 
* p < . l 
** p<.05 
***p<01 
; 
Comm System 
Strength w/ 
CHIP Expends 
& CHIP Type 
66.18 
(72.62) 
-531.64**** 
(84.36) 
-5.03 
(5.39) 
-17.70 
(16.88) 
-24.48 
(21.18) 
1.16*** 
(.119) 
231.55*** 
(38.34) 
-442.09 
(196.32) 
234 
.609 
2 
Comm System 
Strength w/ 
Previous Session 
Control 
356.08*** 
(83.10) 
-236.54*** 
(94.03) 
17.82*** 
(5.34) 
18.37 
(17.59) 
-80.15*** 
(24.31) 
7.28*** 
(.921) 
-713.21 
(219.92) 
234 
.487 
3 
Comm System 
Strength 
w/CHIP 
Expends & 
Previous Control 
192.60* 
(79.01) 
-339.46*** 
(86.67) 
3.37 
(5.27) 
28.57 
(16.05) 
-47.22** 
(22.57) 
.992*** 
(.141) 
3.91*** 
(.965) 
-416.60 
(204.21) 
234 
.576 
4 
Comm System 
Strength w/ 
Previous 
Control & 
CHIP Type 
296.90*** 
(80.45) 
-369.83*** 
(94.26) 
7.87 
(5.52) 
-20.14 
(18.70) 
-70.94*** 
(23.33) 
205.02*** 
(43.48) 
5.98*** 
(.923) 
-734.87 
(210.35) 
234 
.531 
5 
Comm System 
Strength w/All 
Controls 
134.64* 
(75.65) 
-471.15*** 
(85.91) 
-6.42 
(5.33) 
-9.65 
(16.89) 
-38.23* 
(21.45) 
.988*** 
(.134) 
203.24*** 
(39.12) 
2.63** 
(.946) 
-439.36 
(193.44) 
234 
.620 
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Table 8-2: Assessing the Impact of Political & Institutional Environments on Total Control 
With Legislative Professionalism 
Variable 
Political Environment 
Unified Legis Against Gov 
Divided Legislature 
Legislative Capacity 
Legislative Professionalism 
Legislative Veto 
Unified Against GovX Veto 
Institutional Controls 
CHIP Expenditures 
CHIP Type 
Previous Session's Control 
Constant 
N 
Adjusted R2 
* p < . l 
** p<.05 
***p<.01 
1 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
w/CHIP 
Expends & 
CHIP Type 
51.69 
(70.34) 
-523.95**** 
(92.06) 
-213.84 
(424.88) 
-17.67 
(17.09) 
-21.46 
(21.02) 
1.26**** 
(.320) 
224.78**** 
(38.15) 
-490.90 
(186.59) 
234 
.608 
2 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
w/Previous 
Session Control 
182.16* 
(75.35) 
-455.66**** 
(90.26) 
1271.18**** 
(164.75) 
13.20 
(15.58) 
-53.29** 
(22.11) 
4.16**** 
(.945) 
-713.21 
(219.92) 
234 
.573 
3 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
w/ Previous 
Session Control 
&CHIP 
Expends 
187.36** 
(74.93) 
-386.85**** 
(96.25) 
529.26 
(410.47) 
23.86 
(16.40) 
-49.14** 
(22.07) 
.642** 
(.326) 
3.89**** 
(.949) 
-436.11 
(192.85) 
234 
.579 
4 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
w/ Previous 
Control & CHIP 
Type 
118.20* 
(74.57) 
-560.36**** 
(91.03) 
1078.82**** 
(166.23) 
-20.45 
(17.19) 
-43.26** 
(21.53) 
157.36**** 
(38.65) 
3.20**** 
(.944) 
-670.19 
(181.66) 
234 
.601 
5 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
w/ All Controls 
112.08 
(72.95) 
-468.64**** 
(93.13) 
-217.76 
(419.17) 
-10.30 
(17.09) 
-33.91* 
(21.24) 
1.08**** 
(.323) 
193.99**** 
(39.35) 
2.53**** 
(.944) 
-507.23 
(184.18) 
234 
.618 
The results from Table 8-1 and Table 8-2 provide some interesting results. Not 
only do Table 8-1 and 8-2 present virtually the same results, they are also very similar to 
the results of the model of statutory in the previous chapter examining mandate length. In 
fact, the results provide four distinct findings. First, in all but one model in Table 8-1 and 
all but two models in Table 8-2, the measures for unified legislatures against the 
governor and divided legislatures are significant and in the correct directions as expected 
by the PA model. The results suggest that when confronted by an executive with 
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divergent policy preferences (unified legislatures against the governor), legislators 
impose more control in CHIP mandates and decrease the amount of bureaucratic 
discretion. At the same time, when confronted by another chamber and an executive with 
divergent policy preferences (divided legislatures), legislators impose less control in 
CHIP mandates or simply do not engage in statutory control. Not only are these findings 
consistent across most model specifications, and when combined with both committee 
system strength and legislative professionalism but, there are no significant changes in 
the impact of the measures. 
The second finding involves the impact of the institutional control variables. As in 
the previous chapter, CHIP expenditures, CHIP program type, and the previous session's 
control are completely robust across all model specifications in both tables, consistent 
with the theoretical expectations. Unlike chapter 7, which found that CHIP program type 
and CHIP expenditures to be providing the most impact on mandate length, the results 
form Table 8-1 and 8-2 reveal that along with CHIP program type, the previous session's 
control appear to be the most influential. In essence, these results suggest that the amount 
of control legislators impose in CHIP mandates is significantly impacted by the type of 
CHIP program that they adopt and the amount of control that they imposed in the 
previous session. CHIP expenditures is still influential, but less so in terms of total 
control. What makes these results more interesting is that their impact is consistent 
regardless of the level of capacity, whether committee system strength or professionalism. 
The third finding involves the direct measures of legislative capacity. Although 
they possess a direct effect on the amount of control, their impact is contingent upon the 
institutional control mechanisms, as found in the previous chapter. In fact, Table 8-1 
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reveals that impact of capacity is present when controlling for the previous session's 
control, but disappears when the model includes CHIP expenditures. The same is true for 
professionalism in Table 8-2 except that it is also significant in model 4 with previous 
control and CHIP program type. 
The last finding involves the impact of the interaction between unified 
legislatures against the governor and the legislative veto. In Table 8-1 and 8-2, the 
interaction term is significant and in the correct negative direction in all specifications 
except for models that only control for CHIP expenditures. The results suggest that when 
confronted by a governor with divergent policy preferences, legislators that possess a 
veto impose less control in mandates because of the ability of the veto to alter their 
behavior outside of the legislative process. At the same time, because I use an index of 
veto powers across states, the findings confirm that stronger veto powers can further 
diminish the incentive to engage in statutory control 
The results from Table 8-1 and 8-2, and the similarities with the previous chapter, 
are important for two reasons. First, the similarities between the total control and 
mandate length suggest that total control is capturing the impact of the political and 
institutional arrangements. For a new dependent variable developed for this study that is 
not based on the amount of words, this is a important finding and reassures me that the 
mandates are coded consistently and, at the very least, total control is a comparable 
measure to mandate length. Second, the similarities between the tables, and committee 
system strength and legislative professionalism in particular, provide me with some 
confidence that this model is appropriately specified and acceptable to use in subsequent 
empirical tests. 
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As mentioned above however, the comparison of these variables is not the main 
purpose of this chapter. The importance of total control is in the mandates that make up 
the variable: procedural, policy, and both mandates. The individual mandates are 
important because they provide a level of information about legislative intent and control 
strategies not previously found in statutory control research. In particular, the choice of a 
specific mandate type signals to bureaucrats the aspect of the policy that legislators are 
concerned about controlling or overseeing as well as the costs that they are willing to 
incur to achieve these goals. This knowledge of legislative policy foresight provides me 
with a much more complete understanding of statutory control decisions and strategies 
employed by legislators. More importantly for this study, legislators face different costs 
and demands with the choice of different mandate types. As a result, I expect to see 
differences in the use of different mandates depending on the political and institutional 
arrangements in which the legislators reside. This is the focus of the next section. 
The Amount of Control in Procedural, Policy, & Both Mandates 
In this section, I examine the amount of control in procedural, policy, and both 
mandates. In particular, after a brief re-introduction of the three mandate types, I use the 
statutory control model developed in chapter 7 and tested in the beginning of this chapter 
to assess the impact of the political and institutional environments on the amount of 
control in each mandate type. 
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Procedural, Policy, & Both Mandates 
Recall that procedural mandates are non-policy related instructions by legislators 
placed in legislation that directly requires the agency or agencies to "do something" in 
order to achieve the legislator's preferred outcomes (hold a hearing, consult with a group, 
or develop procedures). The amount of procedural control in mandates is based on the 
specific language used to convey discretion ("must" "shall" "may"), as well as the 
specificity of the language and any additional control mechanisms imposed in the 
mandate (time constraints, approval requirements). 
In terms of the PA model, I consider procedural mandates to require less time and 
resources for legislators to impose upon bureaucrats. Not only do procedural mandates 
require bureaucrats to perform specific tasks (develop procedures) or duties (meet with a 
specific group), but they also shift much of costs associated with developing and 
implementing a policy to bureaucrats or to constituents who are most concerned with the 
specific policy area. At the same time, because procedural mandates focus on procedures 
and not the specific policy details, I consider them credible signals to bureaucrats that 
legislators are concerned with the manner in which the policy is developed and 
implemented, as well as the importance of acquiring specific knowledge, or satisfying the 
needs of specific groups or constituencies. 
Unlike procedural mandates, policy mandates are instructions by legislators that 
define, clarify, or set the parameters of the specific policy area. Depending on the scope 
and detail of the language, policy mandates are designed to let bureaucrats know how 
legislators interpret the policy as well as what outcomes they prefer. This is accomplished 
through the use of policy terms and policy procedures. Policy terms are mandates 
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designed specifically to define a term or a process pertaining to the policy, while policy 
procedures are policy mandates that define or clarify how the policy is to be developed or 
implemented without actually telling bureaucrats to do something. The amount of policy 
control is based on the focus of the mandate {policy term versus procedures) and the 
specificity of the language used to convey the policy parameters. 
I consider policy mandates to be more costly for legislators to develop and impose 
on bureaucrats because of the knowledge legislators are required to have about the 
specific policy, in addition to the costs associated with writing mandates designed to limit 
the ability of bureaucrats to interpret the policy in a manner that conforms to their policy 
preferences. Additionally, because policy mandates focus on the content and 
interpretation of the specific policy, it is a credible signal to bureaucrats that legislators 
are more concerned with setting the parameters of the specific policy area and/or the 
specific outcomes of policy implementation. 
Both mandates are instructions by legislators that require an agency to not only do 
something, but also defines how the required action will affect the specific policy 
parameters. In other words, both mandates articulate a particular requirement for 
bureaucrats to utilize (develop enrollment procedures) and provide an explanation of how 
this requirement will influence, alter, or expand the policy or the policy outcome. Both 
mandates differ from individual procedural and policy mandates because the procedural 
requirement and the policy parameter are substantively connected and cannot be 
separated. Calculating the amount control in both mandates is based on the same 
calculations made for procedural and policy mandates. 
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I posit that both mandates are the most constraining of the three mandates types 
simply because they control bureaucratic behavior by imposing specific requirements 
(procedural mandates), and they limit the ability of bureaucrats to interpret or shape the 
outcomes of the requirements {policy mandate). The additional constraint provided by 
both mandates however, comes with a price for legislators. Both mandates are the most 
costly for legislators they must incur the costs associated with the development and 
implementation of both procedural and policy mandates together. However, with these 
additional costs comes a much clearer signal to bureaucrats that legislators are concerned 
about both the manner in which the policy is developed and implemented as well as the 
specific policy outcomes. 
The Impact of Political & Institutional Environments on Proced, Policy, & Both Control 
Based on the descriptions of the different mandate types and their impact on the 
PA relationship, we should expect to see the political and institutional environments 
affect the three mandate types differently. Table 8-3, 8-4, & 8-5 provide the results of the 
models examining the impact of these environments on the amount of control in 
procedural, policy, and both mandates respectfully. In particular, to test the impact of 
these environments, I use the model of statutory control developed in chapter 7, which 
includes both committee system strength and legislative professionalism, a direct and 
interaction measure for the legislative veto index, as well as different configurations of 
my institutional control variables to assess the best fit. 
Although the three graphs provide similar results in terms of the institutional 
arrangements, they do differ in relation to the political environment. In particular, all of 
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my institutional control variables are significant and in the correct, positive direction 
across all specifications regardless of level of capacity or type of mandate control. 
Additionally, there are no significant changes in the impact of the three controls. These 
results suggest that the amount of control legislators impose is affected by the type of 
CHIP program adopted, the amount of control imposed in the previous session, and the 
amount of CHIP expenditures. 
Tables 8-3, 8-4, and 8-5 also show that despite the direct impact of my legislative 
capacity measures, both committee system strength and, to a lesser extent legislative 
professionalism lose their significance when I include the institutional control variables. 
This is also consistent with my previous findings and supports the notion that the direct 
impact of capacity is subsumed by the mechanisms that are derived from legislative 
capacity, specifically CHIP program type, the previous session's control amount, and 
CHIP expenditures. Unlike committee system strength, professionalism maintains its 
significance except when CHIP expenditures is included in the model because the two 
variables are highly correlated (.865). 
In addition to the impact of the institutional measures, the interaction between 
unified legislatures against the governor and legislative veto is significant and in the 
correct, negative direction in most models. The veto continues to enable legislators to 
impose less control in mandates in instances where incentive to engage in statutory 
control of bureaucrats is present. 
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The differences between the procedural, policy, and both control are seen most 
prominently in the impact of the political environment. Although the results for policy 
and both control reveal that both unified legislatures against the governor and divided 
legislatures are relatively stable across all specifications and are consistent with my 
theoretical expectations. In fact, the measures for divided legislatures are not just robust 
across all model specifications, but there are also no significant changes to its impact 
across specifications. At the same time, the measures for unified legislatures against the 
governor are always in the correct, positive direction, and significant in all models except 
those that does not include previous session's control. These results however, are not the 
same for procedural control. More specifically, while divided legislatures is significant 
and across all model specifications, the impact of unified legislatures against the 
governor are insignificant in most models and, in some cases, in the wrong direction. In 
other words, legislators are less inclined to impose more control in procedural mandates 
when they possess an incentive to do so {unified legislatures against the governor) than 
they would in other mandate types. 
Although these results confirm my findings regarding the impact of the political 
and institutional environments on the amount of control in each mandate type, they do 
not allow me to explore how the different costs and demands associated with each 
mandate type combine with the political and institutional environments to influence their 
use by legislators. The next section will focus on delving deeper into the three mandate 
types and exploring these relationships 
Looking Beyond the Impact of Political & Institutional Environments 
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As mentioned previously, each mandate type represents different costs and 
demands on legislators that, depending on the capacity and the political environment in 
which they reside, will influence which mandate they choose and which environment 
they will impose them on bureaucrats. In order to explore these relationships, I use the 
statistical software Clarify to present estimates of the expected values of the amount of 
control in each mandate type based on one-unit increases in my measures of capacity in 
each political environment: unified legislatures with the governor, unified legislatures 
against the governor, and divided legislatures . 
Based on the different costs and demands associated with each mandate type, I 
expect to see differences in the use of each mandate type depending on the political 
environment and the capacity of the legislature. In particular, I expect to see more 
capable legislatures imposing more control on bureaucrats in instances where they 
possess the incentive to do so, regardless of the mandate type. At the same time, I expect 
less capable legislatures to impose less control in mandates than their more capable 
counterpart in general and regardless of the mandate type. I also expect to see similar 
control strategies by less and more capable legislatures in instances where one chamber 
and the governor are controlled by another party and, as a result, the likelihood of bill 
passage is uncertain the costs of bargaining are elevated. 
Graphs 8-1, 8-2, and 8-3 presents the range of expected values derived by Clarify 
as they relate to the distribution of procedural, policy, and both control respectfully, 
across all six sessions based on the level of committee system strength in the three 
different political environments. 
61
 Clarify uses Monte Carlo simulations to extract all information from a statistical model and estimates the 
expected value of my dependent variable for one-unit increases in my main explanatory variables while 
holding my other independent variables constant at appropriate or meaningful values. 
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Graph 8-1: Changes in Procedural Control with 
Increases in Committee System Strength 1997-2007 
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Graph 8-2: Changes in Policy Control with 
Increases in Committee System Strength 1997-2007 
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Graph 8-3: Changes in Both Control with 
Increases in Committee System Strength 1997-2007 
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The results of the estimates of expected values for procedural, policy, and both 
control in Graphs 8-1, 8-2, and 8-3 provide strong support for my expectations. In each of 
the graphs we observe more capable legislatures imposing more control in CHIP 
mandates in instances when the executive branch is controlled by an opposing party and 
they thus possess an incentive to control bureaucrats. Although we can see differences in 
the levels of control between procedural, policy, and both mandates, this is true for all 
three mandate types despite the different costs and demands on legislators. Less capable 
legislatures simply do not possess the time or resoures to engage at the same level or with 
the same flexibility as their more capble counterparts. Additionally, for more capable 
legislatures in unified legislatures against the governor, absent legislative capacity, the 
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range of the level of control imposed in CHIP mandates is above zero, while the same 
cannot be said of less capable legislatures. 
In divided legislatures, where both chambers of the legislature and the executive 
possess divergent policy preferences, we observe both less and more capble legislators 
imposing about the same levels of control in CHIP mandates, as expected. Despite the 
different levels of control imposed by less and more capable legislatures in each of the 
different mandate types, capacity has little effect in this political environment because the 
costs of bargaining and policy conflict and the uncertainty over the passage of the CHIP 
bills is simply too high. Not only are the levels lower in divided legislatures as compared 
to the other environments, but absent capacity, unlike unified legislatures against the 
governor, the range of control imposed by legislatures starts at and inlcudes zero. 
The distriubution of the control imposed in each manddate type in unified 
legislatures with the governor suggests that as the capactiy of the legislature increases, 
the level of control decreases. This contradicts our theory in the sense that more capable 
legislatures should always be better able to incur the costs of control regardless of the 
incentive to engage or not. However, our data in chapter 6 revealed that in many cases, 
more capable legislatures simply did not engage at all while some less capable 
legislatures incurred the costs of engaging more than expected. The increased range of 
control in this enviornment for less capable legislatures suggests that this may be the 
cause of the direction of the distrubtion. In any event, the range of control for each of the 
mandate types is above zero which is consisetent with my theory since the costs 
associated with the political enviornment are diminished as a result of all chambers and 
the executive sharing similar policy preferences. 
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Based on these graphs, we can see that legislatures impose control in specific 
mandates based both on their capacity to incur the costs and demands of the mandate type 
as well as the costs and demands of the political enviornment. These findings enable me 
to better understand not only the decision to impose control in a specific mandate but also 
under what political conditions it will be imposed. 
Additional Control Mechanisms 
In chapter 6, we observed significant differences in the use of additional control 
mechanisms across states. In particular, Figure 6-2 revealed that legislators varied in their 
use of time constraints, approval requirements, and sanctions for non-compliance within 
procedural mandates. Now that we have observed the strategies of legislators in terms of 
the type of mandates that they use and the amount of procedural, policy, and both control 
imposed in each mandate type, I want to examine whether legislators display the same 
strategies or behavior when it comes to the imposition of additional control mechanisms. 
More specifically, I want to assess how the political and institutional environments 
influence the decision to include time constraints and approval requirements . 
Although additional control mechanisms do not represent substantial costs for 
legislators to impose, their inclusion in mandates have the potential to raise the costs of 
control significantly for legislators depending on its scope. For example, if legislators 
require bureaucrats to seek approval from a legislative body, legislators must incur more 
costs because of reviewing the document, holding a hearing or simply making sure that 
bureaucrats fulfill the requirements. On the other hand, legislators can significantly 
62
 I do not examine sanctions since, as mentioned previously, legislators only use them in ten instances 
throughout the six legislative sessions. 
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diminish potential costs by simply by requiring a non-legislative body to approve the 
requirement (interest group, constituents, study group). Alternatively, if legislators 
require that procedures be developed by a specific time, they must incur the costs of 
researching an acceptable time frame to perform the requirement, which may involve 
meetings and/or correspondence with other groups, as well as the time and resources to 
make sure that the procedures are submitted on time. At the same time, depending on the 
political environment, legislators might be more willing to incur the costs because of the 
incentive to control bureaucrats and ensure consistent behavior. As a result, I expect 
differences in the use of additional control mechanisms based on both the level of 
capacity and the political environment in which the legislators reside. 
Time Constraints 
Table 8-6 displays the sum and percentage of the use of unspecified and specified time 
constraints across all six sessions. Without knowing the level of capacity, it is interesting 
to see that legislators imposed 27% of all time constraints in the first session, 86% of 
which specified a specific time frame. At the same time, as the use of specified time 
constraints diminished in subsequent sessions, except the 2005-2006 session, the use of 
unspecified time constraints remained relatively stable. This strategy seems consistent 
with the PA model since the benefit of the time constraints clearly outweighs the minimal 
costs of imposing them in mandates. More specifically, it is likely that legislators will 
incur the costs of placing specified time constraints in early sessions of the CHIP 
program to put pressure on bureaucrats to produce results in a timely matter as well as to 
send a signal to bureaucrats that they are serious about control and oversight. 
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Table 8-6: Sum of Time Constraint Types Imposed in CHIP Mandates 1997-2007 
Time Constraint 
Unspecified 
Specified 
Totals 
1997-1998 
48 
(14%) 
304 
(86%) 
352 
(27%) 
1999-2000 
35 
(13%) 
231 
(87%) 
266 
(21%) 
2001-2002 
38 
(23%) 
140 
(77%) 
178 
(14%) 
2003-2004 
19 
(12%) 
134 
(88%) 
153 
(12%) 
2005-2006 
26 
(12%) 
200 
(88%) 
226 
(18%) 
2007-2008 
19 
(16%) 
97 
(84%) 
116 
(9%) 
Totals 
185 
(14%) 
1,106 
(86%) 
1,291 
Although the results of Table 8-6 provides me with a general assessment of the 
use of specified and unspecified time constraints, it does not tell me anything about the 
impact of the political and institutional environments on the decision to impose time 
constraints. Table 8-7 displays the use of specified and unspecified time constraints by 
less and more capable legislatures in both unified legislatures against the governor and 
divided legislatures . 
Table 8-7 reveals that, like the imposition of control in different mandate types, 
legislators take into consideration both their capacity to incur the costs and demands of 
time constraints as well as the costs and demands of the political environment. In 
particular, when legislators possess an incentive to engage in statutory control and 
oversee bureaucrats {unified legislatures against the governor), they incur the costs of 
imposing more time constraints, than in instances when they do not possess the incentive 
to control bureaucrats {divided legislatures). At the same time, within unified legislatures 
against the governor, we observe that legislators with more capacity use specified time 
63
 The data for Table 8-7 is taken from seven less professionalized legislatures - Alabama, Kentucky, 
Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah, and five more professionalized legislatures 
- Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, 
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Table 8-7: Use of Time Constraints by Level of Legislative Professionalism 
in Unified Legislatures Against the Governor and Divided Legislatures 
Session 
1997-
1998 
1999-
2000 
2001-
2002 
2003-
2004 
2005-
2006 
2007-
2008 
Totals 
Unified Legislatures Against the Governor 
Les Professionalized 
Unspecified 
6 
1 
3 
0 
3 
2 
15 
Specified 
20 
10 
12 
5 
6 
2 
55 
More Professionalized 
Unspecified 
3 
7 
2 
4 
8 
6 
30 
Specified 
53 
82 
48 
43 
73 
15 
314 
Divided Legislature 
Less Professionalized 
Unspecified 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
Specified 
0 
4 
0 
0 
4 
0 
8 
More Professionalized 
Unspecified 
1 
1 
3 
0 
0 
0 
5 
Specified 
25 
2 
6 
5 
7 
I 
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constraints at will, whereas less capable legislators must be strategic. The use of more 
specified time constraints in early sessions by less capable legislators suggests that they 
know their limitations and are possibly using the constraints to send a credible signal to 
bureaucrats early in the program. 
In divided legislatures, the use of time constraints is significantly diminished for 
both less and more capable legislators because of the increased costs and uncertainty 
surrounding policy enactment. In fact, legislators that are more capable behave similarly 
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to their less capable counterparts in unified legislatures against the governor by imposing 
more specified time constraints in early sessions to conserve resources and possibly 
attempting to establish a foundation of control early in the program. 
Approval Requirements 
Table 8-8 displays the use of approval requirements (approval by non-legislative 
body or legislative body)64 for all legislators across all six sessions. 
Table 8-8: Sum of Approval Requirements Imposed in CHIP Mandates 1997-2007 
Time Constraint 
Non Legislative 
Body 
Legislative Body 
Totals 
1997-1998 
85 
(47%) 
94 
(53%) 
179 
(27%) 
1999-2000 
64 
(54%) 
54 
(46%) 
118 
(18%) 
2001-2002 
71 
(77%) 
21 
(23%) 
92 
(14%) 
2003-2004 
57 
(63%) 
34 
(37%) 
91 
(14%) 
2005-2006 
60 
(56%) 
48 
(44%) 
108 
(16%) 
2007-2008 
47 
(71%) 
19 
(29%) 
66 
(10%) 
Totals 
385 
(59%) 
270 
(41%) 
655 
Without knowing the capacity of legislators, we see legislators imposed 27% of all 
approval requirements in the first session of the CHIP program (1997-1998), 53% of 
which required approval of a legislative body. As discussed above, this constitutes 
significant additional costs for legislatures. However, we can see that aside from the 
2005-2006 session, the use of approval requirements diminished consistently after the 
first session, and we even see the focus of the approval requirements shifting to non-
legislative bodies. In fact, the use of non-legislative bodies as approval mechanisms 
remains relatively consistent across all sessions. 
641 coded approval requirements based on whether legislators required bureaucrats to seek approval from 
both a non-legislative body and a legislative body, but legislators in no states imposed such a constraint. 
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When we examine approval requirements by less and more capable legislators in 
unified legislatures against the governor and divided legislatures in Table 8-9, we 
observe similar strategies to time constraints. In particular, in unified legislatures against 
the governor, legislators incur the costs of imposing more approval requirements when 
they possess the incentive to control bureaucrats. We also observe that legislators that are 
more capable are better able to incur the costs than their less capable counterparts, as 
evidenced by their use of non-legislative approval requirements almost at will. However, 
both less and more capable legislators appear to be imposing approval requirements that 
involve the legislature strategically and in early sessions of the program. 
Table 8-9: Use of Approval Requirement by Level of Legislative Professionalism in 
Unified Legislatures Against the Governor and Divided Legislatures 
Session 
1997-1998 
1999-2000 
2001-
2002 
2003-
2004 
2005-2006 
2007-2008 
Totals 
Unified Legislature Against the Governor 
Les Professionalized 
Non Legis 
Body 
5 
2 
2 
0 
1 
1 
11 
Legis 
Body 
10 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
18 
More Professionalized 
Non Legis 
Body 
14 
15 
23 
20 
22 
10 
104 
Legis 
Body 
13 
20 
4 
9 
20 
3 
69 
Divided Legislature 
Less Professionalized 
Non Legis 
Body 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Legis 
Body 
0 
1 
1 
0 
2 
0 
4 
More Professionalized 
Non Legis 
Body 
7 
0 
0 
4 
2 
1 
14 
Legis 
Body 
14 
0 
2 
0 
2 
1 
19 
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In divided legislatures, there is considerable less use of either approval 
requirement, as expected. However, when approval requirements are imposed in divided 
legislatures, primarily legislators that are more capable use them and in a manner that 
enables them to both conserve resources and set a foundation of control and oversight 
early in the program to ensure that bureaucrats do not defect or pursue their own policy 
preferences. 
Examining the use of additional control mechanisms in addition to the impact of 
the political and institutional environments on their use has provided us with a much 
clearer picture of how legislators actually engage in statutory control and of the specific 
mechanisms that they use to achieve their control and oversight goals. The results suggest 
that, consistent with our empirical findings, legislators understand their capabilities and 
shape their statutory control strategies based on this understanding as well as the political 
environment in which they reside. 
Chapter Summary 
The results of the empirical tests in this chapter provide similar results to the tests 
performed in chapter 7. In particular, I find that legislators impose more control when 
they choose a CHIP program that compels them to engage in more statutory control, as 
well as when they impose more control in the previous session. Additionally, I find that 
despite the direct effect of my measures of legislative capacity, the type of CHIP 
program, CHIP expenditures, and previous session's control amount subsume their 
influence and drive control decisions. Lastly, I find support for the impact of the veto 
interaction with unified legislatures against the governor. Legislators with stronger veto 
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powers diminish the need to impose control in instances when they possess the incentive 
to so primarily because the veto shapes bureaucratic behavior itself. 
Although confirming these results using a new dependent variable that is not 
based on the amount of words is a significant finding in itself, delving deeper into total 
control provides me with a much more complete understanding of statutory control 
decisions. In particular, by examining the procedural, policy, and both mandates that 
make up total control, I am able to observe that legislators are well aware of their 
capabilities as well as the demands and constraints placed on them by the political 
environments in which they reside. Much like legislators know how much to dedicate to 
their CHIP programs or what type of program to adopt, they make the same calculations 
when deciding how much control to include in specific mandates, in which political 
environments to impose specific mandates, as well as in the choice of when and where to 
impose time constraints and approval requirements. 
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Chapter 9: 
Conclusion & Future Research 
In this dissertation, I set out to improve our understanding of the use of language 
in legislation by state legislators to control and oversee the actions of bureaucrats in the 
development and implementation of policy. First, I have expanded upon an existing 
dependent variable to provide a more accurate assessment of the amount of discretion 
provided to bureaucrats by examining only the words that directly relate to the specific 
policy area as well as examining statutory control in both general legislation and 
appropriations bills. Second, I developed and employed a new dependent variable based 
on the substantive content of mandates that provides the necessary policy foresight to 
understand how legislators control bureaucrats and the aspects of the policy that is 
important to them. Third, I delved deeper into the specific mandates to provide a more 
complete understanding of statutory control decisions and the strategies employed by 
legislators. Lastly, I used more appropriate institutional measures to expand upon the 
prevailing research and provide a better understanding of the influence of the institutional 
environments that vary across states on statutory control decisions. 
Based on the extensions and improvements discussed above, in addition to the 
results of the empirical tests performed in the previous two chapters, I believe that this 
project has accomplished its goal. In particular, the information obtaining in this study 
and the expanded understanding we have acquired has enabled us to take a step closer to 
a more complete understanding of statutory control of bureaucrats. In this concluding 
chapter, I discuss why I come to this conclusion by summarizing and addressing the 
implications of my key findings, as well as possible avenues of future research. 
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Summary of Findings 
Variation in CHIP Mandates across U.S. State Legislatures 
Attempting to assess whether the political and institutional environments 
influence statutory control decisions by legislators in CHIP legislation required that I first 
observe sufficient variation in my dependent variables so that I would be able to observe 
differences if they did in fact exist. Examining the data in chapters 5 and 6,1 was able to 
confirm that contextual variation existed for both mandate length and total control across 
states as well as over sessions both within individual states and across all states. 
In chapter 5,1 observed states enacting different amount of CHIP bills, mandates, 
and length of mandates while in chapter 6,1 observed significant variation in total control 
as well as in the use of and control imposed in the procedural, policy, and both mandates 
that make up total control. At the same time, chapter 6 revealed significant differences in 
the use of additional control mechanisms such as time constraints, approval requirements, 
and sanctions for non-compliance. The variation in chapter 6 is especially important 
considering that total control and the factors that make up the variable I developed for 
this study and, coupled with its similarities to mandate length, suggest that I coded the 
measure consistently and correctly. 
More importantly, chapter 5 and 6 reveal that the differences in mandate length, 
total control and in the three mandate types exist across legislative sessions. While the 
prevailing literature examines a snapshot of statutory control decisions (one or two 
legislative sessions), my data includes decisions across six legislative sessions. By 
observing differences between states across legislative sessions rather than in a single 
session enables me to be more certain about the impact of specific factors as well as the 
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strategies employed by legislators. Observing decisions in a single session cannot provide 
this degree of certainty. 
Statutory Control as a Two-Stase Process 
The examination of mandate length and total control in chapters 5 and 6 also 
revealed that legislators use both general legislation and appropriations bills to impose 
their legislative intent. This is an important finding not just because of the variation in the 
use of the two control mechanisms across states, but because it also suggests that 
statutory control is a two-stage process: legislators choose where they impose their 
statutory control intent. This finding also reveals that the prevailing literature provides an 
incomplete assessment of the statutory control environment because of their exclusive 
focus on general legislation. Figure 5-3 clearly shows that appropriations bills are a 
significant part of statutory control decisions as evidenced by the nearly 40% of statutory 
control decisions imposed in appropriations bills. In fact, New Mexico, Alabama, and 
Michigan used appropriations bills exclusively. At the same time, the visual inspections 
and the mixed effects model examined in these chapters provided me with some insight 
into the type of factors that might be causing this variation. 
Mandate Length 
Prior to the empirical tests in chapter 7, I argued that if we wanted to know how 
much discretion legislators provide bureaucrats, mandate length was a better measure 
than length of legislation because it was based only on the words that directly related to 
the policy area and eliminated the superfluous language some legislators impose in 
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legislation. Mandate length also includes statutory control decisions that were imposed in 
appropriations bills. Theoretically, mandate length is a more appropriate measure and 
although the empirical results in chapter 7 confirmed much of Huber & Shipan's findings 
regarding the impact of the political environment, legislative capacity, and the legislative 
veto, mandate length further enabled me to expand upon their findings. 
Procedural, Policy, and Both Control 
I also argued that if scholars wanted to obtain the necessary policy foresight to 
better understand how legislators control bureaucrats and the aspects of the policy that 
are important to them, we must observe and investigate the substantive content of 
statutory control decisions. The creation of separate dependent variables based on the 
type of mandate imposed by legislators {procedural, policy, or both), the discretion-
limiting language used to convey their policy intent, the specificity of the mandate, and 
any additional control mechanisms included to further constrain bureaucrats enabled me 
to accomplish these goals. I was able to observe whether legislators were more concerned 
with the manner in which bureaucrats developed and implemented the CHIP program 
(procedural mandates) or they were uncertain about the outcome of the CHIP program or 
believed that it was in jeopardy as a result of bureaucrats pursuing their own policy 
preferences {policy mandates). At the same time, I could also assess whether they were 
concerned with both the development and outcomes of the policy (both mandates). 
Additionally, the use of each mandate type thus provided me with a much more complete 
understanding of the type of costs legislators were willing to incur to achieve their goals. 
As a result, I believe this first attempt at extracting the policy foresight and assessing how 
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legislators controlled bureaucrats was a success, and we are able to observe and 
understand much more about legislative decisions and the strategies that they employ to 
control bureaucrats. 
Partisanship Matters 
The fact that the political environment influences decisions by state legislators to 
write longer, more detailed mandates or impose more procedural, policy, and both 
control in CHIP mandates is not necessarily a significant finding in itself. In fact, other 
legislative scholars, including Huber & Shipan, have found that when confronted with an 
executive with divergent policy preferences {unified legislatures against the governor) 
legislators engage in writing longer, more detailed mandates in an attempt to control and 
oversee bureaucrats. At the same time, scholars have also found that when confronted 
with another chamber and an executive with divergent preferences {divided legislatures), 
legislators pass less detailed CHIP mandates or do not engage in statutory control 
because the costs of doing so are simply too high and the likelihood of passage too 
uncertain. What is significant about these results in this study is that I find that the 
influence of the political environment is not contingent upon the capacity of the 
legislators or the legislature. Partisanship has a direct effect on statutory control by itself. 
This is a significant finding if we consider that Huber & Shipan conclude that 
given the incentive to control bureaucrats based on the political environment, legislators 
will only engage in statutory control if they also possess the capacity to do so. This is not 
the case in CHIP legislation whether I use mandate length, total control, or examine the 
impact on procedural, policy, or both control: legislators attempt to control bureaucrats 
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when they possess the incentive to do so, and when the costs of doing so are not too high 
or bill passage is not in jeopardy. At the same time, the political environment also affects 
the choice of additional control mechanisms examined in chapter 6. As with the amount 
of discretion provided to bureaucrats, legislators impose more time constraints and 
approval requirements in unified legislatures against the governor, when they possess the 
incentive to control bureaucrats, than they do during divided legislatures, when the costs 
are too high and enactment is uncertain. What is even more significant is that my findings 
are based on statutory control decisions across six legislative sessions and are robust with 
either of my measures of legislative capacity, committee system strength and legislative 
professionalism. 
It is Not "Whether, " but "How" Legislative Capacity Matters 
In addition to the findings regarding the political environment, this study also 
confirms the prevailing literatures findings that legislative capacity has a direct effect on 
the amount of discretion provided to bureaucrats through legislation. In fact, this is true 
whether I measure it in amount of words pertaining to CHIP mandates or based on the 
amount of control imposed in procedural, policy, or both mandates: more capable 
legislatures can and will incur the costs of acquiring the requisite information to develop 
CHIP policy, as well as writing more detailed mandates. At the same time, these results 
are relatively consistent whether I examine committee system strength or legislative 
professionalism. Although these results differ from Huber & Shipan's findings that 
legislatures must meet a capacity threshold in order to engage in statutory control, they 
use legislator compensation as a measure of capacity and only examine one session of 
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control decisions in general legislation. My results are based on six legislative sessions, 
using two separate and distinct measures of capacity that are based on "collective" and 
not "individual" motivations and in both general legislation and appropriations bills. 
Aside from the direct impact of legislative capacity, the results from the empirical 
tests in this study reveal that we may be missing the true story regarding legislative 
capacity by simply assessing whether or not it is influential. In fact, the results from 
chapter 7 and 8 suggest that the real story of capacity involves the mechanisms that make 
capacity influential. In terms of the CHIP, the mechanisms are the CHIP program is the 
type of program adopted, the amount of expenditures dedicated to the program, and the 
amount of control legislators imposed in the previous session. In fact, the empirical 
results in chapters 7 and 8 suggest that legislators make policy decisions based on their 
own capacity to provide funds and resources, as well as withstand the demands the 
specific program places on them. As a result, the amount of expenditures dedicated to 
CHIP and the program legislators adopt are a reflection of their capacity, and these 
factors dictate how much legislators will need to engage in statutory control. More 
specifically, the more money dedicated and the more demands placed on them by a stand-
alone CHIP program, the more directives, instructions, clarifications, and constraints 
legislators will have to articulate to bureaucrats. The results also suggest that for states 
that spend more on CHIP and adopt programs that demand more time, resources, 
information, and thus attention, the previous sessions control influences the amount of 
control in the subsequent session. In other words, if you impose more statutory control 
today, you are going to impose more in the future. 
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Legislative Veto 
Lastly, the results of this chapter allow me to confirm Huber & Shipan's finding 
regarding the legislative veto. In particular, confronted with a governor with divergent 
policy preferences {unified legislatures against the governor), legislators that possess a 
veto enact shorter, less detailed mandates because the veto controls bureaucratic behavior 
outside of the legislative process and thus diminishes the incentive to control bureaucrats 
through statutory control. However, using my index of veto powers I am able to expand 
upon Huber & Shipan's findings and conclude that legislators with stronger veto powers 
are even more capable of diminishing the incentive to engage in statutory control. This is 
an important finding considering the significant differences in scope and power of the 
veto across states. These results suggest that even legislators that possess advisory veto 
authority are able to shape bureaucratic behavior outside of legislation and can diminish 
the incentive to engage in statutory control, although to a much less degree than 
legislators with vetoes that are more powerful. 
Avenues of Future Research 
Although I believe that this study has enabled me to advance the study of 
statutory control of bureaucrats an additional step, more research is necessary. First, if we 
truly seek to better understand the factors that influence statutory control decisions, then 
we must continue to focus on policy foresight and the decisions legislators make to 
control and oversee bureaucrats. In fact, attempts to assess the impact of the political and 
institutional environments mean little if legislators did not intend to control bureaucrats 
or were concerned more with the development of the policy rather than specific 
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outcomes. As a result, we must continue to delve deeper into the manner in which 
legislators attempt to control and oversee bureaucrats. In particular, the specific mandates 
imposed, the language they utilize, the aspects of the policy that are important to 
legislators, and the additional constraints placed in legislation to constrain their behavior 
further and the outcomes they pursue. Policy foresight is the key to this improved 
understanding as well as the key to appropriately interpreting the empirical results. If we 
know that legislators are concerned with the manner in which the policy is developed 
because they use procedural mandates, then we should focus more on bureaucratic 
behavior rather than policy outcomes. 
Second, future research should continue to focus on more than a snapshot of 
statutory control decisions. While this study examines decisions across six legislative 
sessions and provides a level of certainty about the impact of the political and 
institutional environments not previously presented, a closer look at the decisions and 
strategies in specific sessions will further improve our understanding. In particular, by 
examining the use of specific mandate types within and across sessions will provide us 
with a better idea about whether legislators are strategic in their choice of specific 
mandates or in the timing of their use. We observe some strategic behavior in the 
imposition of time constraints and approval requirements across sessions in this study, 
and I would assume that legislators would also be strategic in the imposition of different 
mandate types as well. I suspect that all legislators want to signal to bureaucrats that they 
are serious about control at the beginning of the program as well as impose certain 
procedures and requirements to put them on auto-pilot, pursuing the legislature's goals. 
However, legislators adopting a stand-alone CHIP program are likely to want to obtain 
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information more quickly and beginning laying the foundation for the new program, 
necessitating the use of more procedural mandates rather than policy mandates. 
Additionally, examining these decisions over legislative sessions will also provide us 
with even more information about the influence of the political environment. In 
particular, do decisions regarding the type or timing of mandates change because of 
partisanship or in anticipation of changes to partisanship? 
Third, in addition to the theoretical and empirical research examining statutory 
control, future research should focus on specific case studies to provide additional 
information and clarity regarding the influence of political and institutional 
environments. Although each state deals with similar issues (eligibility requirements, 
enrollment levels, funding sources, or expansion), examining decisions more closely in 
specific states can provide invaluable information about the development, 
implementation, and maintenance of the CHIP policy as well as about differences 
between states with similar arrangements. Why do some more capable legislators choose 
not to engage in control while similarly situated legislators in another state do? Why do 
some legislators adopt programs that place more demands than they are capable of 
maintaining? Although this study joins the existing research in suggesting that these 
decisions are based on the political and institutional environments within the state, are 
there other state-specific forces influencing these decisions? A closer look within states 
will allow us to answer these questions. 
Lastly, future research should attempt to examine statutory control decisions in a 
more realistic statutory control environment, specifically examining legislative decisions 
in multiple policy areas simultaneously. Although the prevailing research design 
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examining a single policy area has provided invaluable information regarding legislative 
decisions to control and oversee bureaucrats, legislators do not have the luxury of 
focusing exclusively on a single policy area. In fact, legislators must make multiple 
policy decisions simultaneously, balancing the amount of discretion and control in 
different policy areas with different informational requirements and interacting with 
different bureaucrats with different levels of knowledge and expertise, all with the same 
amount of time and resources. In terms of the PA relationship between legislators and 
bureaucrats, we might expect that different policy areas that represent different costs and 
requirements for legislators to result in different statutory control decisions, but we 
cannot be sure at this point. At the same time, if we are able to observe multiple policies, 
we should also see differences in strategies depending on the degree of preference 
divergence (how far apart are legislators and bureaucrats?) as well as how much 
information legislators have about the specific policy area. In other words, if a legislators 
possess experience or knowledge of health care and less about toxic chemicals, do we 
observe more statutory control or the use of specific mandate types for toxic chemicals 
than for health care? Examining multiple policy areas simultaneously will enable us to 
answer these questions and take another step towards a more complete understanding of 
statutory control of bureaucrats. 
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Appendix A: 
Coding State CHIP Legislation 
Variable 
obs 
state 
sessyr 
billnumb 
billtype 
Description 
Observation - number of each 
observation in the database. Each 
individual mandate constitutes a separate 
observation. 
** each coder will start with different 
observation numbers. 
State - refers to the particular state in 
which the legislation comes from, noted 
in two-letter abbreviation. 
Session Year - refers to the year in 
which the legislation was ENACTED -
Signed by the Governor if applicable. Be 
careful here ... the bill number will 
provide different years. These may be the 
year in which it was introduced or the 
year it was re-introduced after it was 
tabled (held over due to end of session). 
Make sure that you put down the year it 
was enacted. 
Bill Number - what is the bill number of 
the legislation? This is the actual bill 
number given by the chamber of the 
legislature that introduced the bill. 
Bill Type - the type of bill the legislature 
placed the mandate - either General 
Legislation or in an Appropriations Bill. 
First line of bill will usually determine 
what type of bill it is. 
Example 
Starting observation numbers 
David-1 
Claire - 5000 
Shehni-3000 
Rob - 8000 
CA - California 
TX - Texas 
Biennial Session 2007-2008 = enter 2007 
Annual Session 2007 = enter 2007 
H.B. 200 - House Bill 200 
S.B. 4567 - Senate Bill 4567 
"An act relating to parks..." (Gen Legis) 
"An act to make, supplement, and adjust 
appropriations..." (Appros Bill) 
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Billhouse 
billsub 
mandate 
Mandlocate 
Mandsect 
Bill House - refers to the chamber of the 
legislature that the bill was introduced 
and passed. Either the House/Assembly 
or the Senate. 
Bill Subject - the subject of the bill. This 
is for identification purposes. Simply type 
in the first few words of the first line of 
the bill 
Mandate - a "mandate" is the language 
used by the legislature to either affect (1) 
policy development or implementation, 
AND/OR (2) agency behavior. 
*It is important to cut and paste the 
mandate here - we want to be able to 
track the mandates over time - if 
legislatures use the same mandates year 
after year, they use them only once or 
adjust them over time. 
Mandate Location - a mandate can be in 
either general legislation or an 
appropriations bill - it will be in different 
sections either in the body of the bill 
(section, a "rider," appendix, notes, or 
footnotes) or in a subsequent / 
accompanying or supplemental document 
that includes legislative intent (committee 
report, letter of intent, staff report, 
legislative journal). *Each of these 
options have the "force of law." 
Simply choose where the mandate is 
located. 
Mandate Section - simply write the 
section and page number of the particular 
mandate. 
H.B. 200 = House Bill 200 
S.B. 4567 = Senate Bill 4567 
"An act relating to parks ..." 
"An act to make, supplement, and adjust..." 
Cut and paste the mandate into the section -
the limit on Access is 255 characters so cut 
and paste as much as will fit in the box. If 
you do not get all of the mandate in, after 
the last word place "..." so that we know 
that the mandate continues 
Ex. "The Dept of Social Services shall 
implement rules and procedures to address 
the eligibility requirements for children 
under 300% of the . . . . " 
General Legislation (GL) or 
Appropriations Bill (AB) 
• Section (Sec) 
• Rider 
• Appendix 
• Notes 
• Footnote 
• Staff Report 
• Letter of Intent 
• Legislative Journal 
Sec 1 (a) (2) pg 34 
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Mandtype 
(see above) 
mandlength 
manddiscr 
Mandate Type - A mandate is a "single" 
action even though most often it will be 
combined with other mandates. 
Legislatures will use them to control 
agencies through "procedures" or 
"policy." 
Procedural mandates - are instructions 
by the legislature for the agency to do or 
not do something related to the 
development or implementation of the 
policy (i.e. perform a procedure) (1) 
develop a procedure / program, (2) hold a 
hearing, (3) contact or consult with a 
group, (4) create a group or committee. 
Policy mandates are instructions for the 
legislature regarding the policy itself and 
does not require the agency to act or 
perform - instead the mandate dictates 
specifics about the particular policy, (1) 
what is the intent of the policy, (2) how 
terms and procedures are defined, (3) 
what constitutes a "goal" or 
"achievement," - how performance and 
goals are measured, (4) the agency's 
rights and/or responsibilities (5) the 
population "affected" & "not affected" by 
the policy and (6) who is / is not involved 
in the implementation of the policy. 
Mandate Length - this variable simply 
measures how many words are in EACH 
mandate. 
Mandate Discretion - refers to how 
much discretion the mandate provides the 
agency. 
This is not a subjective measure, based 
on the words used to control or direct the 
agency. Words such as "must" and 
"shall" denote that the agency has "no 
discretion" and that they are "required" to 
do what the mandate states. Words such 
as "may" or "should" denote "limited 
discretion" provided to the agency. 
Agencies have "broad discretion" when 
the mandate states that they may do "as 
they see fit." 
Policy Mandate - "The program will be 
called "ARKids " and will cover children 
below 200% of the poverty level" 
— ** all instructions are related to the policy 
and does not require the agency to act or 
perform any procedures 
Procedural Mandate - "Sect 1 - Dept. of 
Corrections shall consult with the Attorney 
General to develop a program to monitor 
released inmates. The department shall 
submit a report to the legislature on its 
progress " 
--** instructions for agency to "perform" 
(consultation and report) with no 
instructions for policy 
Both Policy & Procedural — The agency 
shall develop a program called "ARKids" 
that will cover children below 200% of the 
poverty level" 
--** both policy and procedural 
This is found by highlighting the mandate 
and clicking on "tools" then "word count" 
(in Word files), or highlighting the mandate, 
"copy" mandate to a Word file and clicking 
on "tools" then "word count." 
No Discretion - "must" "shall" "it is the 
intent of the legislature that..." 
Limited Discretion - "may" "should" 
Broad Discretion - "as agency sees fit" 
** Sometimes these objective words will 
not be used and you will have to make a 
decision about the amount of discretion 
provided based on the language. Simply 
decide, what you believe to be the amount 
of discretion given to the agency 
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mandgroup 
funds 
fundspecif 
Mandate Group - This measure simply 
states the amount of agencies that the 
mandate is directed toward - which 
agency is the legislature attempting to 
control? There may be a single agency 
(i.e. Dept of Corrections must...), or a 
group of agencies (i.e. agencies dealing 
with health care). It is argued that if a 
legislature singles out a particular agency, 
their behavior and actions are of the 
utmost importance to the legislature and 
deserve their own language. 
Funds - what type of funds and 
resources are being referred to in the 
mandate? Funds and resources will be 
involved in mandates primarily in 
appropriations bills "'but not always". 
Funds in mandates will take the form of 
Appropriated Funds & Resources 
(appropriations bills), Non-Appropriated 
Funds & Resources (both general 
legislation and appropriations bills), and 
Supplemental F&Rs. Supplemental 
F&Rs are primarily F&Rs provided after 
the passage of the budget in a subsequent 
document. The mandate will usually state 
what types of F&Rs are being addressed. 
Sometimes the mandate refers to "both" 
appropriated and non-appropriated F&Rs. 
Fund Specificity - measures the 
specificity of the mandate. Legislatures 
will use more words (more specificity) 
when they want to control an agency. 
Minimal Specificity - the legislature will 
provide the mandate with no additional 
descriptive or supporting words. 
Moderate Specificity - in addition to the 
mandate, the legislature includes " 1 " 
additional descriptive statement. 
Significant Specificity - in addition to 
the mandate, the legislature includes 2 or 
more descriptive statements OR provides 
an example or model to be followed. 
1 Agency Only - "Dept of Corrections 
shall..." (Specific Agency) 
2-3 Agencies - may refer to more than 1 
agency specifically or a group of similar 
agencies / Commission / Group (i.e. Health 
Care Commission) (Group of Agencies) 
More than 3 agencies (General) 
*** N/A - for mandates that are only policy 
related, they are not speaking directly to one 
or more agencies but to a "general" 
audience. Therefore, we will code policy 
related mandates as "N/A" - unless it 
specifically says that it is directing the 
mandate to a specific agency or group of 
agencies. 
Appropriated funds 
Non-Appropriated funds 
Supplemental funds 
Emergency funds 
Minimal Specificity - "DOC shall have a 
program for pregnant inmates." 
Moderate Specificity - "The DOC shall 
develop a program for pregnant inmates. 
The program should include procedures for 
childbirth in prison" 
Significant Specificity - (1) "The DOC 
shall develop a program for pregnant 
inmates. The program should include 
procedures for childbirth in prison" OR (2) 
"The DOC shall develop a program for 
pregnant mothers that follows the program 
established in the Harris County 
Correctional System" 
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fundtime 
fundaprov 
Procedures 
report 
hearing 
contact 
body 
proced 
Fund Time - does the legislature place a 
time requirement on the use the funds? 
An agency that is required to use funds in 
a specific amount of time is more 
constrained than an agency that does not 
have a time constraint. Constraints also 
have varying degrees. 
Fund Approval - does the legislature 
require that an agency's use of funds be 
approved by itself or another body? 
Agencies that must have their use of 
funds approved by another body are more 
constrained than agencies that do not 
have to have their use of funds approved. 
Approval by the legislature itself is more 
constraining than if another body is 
required to do so. 
The following variables refer to specific 
procedural constraint a legislature can 
require of an agency. The requirement of 
one or a combination increase control 
over the agency. For whom the procedure 
must be provided for or with also adds to 
the level of control 
Report-does mandate require submission 
of a report? 
Hearing - mandate require agency to 
hold hearing? 
Contact - does the mandate require that 
the agency contact, consult, or interact 
with another body? 
Body - does the mandate require that the 
agency establish a body - study group, 
committee, agency, etc? 
Procedure - does the mandate require 
that the agency perform or develop a 
particular procedure? 
No Time Constraint - "The DOC is 
appropriated S500K to use on education." 
Time Constraint but Not Specified - "The 
DOC must utilize $500K for inmate 
education in a reasonable amount of time, 
or it will be transferred to the DOT." 
Specified Time Constraint - "The DOC 
has until January 31, 2008 to utilize $500K 
appropriated for inmate education, or it will 
be transferred to the DOT" 
Fund Approval by Legis & Body - "DOC 
payments must be approved by the 
legislature and the attorney general" 
Fund Approval by Non-Legis Body -
"DOC payments must be approved by the 
attorney general" 
Fund Approval by Legis - "DOC 
payments must be approved by the 
legislature" 
No Report/Hearing/Contact Required 
Yes - For Legislature - The DOC must (1) 
provide a report (2) hold a hearing with (3) 
consult with the legislature 
Yes - For Legis & Non-Legis Body - The 
DOC must (1) provide a report (2) hold a 
hearing with (3) consult with legis & 
constituents / IGs / commission 
Yes - For Non-Legis Body - The DOC 
must (1) provide report (2) hold hearing (3) 
consult w/ constituents / IGs / commission 
* Agencies required to establish a "body " 
or "procedure, " these will not necessarily 
be accomplished for the legislature or 
another body. These should be coded as 
"No-Not Specified" 
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Purpose of 
Procedures 
reportpurp 
hearingpurp 
contactpurp 
bodypurp 
procedpurp 
Time Constraint 
on Procedures 
reporttime 
hearingtime 
contacttime 
bodytime 
procedtime 
* mandates display more statutory 
control if they state the purpose of the 
specific procedure - more specificity. 
These variables are further distinguished 
by the focus of the procedure. 
Report Purpose - does the mandate 
specify the purpose of the agency writing 
a report and, if so, what does the purpose 
pertain to? 
Hearing Purpose - does the mandate 
specify the purpose of the agency holding 
a hearing and, if so, what does the 
purpose pertain to? 
Contact Purpose - does the mandate 
specify the purpose of the agency 
contacting, consulting or interacting with 
another entity and what does the purpose 
pertain to? 
Body Purpose - does the mandate 
specify the purpose of the agency 
establishing a body? What does it pertain 
to? 
Procedure Purpose - does the mandate 
specify the purpose of the procedure and, 
if so, what does it pertain to? 
* agencies that must act within a specific 
time period are more constrained than 
those that have no or an unspecified time 
constraint. 
Time Constraint on Requirement -
does the mandate require that the agency 
perform, establish, or develop the 
procedure in a specific amount of time? 
Not Specified - "DOC shall (1) submit a 
report (2) hold a hearing (3) consult with 
constituents (4) establish a study group (5) 
develop a program for the legis." 
On Outcomes - "DOC shall (1) submit a 
report (2) hold a hearing (3) consult with 
constituents (4) establish a study group (5) 
develop a program for the legislature on 
progress and procedures." 
On Design - "DOC shall (1) submit a report 
(2) hold a hearing (3) consult with 
constituents (4) establish a study group (5) 
develop a program for the legislature on 
processes and individuals involved." 
On Financials - "DOC shall (1) submit a 
report (2) hold a hearing (3) consult with 
constituents (4) establish a study group (5) 
develop a program for the legislature on 
fiscal matters." 
On Multiple Items - combination of two or 
more items 
No Time Constraint - "DOC shall (1) 
submit a report (2) hold a hearing (3) 
consult with constituents (4) establish a 
study group (5) develop a program for the 
legis." 
Time Constraint Not Specified - "DOC 
shall (1) submit a report (2) hold a hearing 
(3) consult with constituents (4) establish a 
study group (5) develop a program for the 
legis in a timely manner." 
Time Constraint Specified - "DOC shall 
(1) submit a report (2) hold a hearing (3) 
consult with constituents (4) establish a 
study group (5) develop a program for the 
legis by January 31, 2008." 
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Approval of 
Procedures 
reportaprv 
hearingaprv 
contactaprv 
bodyaprv 
procedaprv 
Sanction for Non -
Compliance of 
Procedures 
reportsanct 
hearingsanct 
contactsanct 
bodysanct 
procedsanct 
genlang 
* like procedures, specificity and time 
constraints, mandates that require that an 
agency get approval for their procedures 
imposes additional constraints & control 
over agencies. Also, agencies that must 
get approval are more constrained if the 
legislature is the approving body rather 
than a non-legislative body 
Approval Requirement on Constraint -
does the mandate state that the agency 
must obtain approval for the procedure? 
* sanctions and/or penalties imposed for 
non - compliance further increase 
legislative control, sanctions can be 
considered a signal to an agency that 
complying with the legislature's mandate 
is more important than if it was not 
attached to a sanction 
Report Sanction - failure to submit 
report? 
Hearing Sanction - failure to hold a 
hearing? 
Contact Sanction - failure to contact, 
consult or interact another body? 
Body Sanction - failure to contact, 
consult or interact with another body? 
Procedure Sanction - failure to perform 
or develop a procedure? 
* the following variables pertain to the 
specific policy itself rather than 
procedures associated with the policy: 
instructions, definitions, participants, 
outcomes, etc. 
General Policy Language - does 
mandate discuss general policy language? 
Specifically, does the mandate discuss 
policy goals or background information 
about the policy and/or the reasons why 
implementing the policy is necessary? 
These can be economic, historical, 
cultural, as well as moral reasons. 
Not General Policy Language - does 
mandate state what are NOT policy goals 
or address why a policy is NOT 
developed a certain way? 
No Approval - "DOC shall (1) submit a 
report (2) hold a hearing (3) consult with 
constituents (4) establish a study group (5) 
develop a program" 
Approval by Legis - "DOC shall (1) submit 
a report (2) hold a hearing (3) consult with 
constituents (4) establish a study group, and 
(5) develop a program that must be 
approved by the legislature" 
Approval by Non-Legis Body - "DOC 
shall (1) submit a report (2) hold a hearing 
(3) consult with constituents (4) establish a 
study group, and (5) develop a program and 
be approved by the Commission on 
Criminal Procedures" 
No Sanction - "DOC shall submit a report 
on procedures and outcomes" 
Sanction but Not Specified - "DOC shall 
submit a report on procedures and outcomes 
by Jan 31, 2008 or incur a penalty for non-
compliance" 
Sanction Specified - "DOC shall submit a 
report on procedures and outcomes by Jan 
31, 2008 or face legislative review" 
No General Language - "SCHIP 
legislation shall be passed by the agency" 
General Language - "SCHIP legislation 
will improve the health of eligible children" 
Not General Language - "SCHIP 
legislation is not designed to provide health 
care services for children above 200% of 
the poverty level" 
Both General & Not General Language -
"SCHIP legislation is designed to improve 
the health of eligible children but not to 
provide care for children above 200% of the 
poverty level" 
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genlangspecif 
define 
definespecif 
General Policy Language Specificity -
measures the specificity of the general 
policy language. Legislatures will use 
more words (more specificity) when they 
want to control or constrain an agency. 
Minimal Specificity - the legislature will 
provide the mandate only with no 
additional descriptive or supporting 
words. 
Moderate Specificity - in addition to the 
mandate, the legislature includes " 1 " 
additional descriptive statement. 
Significant Specificity - in addition to 
the mandate, the legislature includes 2 or 
more descriptive statements OR provides 
an example or model to be followed. 
Definitions - does the mandate define 
policy terms or procedures? Legislatures 
are likely to include definitions of policy 
terms and procedures to make sure 
agencies are clear about what their intent 
is and terms or procedures are 
unambiguous. 
Definition Specificity - measures the 
specificity of the definition. Legis will 
use more words (more specificity) when 
they want to control or constrain agency. 
Minimal Specificity - the legis will 
provide the mandate only with no 
additional supporting words. 
Moderate Specificity - in addition to the 
mandate, the legislature includes " 1 " 
additional descriptive statement. 
Significant Specificity - in addition to 
the mandate, the legislature includes 2 or 
more descriptive statements OR provides 
an example or model to be followed. 
Minimal Specificity - "The DOC shall 
develop a program for pregnant inmates." 
Moderate Specificity - "The DOC shall 
develop a program for pregnant inmates. 
The program should include procedures for 
childbirth in prison" 
Significant Specificity - (1) "The DOC 
shall develop a program for pregnant 
inmates. The program should include 
procedures for childbirth in prison; and day 
care facilities" OR (2) "The DOC shall 
develop a program for pregnant mothers 
that follows the program established in the 
Harris County Correctional System" 
No Definitions - "The DOC shall use Texas 
based products for all improvements." 
Yes - Definitions - "The DOC shall Texas 
based products for all improvements. 
'Texas based products' are materials 
manufactured in the state". 
Yes - NOT Definitions - "The DOC shall 
use Texas based products for all 
improvements. 'Texas based products' are 
materials manufactured in the state of Texas 
and not those that originate from any other 
state." 
Both Definitions & NOT Definitions -
'Texas based products' are materials 
manufactured in the state and are NOT 
made in any other state" 
Minimal Specificity - "The DOC shall 
develop a program for pregnant inmates." 
Moderate Specificity - "The DOC shall 
develop a program for pregnant inmates. 
The program should include procedures for 
childbirth in prison" 
Significant Specificity - (1) "The DOC 
shall develop a program for pregnant 
inmates. The program should include 
procedures for childbirth in prison; and day 
care facilities" OR (2) "The DOC shall 
develop a program for pregnant mothers 
that follows the program established in the 
Harris County Correctional System" 
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population 
implement 
Population - does the mandate specify 
the population impacted by the policy? 
Specifically, which individuals, groups or 
agencies are involved with the particular 
policy. 
Implementation - does the mandate 
specify which individuals, groups, and/or 
agencies are involved with the 
implementation of the policy? 
No Population - "The DOC shall develop a 
program to improve prison conditions." 
Population - "The DOC shall develop a 
program to improve prison conditions for 
pregnant inmates" 
NOT Population - "The DOC shall not 
develop a program to improve prison 
conditions for pregnant inmates. 
Both Population & NOT population -
"The DOC shall develop a program to 
improve prison conditions for pregnant 
inmates and not general inmate population" 
No Implement - "The DOC shall develop a 
program to improve prison conditions for 
pregnant inmates." 
Implement - "The DOC shall develop a 
program to improve prison conditions for 
pregnant inmates. The DOC shall consult 
with the Commission and hold a hearing for 
public input." 
NOT Implement - "The DOC shall 
develop a program to improve prison 
conditions for pregnant inmates. In 
developing the program the DOC need not 
consult with the Commission nor hold a 
hearing for public input." 
Both Implement & NOT Implement -
"The DOC shall consult with the 
Commission and hold a hearing for public 
input but need not consult with the Dept of 
Social Services" 
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Appendix B: 
Coding Mandate Types: Procedural, Policy, & Both Mandates 
To obtain a score for the amount of control in each of the 8,274 CHIP mandates 
obtained from the 1,674 bills in 45 states, each mandate was identified as either a 
procedural, policy, or both procedural and policy mandates. Once identified, the 
following process was utilized to code each mandate type. 
Procedural Mandates 
Procedural Mandates are non-policy related instructions by legislators placed in 
legislation that directly requires the agency or agencies to "do something" in order to 
achieve the legislator's preferred outcomes. For the purposes of this study, procedural 
mandates include requiring bureaucrats to submit a report, contact a group, hold a 
hearing, create a body, or develop a procedure. Once the type of procedure is identified, I 
code for whom the procedure is to be performed; a non-legislative body (e.g. the 
executive branch, another agency, constituent), a legislative body (e.g. study group, 
committee, chamber), or both a non-legislative body and the legislature. Performing a 
requirement for both a non-legislative body and a legislative body represents the most 
control that legislators can impose on bureaucrats since they must satisfy the preferences 
of both groups. At the same time, as legislators minimize the costs of oversight and 
obtaining information by shifting the burden to bureaucrats, they can also observe 
bureaucratic action to make sure that they are behaving in a manner that is consistent 
with their intent. As a result, non-legislative body requirements receive a score of " 1 " 
while both groups receive a "3". Once the target of the procedure is identified, I 
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determine the amount of discretion legislators provide bureaucrats in the mandate. 
Legislators that provide bureaucrats with broad discretion in the development and 
implementation of the procedure surrender significant control over bureaucratic behavior, 
while no discretion provides no flexibility for bureaucrats, constrains their behavior 
completely, and thus reserves the most control for legislators. Consequently, no 
discretion mandates receive a score of " 3 " while broad discretion gets a "0". 
In addition to the language used by legislators to convey their CHIP policy intent, 
I also code any additional mechanisms imposed in mandates to further constrain 
bureaucrats and reserve control for legislators. In particular, I code whether the mandate 
includes a time constraint, approval requirement, or a sanction for non-compliance. Time 
constraints are broken down into not specified and specified time constraints. Specified 
time constraints provide less discretion and flexibility to bureaucrats in carrying out the 
mandate and thus reserve more control for legislators. As a result, specified time 
constraints receive a score of "2," not specified time constraint receives a " 1 , " and no 
time constraint a score of "0". Approval requirements are coded base on to whom 
bureaucrats must seek approval; non-legislative body, legislative body, or both non-
legislative and legislative body. Using the reasoning discussed above, both groups 
receives a score of " 3 " while a non-legislative body receives a " 1 " . Sanctions are coded 
based on whether they are specified or not. Non-specified sanctions are more constraining 
on bureaucrats than no sanction, but would require legislators to act and incur additional 
costs to determine and impose a sanction in the event of non-compliance. As a result, 
specified sanctions receive a score of "2" while non-specified sanctions receive a " 1 " and 
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no sanction a "0". Based on this coding process, the most constraining procedural 
mandate can receive the score of "12". 
Policy Mandates 
Policy Mandates are instructions by legislators that define, clarify, or set the 
parameters of the policy. More specifically, depending on the scope and detail of the 
language, policy mandates are designed to let bureaucrats know how legislators interpret 
the specific policy as well as what outcomes they prefer. Policy mandates are coded as 
either policy terms, mandates that are designed specifically to define a term or a process 
pertaining to the policy, or policy procedures, mandates that are designed to define or 
clarify how the policy is to be developed or implemented. Once the type of policy 
mandate is identified, I code whether the mandate includes general policy language, and 
if so, what type it is. General policy language is language in a statute that articulates the 
state's specific reasons, goals, or needs for the legislation, and in most cases, 
opportunities for the legislature to credit claim. Although this language does not impact 
the policy specifically, it does include aspects of legislative intent and provides additional 
emphasis for the importance and/or reasons for developing and implementing the policy 
in a particular manner or at a particular time. Additionally, including this language in 
legislation represents significant costs for legislators, both in time and resources. States 
that include more general legislation must incur additional costs writing in legislation. 
To account for the inclusion of this language, I include it in this study and code 
whether the language expresses general policy language, or not general policy language. 
Not general policy language constitutes an additional level of control on bureaucrats as a 
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result of legislators telling them what the policy is not intended to accomplish or the 
needs or goals it is not intended to achieve. This language does not address the policy 
area itself, but it further narrows the parameters of the policy for bureaucrats and 
ultimately constrains their behavior and the outcomes that they can pursue. Legislators 
that include both general legislation and not general legislation impose the most 
constraining language and is coded as a "3" while only not general legislation receives a 
" 1 " and general legislation a "2". 
The specificity of the general legislation is then coded. In some cases legislators 
simply state the reasons and goals, or the reasons why the policy was not pursued or 
addressed, and nothing else. I code these as minimal specificity and give it a score of " 1 " . 
In mandates where legislators provide an additional sentence providing information about 
the goals and reasons for the policy (e.g. examples of similar policies or goals), I consider 
this moderate specificity and code it as "2". In situations where legislators provide 
significant support or examples for the general or not general policy language, I consider 
these significant specificity and code it as a "3". The more information legislators provide 
bureaucrats about their goals, reasons, or policy need, the less discretion bureaucrats have 
and the more control legislators reserve for themselves. 
In addition to coding the general policy language, I code the differences in the 
type of policy mandate. In particular, I code whether the mandate articulates policy terms, 
policy procedures, not policy terms, not policy procedures, both policy terms and not 
terms, and both policy procedures and not procedures. I consider policy procedures to be 
more constraining on bureaucrats than policy terms because defining the manner in which 
the policy must be developed or implemented provides legislators with more control over 
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bureaucratic behavior and strategies than simply defining policy terms. Policy procedures 
also possess the potential of imposing additional costs on bureaucrats in the event that the 
manner in which legislators define the procedure differs from their established 
procedures. I also include in this code whether legislators articulate to bureaucrats what 
they do not consider to be the definition of a term (not term) or a procedure (not 
procedure). Adding a not term or procedure to a policy mandate further constrains 
bureaucrats and reserves additional control for legislators. As a result, policy mandates 
that include both not procedures and procedures as a "5", terms and not terms as a "4", 
procedures only as "3", terms only as "2", not procedures as " 1 " , and terms as "0". 
Lastly, like general policy language, I code the specificity of the policy mandate. 
Specifically, I code whether legislators articulate only the policy term or procedure (e.g. 
minimal specificity), include one sentence of clarification or provide an example 
(moderate specificity), or if legislators include more than one sentence of clarification or 
examples (significant specificity). These are coded " 1 " , "2", and " 3 " respectfully. 
Both Procedural and Policy Mandates 
Both procedural and policy mandates are instructions by legislators that not only 
require an agency to do something, but also instruct bureaucrats as to how the 
requirement will impact the specific policy. These mandates are substantively linked 
together and are coded as a single mandate. As a result, I consider both procedural and 
policy mandates (henceforth called "both mandates") to be the most constraining 
mandates imposed on bureaucrats because they not only limit and constrain bureaucratic 
behavior by limiting the manner in which they can achieve their goals, but they also limit 
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the set of possible goals that bureaucrats can pursue. In instances where procedural and 
policy mandates are substantively linked, the both mandate is coded separately as 
procedural and policy mandates. The control score for each mandate is then added 
together to obtain a combined control score. Since the most constraining procedural and 
policy mandates receives a score of "12" and "14" respectively, the most constraining 
both mandate for bureaucrats and the one that reserves the most control for legislators 
takes the value of "26." It is important to mention here that both mandates are not simply 
adding all of the procedural and policy mandates together. Mandates are first coded 
whether they are procedural, policy, or both mandates and only those identified as both 
are coded so there is no overlap in mandates. 
Once each mandate is coded based on whether it is a procedural, policy, or both 
mandate, I aggregate the scores to the state session level. As discussed above, this 
measure allows me to overcome the problems associated with state legislation and the 
limitations of my data to enable me to compare the amount of control within states, 
across states, and across legislative sessions. Additionally, if our hypotheses are correct 
regarding the impact of the political and institutional environments on these decisions, 
then I should not only expect to see variation in the use of specific mandates across 
states, but also in other factors such as the use of additional bureaucratic control 
mechanisms (e.g. time constraints, approval requirements, sanctions). 
Total Amount of Control 
Once the procedural, policy and both mandates are coded, I add the scores 
together to obtain a score for total amount of control which will be the variable I test in 
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the empirical model in the next chapter. This combined score will be aggregated to the 
legislative session level so that I may examine the relationship between my two 
dependent variables, mandate length and amount of control, as well as assess whether 
statutory control strategies vary within states over time. 
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